Modern scholars of American government often claim that there has been an institutional shift in power from the legislative to the executive over the last seventy sixty years. The term has been coined as the imperial presidency, in which the chief executive exercises powers that go far beyond Constitutional limits. Some claim that this has severely weakened the role of Congress in the American political system.
A truly imperial presidency is one which overrides or evades congressional will, even in cases that to us seem banal. Throughout our history several American presidents have exercised their will in this manner. Andrew Jackson’s famous veto of Congress’s decision to charter the Second Bank of the United States established the precedent that a policy disagreement could justify a veto. At the time, Jackson’s action was viewed as an enormous overreach on the part of the executive branch. Similarly, Andrew Johnson was notorious for his efforts to systematically interfere with congressional will after the Civil War and during the Reconstruction era. In modern times, Richard Nixon excessively claimed executive privilege in an attempt to evade congressional investigations during Watergate. The Reagan administration’s determination to circumvent congressional restrictions on the sale of weapons prompted the Iran-Contra scandal. And who could forget George W. Bush’s administration’s use of wiretapping and torture during the Iraqi War? Undoubtedly, an imperial presidency raises separation of powers concerns and presidents from Washington to present time have, at times, overreached their Constitutional bounds. While the examples above justify concern over the use of broad executive authority, Congress’ legislative role is just as alarming.
The Essay on Did the foreign expansion of American Power between 1898 to 1945
America had become very active in foreign expansion in the early 1890’s. America was increasing its industrial activities and productivity that called for the need of foreign markets. It is evident when America intervened about the boundary dispute that was between Britain and Venezuela. Many argue that America wanted to extend its cultural beliefs, laws and way of life as they were expanding its ...
Despite its constitutional supremacy, Congress doesn’t always safeguard civil liberties. Remember it was Congress that passed the Alien and Sedition Acts in the 1790s. It was Congress that imposed the gag rule in the 1830s to stop the flow of anti-slavery petitions. It was Congress that passed the Espionage Act of 1917. Congress even made the appropriations necessary for the internment of the Japanese during World War II. Notwithstanding the Truman administration’s culpability, the most notorious abuses of the anti-communist hysteria in the 1940s and 1950s are doubly linked to Congress: first through the actions of Senator Joseph McCarthy, and second through the actions of the House Un-American Activities Committee.
It is true that the balance of powers between our three branches of government is not equally divided. It invariably ebbs and flows from the executive to the legislative; however, much of the cause of our broken government rests in the hands of Congress. In this paper, I will argue that even under strong presidential leadership, Congress still wields power as intangible as Chief Executive’s. I will, then, identify three key areas in which Congress has failed and finally, offer my conclusion for reform and restoration.
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
It is duly noted that the office of the presidency is, indeed, powerful and that that power has expanded greatly since the era of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. presidential power is much more than the “power to persuade .” Thanks to the singularity of the office, presidents are well positioned to advance their interests before Congress, the nation, and the world. Critics of the modern day presidency, including Theodore Lowi and Jeffrey Tullis, argue: “[Presidents] regularly go over the heads’ of Congress to the people at large,” the powers of the American people have been invested in a single office, “making [it] the most powerful office in the world .” Even defenders of presidential power recognize that Presidents are motivated to seek power and have the tools to accomplish the task. “The opportunities for presidential imperialism are too numerous to count” according to Terry Moe and William Howell, “because, when presidents feel it is in their political interests, they can put whatever decisions they like to strategic use, both in gaining policy advantage and in pushing out the boundaries of their power .”
The Essay on Vice President Chief Presidential Presidency
6 rolls of president: 1) chief of state- the ceremonial head of the government of the U. S. 2) chief executive- vested by the Constitution with the executive power of the U. S. - the most powerful office in the world 3) chief administrator- of Federal Government, heading one of the largest governmental machines the world ahs known 4) chief diplomat- the main architect of American foreign policy ...
When presidents act, moreover, it is up to the other branches to respond. In other words, presidents often win by default – either because Congress chooses not to respond or its response is ineffective. Furthermore, the burdensome and ofttimes unsuccessful strategy of seeking legislative authorization, unilateral presidential action expands the institutional powers and prerogatives of the presidency. In other words, the President’s personal interests and the presidency’s institutional interests are often one and the same. Consider, for example, executive orders: between 1973 and 1998, presidents issued roughly 1,000 executive orders. Only thirty-seven of these orders were challenged in Congress. More striking, only three of these challenges resulted in legislation .
Unlike the presidency, the individual and institutional interests of members of Congress are often in conflict with one another. While each of Congress’s 535 members has some stake in Congress as an institution, competing individual interests will spoil this collective good. In particular, members of Congress need to be reelected to advance their (and their constituents’) interests. For this reason, lawmakers are “trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: all might benefit if they could cooperate in defending or advancing Congress’s power, but each has a strong incentive to free ride in favor of the local constituency .”
Nowhere is the gap between presidential and legislative incentives starker than war powers. To start with, as Lou Fisher and others have shown, the constitutional design envisions a significant congressional role . Notwithstanding this clear constitutional mandate, Congress has very little incentive to play a leadership role. “Rather than opposing the President on a potential military action,” members of Congress “find it more convenient to acquiesce and avoid criticism that they obstructed a necessary mission .”
The Essay on President Bush Power Machiavelli Nuclear
George Bush and Niccolo Machiavelli are two very influential political figures that share some similar ideals. Machiavelli's work was never intended to be applied to republics, or a democratic government. The advice written in The Prince would have likely been applied in the time of absolute government, when countries were ruled by one leader. It is a work which, as Machiavelli himself says that ...
Presidents, in contrast, often have strong incentives to launch military strikes. Presidents achieve status, even fame, by leading the nation into battle. Unwilling to overcome the burden of inertia and rein in the President, Congress typically stands by on the sidelines or worse treats the President as the sole organ of military affairs . In this way, the institutional powers of the President expand through every exercise of self interest.
CONGRESSIONAL ADVANTAGE
In no bolder way do the institutional interests of Congress and the self interests of its members unite than in the budgetary process. Specifically, members have a strong interest in rewarding their constituents through appropriations. And when members of Congress control the appropriations process, the power of Congress itself is strengthened. Moreover, unlike military strikes (where the President can act without Congressional authorization), Congress cannot be shut out of the appropriations process. It must enact a budget. In other words, the President’s agenda control advantage on budgetary matters is minor at best.
Critics who claim that Congress has even abdicated its power over appropriations cite the following evidence: (1) Members of Congress have enacted legislation (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings; Line Item Veto Act of 1996) which formally transfers some of their appropriations power; (2) Presidents, although submitting budgets at least as large as Congress, have waged a successful rhetorical campaign in which they depict themselves as committed to fiscal restraint; (3) Centralization in budgeting – an outgrowth of the Budget Act of 1974 – has both advantaged the President in his negotiations with Congress and contributed to budget deficits.
There is truth to these arguments; however, to say that Congress has abdicated its authority on budgetary matters would be an overstatement. To begin with, Congress, its appropriations committees, and its members are very much engaged in budgetary policy making. Although the Budget Act of 1974 embraced centralizing procedures (the creation of both the Congressional Budget Office and Budget Committees to oversee the budget process), power was not formally transferred from existing authorization, appropriations, or tax-writing committees . Moreover, powerful members of Congress are well served by centralization. For example, in working out the specific terms of omnibus appropriations bills, the status and authority of party leaders is enhanced. Finally, presidential participation in budget summits, negotiations over the terms of omnibus and other appropriations measures, and the like is very much tied to the President’s veto power. In other words, the constitutional design envisions a significant presidential role in budgetary and other lawmaking.
The Term Paper on Civil Rights Congress President Administration
... days of the 101 st Congress the president and Congress reached a compromise on a budget package that increased the marginal ... to reduce spending for social programs and increase appropriations for defense engendered controversy. Reagan's domestic program during ... proposals.In 1947, Congress overrode Truman's veto of the Taft-Hartley Act, which Truman said unfairly weakened the bargaining power of ...
This is not to say that the budget process works well. It may be that centralization in budgeting encourages Congress and the President to build their budget proposals around unrealistic assumptions and, in so doing, contributes to the national debt . Also, while Presidents often make concessions to Congress in their budget negotiations, centralization makes it easier for the President to shape the budget. In FY 1988, for example, Ronald Reagan used his veto threat to preserve funds for anti-abortion counseling and for foreign assistance. Furthermore, Reagan pushed through a provision on Contra aid and the withdrawal of language codifying the fairness doctrine. Reagan, however, did have to bear $23 billion in tax increases .
Effective presidential leadership in negotiating budget agreements is hardly the same as the outright transfer of Congress’s power of the purse. Two exceptions are the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. Here, Congress did seem to relinquish some control of its budget making authority.
Under Gramm-Rudman, Congress proved it was no longer willing to trust either its own internal budgetary process or the President’s. Through an automatic spending cuts procedure, Congress sought to ensure that the budget was actually reducing the deficit . With the formal OMB role in projecting deficits, however, Gramm-Rudman certainly constrained Congressional discretion in budgeting. But Gramm-Rudman did not alter the fundamental budgetary balance of power: Congress helped set deficit reduction targets, it specified what cuts apply to both domestic and foreign spending, it exempted a number of social programs from the appropriation process, and it delegated much of the Act’s implementation to an officer of Congress . Moreover, in an effort to protect their spending priorities, appropriations committees and subcommittees worked hard to restructure Gramm-Rudman . With that said, Congress’s repeated claims that it could not be trusted to keep its fiscal house in order set the stage for item veto legislation.
The Term Paper on Politics, Presidents and War
War is inevitably an exercise in politics. In the best case the political process provides checks and balances that can contain or even prevent war. In other cases the political process itself is the primary driving force towards war. These two realities are not mutually exclusive. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 provided evidence of both political realities. Politics influenced the nature and the ...
At first sight, the Line Item Veto Act looks like a complete abdication of Congress’s power of the purse. By allowing the President to rescind appropriations, Congress seemed to transfer its power both to set expenditure levels and budget priorities (the President could veto programs he disfavored while leaving untouched programs he favored).
In practice, this necessarily wasn’t the case. First, Congress was able to go around presidential cancellations by communicating its priorities and policy preferences to agencies from the start. Since agencies are reluctant to subsequent legislative cycles, this informal mechanism worked well for Congress . Second, the aggressive use of the line-item veto authority was not in the President’s self interest even if it did enhance the power of the presidency. Congressional and interest group pressure would make it politically costly for the President to do more than tinker at the margins. The President would also risk making enemies and little else by invoking the cancellation authority . Bill Clinton’s cautious use of Item Veto Act authority bears this out .
Gramm-Rudman and item veto legislation, at the same time, make clear that Congress is willing to forfeit some of its power. Apparently, members are willing to trade off some institutional power in order to reap the gains of telling the nation that they are serious about the deficit. At the same time, neither Gramm-Rudman nor item veto legislation formally limits the power of individual members of Congress to reward their constituents. Rather, these bills suggest the willingness of Congress to diminish its power of the purse and are an example of how this branch has failed to live up to its own Constitutional mandate.
The Essay on Article I Section Bank Congress Power
McCulloch v Maryland 4 Wheat. (17 U. S. ) 316 (1819) Issue May Congress charter a bank even though it is not an expressly granted power? Holding Yes, Congress may charter a bank as an implied power under the "necessary and proper" clause. Rationale The Constitution was created to correct the weaknesses of the Articles. The word "expressly" particularly caused major problems and therefore was ...
THE FAILURES OF CONGRESS
In the final days of the Republican reign on Capitol Hill that began with the 1994 revolution, Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann claimed that the United States Congress has become the “broken branch .” The institution of government first established by the Framers in Article I of the Constitution had apparently stopped playing the leading role prescribed for it in our system of shared powers between the three branches of government. In addition to this decreasing authority in Washington there has been a continual and escalating erosion of popular support for Congress. A paradox of American voting behavior is the public’s continued willingness to reelect their Congressmen back to office even as public faith in the legislature as a whole declined. In recent years, popular support for Congress as an institution has reached its lowest point. In February 2009, just over thirty percent of Americans approved of Congress’s job performance, while almost three quarters actively disapproved . The “people’s branch,” as the Senate’s unofficial historian Robert C. Byrd describes it, has become the most disparaged branch .
Three features of the contemporary Congress, I argue, are most responsible for this criticism: the decline of deliberation; rampant delegation of legislative power to the executive; and Congress’s frequent failure to engage in oversight of the executive branch. Each of these are pillars of a responsible legislature, and in each, the modern Congress falls short both of its own past precedents and present norms. The most important barrier to sustained, effective oversight has been conflict between the partisan incentives of the congressional majority and the weak institutional incentive to superintend the executive branch. However, further when Congress does exercise the oversight powers at its disposal, it packs a political punch through its ability to influence public opinion and bring popular pressure to bear on the President to change course. There must be institutional reforms that target the barriers to effective oversight and bolster legislative responsibility in the committee room.
Declining Deliberation
When legislative scholars reflect on the contemporary Congress, most instinctively emphasize the dramatic changes that have transformed the institution since the reform efforts of the 1970s . Partisan polarization, the increasing centralization of power within the party leadership, rampant minority obstructionism, and routine manipulation of parliamentary rules and procedures by the majority to stifle the minority are frequently cited as the key innovations separating the Congress of Newt Gingrich and Nancy Pelosi from that of Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson .
Whereas the legislative process was considerably more open for the expression of multiple viewpoints and amendments in the middle of the twentieth century, recent decades have witnessed a sharp decline in the opportunities for discussion, debate and compromise. Over the last three decades, the majority party—particularly in the House of Representatives—has used all of the institutional means at its disposal to move public policy away from the centrist member of Congress and toward the preferences of the majority party median . In committee, powerful chairmen have stifled minority participation and input in crafting legislation. In extreme cases, the majority has even used special rules or leadership task forces to circumvent the committee process altogether and substitute a bill more to the liking of party leaders . On the floor, the prevalence of restrictive rules, which severely limit or forbid amendments and debate, has risen dramatically in recent years. Even in conference committees, the majority has begun refusing members of the minority a seat at the table and instead seizing on the conference process as a final opportunity to craft a bill with minimal minority input. Thus, at every stage of the legislative process, the prospects for serious deliberation have declined rapidly .
These tactics are not unique in American history. In fact, they strongly resemble those prevalent in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries when Speakers Reed and Cannon successively ruled their chamber with an iron fist . The engine that drove the increase in such maneuvers and the decline of Congress as a deliberative body is the same today as it was a century ago . As a result, it seems ironic that even though the partisan balance of power in Congress is so narrow, because the parties are internally all the same and the gulf between them is broad, the conditions are ripe for policy to swing back and forth far from the center as partisan control of the legislature shifts. Instead of the almost even split in Congress serving as an incentive to compromise and find the middle ground, polarization encourages the majority to exploit all of the institutional advantages available to it to shut out the minority and write its policy preferences into law.
The Senate lacks many of the institutional tricks by which majority rule is imposed in the House. Minority rights have long been protected by Senate rules guaranteeing any member the right of unlimited debate . Early attempts in the nineteenth century led by Henry Clay to stop the filibuster failed, and while twentieth-century reformers first provided a mechanism to invoke cloture and terminate floor debate and then adjusted the threshold needed for such a motion to pass, minority rights remain relatively strong in the modern Senate . However, rather than serve to ensure the representation of minority views and foster active deliberation, the filibuster increasingly has been a tool of minority obstructionism that has stopped many policy initiatives dead in their tracks without ever receiving a floor discussion, let alone a vote on the Senate floor .
The end result of these twin processes of majority tyranny in the House and minority obstructionism in the Senate, according to many observers, is a fast decline in deliberation . Moderate legislation that would garner the support of majorities is kept from the floor through the powers of negative agenda control; other initiatives are killed by the threat of filibuster before ever reaching the Senate floor; and legislation that does pass is often void of the improvements that genuine debate and compromise among the nation’s representatives might generate . Mann and Ornstein mention a number of recommendations for institutional reforms that might rekindle Congress’s deliberative spirit . However, as long as the political environment remains unchanged, elections continue to be tightly contested, and the parties remain entrenched and ideologically polarized from one another, such reforms seem unlikely.
Delegating to Executive
The era of congressional dominance over politics began to end with the emergence of the modern American state. As the scope of government grew dramatically in the early-twentieth century, so too did the necessity for Congress to delegate increasing authority to the departments and agencies charged with administering the bureaucratic state . With each successive war and crisis, the power of the federal government grew, and as the scope and breadth of the policies under its purview expanded, Congress was compelled to delegate even more power to the executive branch .
Congressional decisions regarding delegation do respond to changes in the political environment. For example, when writing laws, Congress delegates considerably more authority to the executive branch when the President is in sync with congressional preferences than otherwise . However, the general pattern over the past fifty years has been for Congress to delegate ever more authority to the executive branch. These transfers of power—occasionally even of powers specifically entrusted to the legislature in the Constitution—threaten to undermine the delicate balance between the branches set in place by the Framers.
Some of the starkest cases of such delegations of authority have come in war powers. The bulk of constitutional scholarship on the distribution of war powers across the branches makes clear that Congress was intended to be the primary branch at the helm of the nation’s military affairs . Article I expressly granted to Congress alone the power to raise and equip Armies and Navies, launch limited wars through letters of Marque and Reprisals, and to declare war . Article II provides for the President to serve as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and of the state militias when called into national service ; however, Alexander Hamilton made clear in The Federalist No. 69 that this title amounted to “nothing more” than the direction of forces in the field once authorized by Congress .
Nevertheless, since World War II, the history of inter-branch war powers, Lou Fisher argues, is largely one of Congress’s abdication of its war powers to the President . While many in the legislature weighed against Truman’s undeclared war in Korea, they did nothing to terminate his action once begun . Similarly, during the Vietnam War, Congress eventually revoked the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, but it repeatedly failed to compel President Nixon to end the American military commitment in Southeast Asia . Even the most important accomplishment of the congressional “resurgence” after Vietnam, the War Powers Resolution, was essentially an unprecedented delegation of war-making power to the President . By focusing on mechanisms by which Congress could compel the President to withdraw American forces from foreign deployments, the language of the resolution underscored the President’s authority to order American troops abroad absent any congressional sanction for up to ninety days on his own initiative .
A more recent example of a sweeping delegation of congressional war powers to the President is the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed by near-unanimous consent in both chambers of Congress in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 . The AUMF delegated to the President the power “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against “those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons .” The Bush Administration subsequently used this broad language to justify a wide array of assertions of presidential power—from the authority to order wiretaps on the international communications of American citizens without first obtaining warrants from the FISA court as required by law, to the power to unilaterally establish military tribunals to try terror suspects and those designated enemy combatants independent of the federal judicial system, to the ability to authorize “enhanced interrogation techniques” for suspected terrorists. In the last instance, Congress attempted to reign in presidential power legislatively by banning all interrogation practices involving torture . However, the Administration’s signing statement signaled its willingness to defy Congress if necessary and made clear that the President reserved the right to engage in any action pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief powers that, in his judgment, would prevent further terrorist attacks . It remains unclear how this inter-branch power sharing issue will be resolved; however, an extensive literature on presidential unilateral powers suggests that the President may well have the upper hand .
One means for Congress to become a more responsible branch is for it to take back control of legislative powers delegated to the President and to step up its role. Yet, with the size and scope of government and the ever-increasing complexity of public policy, delegation is unavoidable. Indeed, without it the government would fail to take advantage of the resources and expertise of the permanent bureaucracy in public policy. Rather, for Congress to delegate authority responsibly it must maintain some check on power once delegated. When other political actors abuse delegated authority in a way that conflicts with legislative intent, Congress must retain some mechanism to call that actor to account.
Of course, Congress always has the ability to pass new legislation when the executive branch interprets and implements a law in a way that is contrary to legislative intent. However, such efforts require that Congress overcome its collective action problems and a legislative process marred by money. Any such effort to pass new legislation to undo an executive action must clear majority hurdles in the Senate, and even then, it faces a presidential veto. Subsequently, legislation will frequently offer little remedy to rectifying perceived abuses of delegated authority.
An alternative mechanism, the legislative veto, was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1982. While the legislative veto survives by the mutual consent of both branches in many alternative forms, the court ruling and the sometimes cumbersome provisions for the veto to be exercised limit its usefulness as a widespread check on executive discretion. A third mechanism for Congress to delegate responsibly is to conduct rigorous, sustained oversight of the executive branch and its use of delegated powers. Oversight is perhaps the most logical solution for Congress to maintain some influence over how delegated authority is exercised; yet in this realm too, Congress all too often appears to be the “broken branch.”
Poor Oversight
Throughout American history, legislative oversight conducted by congressional committees has been one of the most powerful tools in Congress’s arsenal to exercise a check on the executive branch and defend its institutional prerogatives. Particularly in times of national crisis—both military and economic—the need for “energy” tilts the pendulum of power toward the executive branch. The very same collective action dilemmas and institutional machinery that encourage such a shift to the executive also hinder Congress’s capacity to police the executive branch and retain a check on delegated powers by acting legislatively. Instead, Congress has repeatedly turned to the oversight and investigative powers of its committees to police the executive branch. And when Congress wields its oversight powers forcefully, it can lead to genuine changes in public policy.
The War of 1812 and subsequent expansion of presidential power strongly contributed to the initial evolution and growth of the standing committee system in the early-nineteenth century . As the era of congressional dominance ended and presidential power grew in the early-twentieth century, Congress increasingly used its committee-based oversight powers to keep a watchful eye on the executive branch. For example, in the wake of the Spanish American War it was the executive’s responsibility to administer the nation’s first major colonial acquisitions in the Philippines. The war subsequently bolstered presidential foreign policy power; yet, Congress retained some check on the exercise of this power through inquests into the conduct of the American occupation and continued oversight of its operations. After Teddy Roosevelt’s bold assertions of unilateral presidential power, Congress struck back in the committee room with months of investigatory hearings into misconduct in the Interior Department and Forestry Bureau stemming from Roosevelt’s proclamations and orders. Investigative oversight was also one of the primary means through which Congress pushed back at President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal regime. The exponential growth in the size of government and its substantive scope fundamentally shifted the balance of power away from Capitol Hill and toward the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. However, even in the midst of the Great Depression, Congress routinely used its investigative powers to exercise a check on the Administration’s use of executive powers. Democratic Congresses launched sustained high profile investigations into the operation of many of Roosevelt’s alphabet executive agencies including the National Recovery Administration, the Works Progress Administration and the Tennessee Valley Authority .
Even today in the post-World War II era, many of the symbols of congressional power in our system of shared powers have emerged not from the chamber floors, but from congressional committee rooms. In myriad cases—from investigations of misconduct by executive agencies, to Iran Contra, Watergate and Whitewater—Congress has used its power to expose executive wrongdoing, challenge presidential policies and bring down presidential administrations. The vast majority of congressional oversight is hardly geared towards high profile publicity probes aimed at extreme allegations of executive misconduct. However, even more mundane oversight can play an important role in maintaining congressional influence over the implementation of public policy. Indeed, even the anticipation of congressional oversight can be enough to keep an executive agency in line and adhere to legislative intent .
Yet despite its political importance, there are reasons to believe that the contemporary Congress is again a broken branch. Interestingly, a principal recommendation of the 9/11 Commission regarding Congress emphasized the critical importance of augmented congressional oversight of anti-terrorism policy . Rather than advocating further transfer of power to the executive to meet the threat posed by global terrorism, the Commission called for the strengthening of the intelligence committees and emphasized the importance of legislative oversight of antiterrorism policy across levels of government . The Commission criticized the lack of oversight in the pre-9/11 era ; and there are strong reasons to worry that Congress has done little to improve its oversight capacity in recent years.
The level and quality of congressional oversight which change over time are difficult concepts to measure. A leading quantitative study of the volume of congressional oversight over time found that congressional oversight increased significantly in the early 1970s, even before the Watergate, and remained strong into the 1990s . More qualitative analyses, by contrast, revealed a general decrease in quality oversight in recent years, especially during the first six years of the George W. Bush Administration .
However, what sets trends in congressional oversight apart from the quality of legislative deliberation and the nature of widespread delegation of legislative powers to the executive branch is that congressional oversight has not decreased or increased over time alone. Rather, when examining the intensity with which Congress has dedicated itself to its oversight responsibilities, we see a pattern much like that of a swinging pendulum; at times, Congress appears to use its investigative powers aggressively to police the executive while at others it takes a decidedly passive role and fails to meet normative standards of a responsible independent legislature. Perhaps nowhere is this variable more apparent than in the fluctuations in oversight of the War in Iraq. The fact that Congress does continue to use its oversight tools to check the executive branch and influence public policy raises the hope that Congress might be able to reform itself.
Conclusion
An important part of the solution to rekindle an institutional identity that will encourage members to take their oversight duties seriously and once again to foster legislative responsibility is reform. Yet, it is unclear what specific reforms could be pursued to encourage members of Congress to embrace this collective institutional identity as long as their electoral interests remain so detached from that of the institution itself. As long as most members of Congress can rest secure in their own political prospects even as popular confidence in Congress as an institution plummets, the momentum to put an institutional identity ahead of a partisan one will be lacking. Until voters begin to value effective oversight as much as political scholars, partisan electoral incentives may continue to trump institutional incentives to protect Congress’s power stakes from the executive branch.
Admittedly, reforms do little to address the underlying problem of congressional motivation to oversee the executive in the first place. As long as members of the majority party in periods of unified government see themselves first and foremost as lieutenants when they’re party’s leader is in the White House, Congress will fail to live up to its true potential.
