TO WHAT EXTENT WAS DISRAELI’S IMPERIAL POLICY DRIVEN BY A VISION OF EMPIRE?
Imperialism is a policy of dominating other nations by acquisition of dependencies or through trade. Disraeli was viewed as a great defender of the British Empire, a man keen to uphold Britain’s interests overseas. He put an emphasis on the importance of colonies as being essential for Britain to play a prominent role in global diplomacy. However, these feelings may have arisen because he felt the previous government was attempting to dismantle the Empire, which was not too popular with the electorate. Historians such as Blake look towards Disraeli’s speeches at Manchester and Crystal Palace on 3 April 1872 and 24 June 1872 respectively and state that this marked a new direction for Disraeli, as he was showing interest in a policy which he hadn’t previously dedicated much time. Events in South Africa and Afghanistan led to Gladstone painting a picture of Disraeli as a reckless warmonger in his famous Midlothian Campaign. It appeared to be the fruits of an irresponsible expansionist imperial policy. However, historians such as Stembridge and Harcourt have put forward evidence to suggest that Disraeli’s opinion on British colonies and Imperialism in his early years was consistent of a forward imperial policy. It has been argued by Feuchtwanger, Moneypenny and Buckle, and Smith that during Disraeli’s reign as Prime Minister, it was not in fact he who was responsible for Imperial events, but rather men on the spot. Disraeli was content to simply follow the line of the previous Liberal government.
The Term Paper on Empire Niall Ferguson
Introduction * To the British, as to people in the rest of the world, imperialism’s golden age is now considered a stain on human history, an era of slavery and racism and the plunder of native lands and peoples. The notion that imperialism is inherently evil, and that no empire can be a good empire, is an axiom in today’s geopolitics. * Examines the British Empire from an economic ...
As a young MP, it has been asserted that imperialism didn’t feature too prominently in his agenda until 1872. Speeches that were made relating to the subject were largely directed at the government for its failure to uphold the traditions or protect borders of the British Empire. These criticisms were evident in the 1872 speeches in Crystal Palace and Manchester where Disraeli argued, “You will find that there has been no effort so continuous, so subtle, supported by so much energy, and carried on with so much ability and acumen, as the attempts of Liberalism to effect the disintegration of the empire of England,”[1] even though the liberals were merely trying to force white colonies like New Zealand and Canada to bear the cost of their own defence, which was a policy Disraeli had previously supported.
Both Smith and Blake question Disraeli’s sincerity on this matter and view the speeches as a form of party propaganda that was repeating Disraeli’s criticisms of a weak Liberal foreign policy. This attack by Disraeli should in their view be categorised by political opportunism, which may have stemmed from his leadership in the Conservative party being under threat. To add to this, Disraeli mentioned in his Crystal Palace speech, “Self-government, in my opinion, when it was conceded, ought to have been conceded as a part of a great policy of imperial consolidation. It ought to have been accompanied by an imperial tariff.”[2] This appears contradictory, as Smith suggests that, ’between 1847 and 1851, Disraeli had canvassed the ideas of an imperial free trade area.’[3]
Blake calls Disraeli a ‘superb improviser,’[4] referring to the fact that he changed his views on colonies due to Gladstone’s weak foreign policy. This weakness provided Disraeli with a window of opportunity. However, Moneypenny and Buckle support the view that, “Disraeli believed it to be Britain’s duty to hold on to the colonies and increase them if necessary.”[5] This indicates that it was a moralistic issue and not mere political opportunism.
Smith bases much of his theory upon two famous quotes used by Disraeli. In 1852, whilst Chancellor of the Exchequer to his newly appointed Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Malmsbury, Disraeli wrote, ‘These wretched colonies will all be independent, too, in a few years, and are a millstone round our necks.’[6] Furthermore in 1866 he referred to colonies which we do not govern as “deadweights.”[7] This indicates that Disraeli was simply claiming a tactically beneficial Conservative position in an existing anxious dispute. To add to this, Smith goes on to argue that the ‘expansionist exploitation of the imperial idea does not seem to consort with the watchwords of ‘consolidation’ and ‘maintenance’ adopted in 1872.’[8] This was relating to the Abyssinian adventure in 1867 and further highlights inconsistency from Disraeli and again suggests political opportunism.
The Essay on Comparison Of Bradford And Smith
Although Captain John Smith and William Bradford, historians and leaders of their respective colonies, Jamestown and Plymouth, wanted to attract settlers to their colonies through their writings, the specific means they took to accomplish their goals varied. First, in spite of the fact each wanted to set an example for the colonists that joined them, Smith strived to attract those with courage and ...
In contrast to Smith’s view, S.R.Stembridge, Harcourt and Walton have argued that Disraeli had consistent views on Empire throughout his political career and that his 1872 speeches were not mere opportunism. He constantly commended the maintenance of Empire as he saw it to be a pivotal asset in playing a leading role in world politics. The first piece of evidence was discovered in Disraeli’s first political pamphlet in 1833 named, What is he? where he ‘feared the loss of our great Colonial Empire’[9] and that he was in favour of it being upheld. This evidence is also backed up by Walton and appears to be consistent because throughout the 1830s and 1840s he continually commended the maintenance of British authority in its colonies, which certainly indicates a long-standing interest in Empire. Disraeli agreed that ‘colonies which govern themselves should defend themselves,’[10] and this may have provoked his comments about ‘millstones’[11] and ‘deadweights.’[12] Walton suggests the quotes made by Disraeli in 1852 and 1866 referred to ‘old-established colonies in British North America,’[13] that were refusing to take accountability for their own defence. Therefore this reduces the reliability of Disraeli’s earlier comments, as Disraeli’s writings commending the maintenance of Empire were directed at all the colonies that Britain possessed. According to Smith, these quotes were made by, ‘an exasperated chancellor of the exchequer struggling with the costs of imperial defence.’[14] This further reduces the sources’ reliability as Disraeli may have only made these claims due to the financial pressure of defending them.
It appears that Disraeli’s views expressed in his 1872 speeches on the maintenance of Empire do tie in with his vision over previous years. Additionally, Harcourt suggests consistency with a speech made by Disraeli at Beaconsfield in 1866, “England is no longer a mere European power; she is the metropolis of a great maritime empire, extending to the boundaries of the farthest oceans…she interferes with Asia, because she is really more an Asiatic power than a European.”[15] This source indicates a long standing interest in Asian colonies, as well as Europe where necessary, and appears to support his claims made throughout the 1830s and 1840s. This evidence is also supported by Stembridge who spoke of Disraeli’s long-standing interest in Europe, as well as the historian Eldridge who suggests, ‘Disraeli was a master of ideas, not detail, and it was the part the possession of empire could play in assisting Great Britain’s role in world affairs that interested him most.’[16]
The Term Paper on British Empire and India
India is located in southern Asia. India borders Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Bangladesh. Pakistan is on the northwest border. China and Nepal are on the northern border. Bangladesh is on the northeastern border. More than half of India is surrounded by the Indian Ocean. Climate, Weather, and Seasons India has one of the most diverse climates in the world. It has monsoons, to very hot weather, all ...
The purchase of shares in the Suez Canal in November 1875 is seen by historians Smith and Feuchtwanger as an act of individual ingenuity by Disraeli. The purchase augmented British prestige and prevented France from extending their influence in the region. Most importantly it acted as a shorter route to the British Empire in the East, in particular India. Disraeli made no hesitation in making his success known, “It is just settled; you have it madam.”[17] Swartz has made the point that Disraeli’s incentive lay in the need to stimulate a popular reaction from the public and deter them from his wavering domestic reforms. Harcourt supports this by asserting that the government was involved in a determined stimulation of popular well-liked imperial sentiment to distract the public from Disraeli’s faltering domestic reform programme in 1875. This again suggests political expediency by Disraeli. However, it is unlikely that Disraeli’s prime aim was to distract the public from domestic matters. The Suez Canal offered a significantly shorter route to India which would inevitably increase trade due to a significantly smaller commuting distance between the two countries. His interest in India was apparent throughout his career, especially in his Crystal Palace speech where he claimed, “It has been shown with precise, mathematical demonstration that there never was a jewel in the crown of England that was so truly costly as the possession of India,”[18] and this is supported by Smith who suggests that, ‘Disraeli was certainly fascinated by India.’[19] These sources insinuate that Disraeli was interested in retaining a strong hold on India and appear consistent with a speech made by Disraeli in the House of Commons, when he referred to the purchase as, “necessary to maintain the Empire, and which favours in every degree the policy which this country ought to sustain.”[20] This was essentially Disraeli’s policy and he considered it a, ‘political transaction and one which I believe is calculated to strengthen the Empire.’[21] This could be interpreted as an expansionist policy, which appeared evident in South Africa and Afghanistan towards the end of his term in office. It does, however, appear unlikely that Disraeli was looking towards colonial expansion in Egypt, as they co-operated with the French to restore financial stability there.
The Essay on A Government of India Enterprise
GENERAL INFORMATION 1. The envelope should be superscribed with the name of the position applied in block letters. 2. Period of experience may be relaxed in case of candidates otherwise found possessing adequate work experience in the related fields/disciplines. 3. SC/ST/OBC/PH candidates should enclose attested photocopy of the caste certificate issued by Competent Authority. 4. The age limit: ...
In 1879 in South Africa, Britain was involved in an expensive conflict with the Zulus and it contained an embarrassing defeat with the loss of 1000 troops at Isandlwana. This was followed by the annexation of the Transvaal, a free Christian Community. This was seen as an unprovoked attack on the Zulus, and the image of a careless expansionist policy emerges. A policy that was both costly and ineffective. In Afghanistan, the “Jewel in the crown of England”[22] was evident in his policy. Lowe argues that two of Disraeli’s obsessions came together; his desire to defend India, and his fear of Russia, whose expansion in Asia appeared to threaten India. Disraeli felt it necessary to take control of Afghanistan as a buffer state because India’s north-west boundary was a ‘haphazard, not a scientific frontier.’[23] This resulted in the Afghan invasion of 1878. However, Blake has argued that this was, ‘in an era of slow communications and an ill co-ordinated governmental machine.’[24] Gladstone painted an image of Disraeli as an, “unprincipled, reckless warmonger with no regard for the twin pinnacles of Gladstonian Liberalism.”[25] Gladstone adopted the word Beaconsfieldism, which was a term used in reference to Disraeli’s peerage and the fast rise of an opportunist in his own eyes. He fiercely attacked the invasion of Afghanistan, claiming the government had ‘made it a miserable ruin.’[26] These imperial actions in both South Africa and Afghanistan either on the orders or on behalf of the government between 1874 and 1880 appear to support the accusations put forward by Gladstone. Disraeli’s choice not to reply was to his detriment, ‘I have not read a single line…what a waste of powder and shot!’ [27] However, it has been asserted by Feuchtwanger and supported by Dicken that Gladstone’s desire to once again climb the political ladder was a significant motive for these indictments. During this period he was attempting to become MP for Midlothian in Scotland and Feuchtwanger has argued that, ‘Gladstone was engaged in a piece of image-making.’[28] This indicates political opportunism on Gladstone’s behalf, and reduces the reliability of his speeches. Furthermore, Disraeli’s ability to reply to Gladstone’s comments was sternly reduced by his failing health. Despite this, Derby, who was once a member of Disraeli’s cabinet argued that Disraeli’s policy was dangerous. However, Derby had resigned in 1877 over Britain coming close to war with Russia and may simply have made these comments to justify his resignation, therefore making the source less reliable.
The Research paper on Policy Sub Governments In The United States Political System
Policy Sub governments in the United States Political System United States is a democratic country with the deep-set democratic beliefs in the freedom and prosperity of their land. The political system of the Unites States of America is a very complex system of interacting branches of management, which enable this country to be one of the most significant countries in the world, with not only ...
Much evidence indicates that Disraeli was not always in complete control of events between 1874 and 1880. Moneypenny and Buckle claim that the methods of procedure were, ‘usually chosen by the servants of the Government on the spot, Lytton or Shepstone or Bartle Frere, and chosen in some instances either without communication with the Home Government, or in actual disobedience to its wishes.’[29] Blake suggests, ‘Disraeli’s responsibility was minimal.’[30] This is supported by Walton who argues that Disraeli followed the same line of the previous Liberal government and left responsibility with men on the spot, which was understandable considering that he was 70 and in poor health by 1874. The policy in South Africa was inherited from the Liberal government. The intention was to make a federation by uniting the four British territories with the two Boer republics. Orders were dispatched from London on 7 November forbidding war Moneypenny and Buckle proposed that although Disraeli was, ‘a strong believer in federation for South Africa, appears to have had his doubts of this very forward policy.’[31] Nevertheless, he told Carnarvon, ‘In all these affairs I must trust you. Do what you think wisest.’[32] This suggests that Disraeli was not hugely concerned with South Africa, showing more interest in re-opening the Eastern Question, and was content to leave accountability with his sub-ordinate. However, the new appointee, Sir Bartle Frere, who wasn’t even appointed by Disraeli, adopted a different strategy and believed the Zulu’s should be destroyed. The orders dispatched from London on 7 November were disobeyed. This emphasises that the Prime Minister’s direct responsibility in this was minimal. The policy adopted against the Zulus was essentially not his. He was extremely upset and despite supporting his officials in public, he privately condemned them, claiming that Frere, ‘ought to be impeached.’[33] He further went on to claim, ‘if anything annoys me more than another it is our Cape affairs, when every day brings forward a new blunder of Twitters.’[34] This was in response to Carnarvon’s criticisms of the government. This was not an expansionist policy, but rather a series of blunders and miscalculations by men on the spot.
The Term Paper on Purely Private Enforcement University Press
4. 8 Purely private enforcement: a model Richard Posner writes, "I hope to challenge the assumption, largely unquestioned since Hobbes, that a state (if only a minimal, 'nightwatchman's tate) is necessary to maintain the internal and external security of society. I am not advocating anarchy. My argument is that a state is not a precondition of social order in the circumstances depicted in the ...
A similar situation arose in Afghanistan. It was feared that Russian expansion posed a risk to Britain’s Asian Empire and trade routes. Lytton was instructed to persuade the Afghan ruler to accept a resident British representative. Disraeli’s main concern was to secure a scientific frontier in the north-west. Evidence pointing towards Disraeli’s lack of authority is apparent in his letter to Cranbrook, where he claims, ‘Lytton by disobeying orders had only secured insult and failure.’[35] This again indicates that too much responsibility was left with men on the spot. Walton argues these, ‘were not the fruits of a Disraelian policy of expansion into and beyond the hill tribe areas of the north-west frontier,’[36] but of an aggressive line followed by Lord Lytton. Blake supports this by asserting that, ‘Disraeli cannot be held seriously responsible’[37] and goes on to suggest that Lytton was, ‘curiously unbalanced in judgement.’[38] Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s awareness of this was extremely late in the day and therefore his ability to act was limited. However, it has been asserted that men on the spot weren’t completely to blame. Blake argues that Disraeli, ‘must bear responsibility of choosing, admittedly after trying many others first, the Viceroy whose disobedience led indirectly to disaster.’[39] It is possible that by his, ‘flamboyant rhetoric’[40] he created an atmosphere in which sub-ordinates such as Lytton were encouraged to adopt an aggressive line of attack.
The annexation of Fiji in 1874 was simply a continuation of Liberal policy which was begun by Kimberly ten years earlier. Walton suggests, ‘the Disraeli government inherited a situation in which the annexation of Fiji was almost inescapable, and the colonial secretary, the Earl of Carnarvon, did little more than carry on the policy of his Liberal precursor.’[41] Disraeli’s direct involvement was minimal. He appeared content to continue the Liberal forward policy under Carnarvon. Singapore was also again seen as a continuation of a forward Liberal policy. The Governor of Singapore, Sir Andrew Clarke, was chiefly responsible for establishing a British presence in Malay. Disraeli was much in favour with keeping possession of the defensive frontiers already acquired by the previous Liberal government. Gladstone chose not to include Fiji in his Midlothian Campaign. The reasoning for this omission was that it was a procedure begun by Gladstone’s government and therefore a continuation of his policy under the new government. Most evidence seems to suggest that imperial policy was not the co-ordinated plan of campaign put forward by Gladstone. Disraeli was in failing health and left his cabinet on a loose reign. Furthermore, the huge distances involved make it difficult to make the case for a co-ordinated plan of campaign in this area. Disraeli’s policies were fundamentally not expansionist. The disasters in South Africa and Afghanistan were down to men on the spot who refused orders from the government. Disraeli, however, could be found guilty of showing a lack of interest in colonies and of leaving his sub-ordinates with too much responsibility.
Overall, it is likely that Disraeli’s imperial policy was driven by a vision of Empire to an extent. It was apparent throughout his career, as well as in office that he was in favour of maintaining the Empire Britain already possessed. Between the years 1874-1880 Disraeli appeared comfortable to keep the defensible frontiers and continue the forward policy begun by the previous Liberal government. However, in the case of South Africa and Afghanistan these were distorted by external factors, largely due to leaving responsibility with men on the spot, such as Lytton and Frere. This gave the impression to many, including Gladstone, of an expensive, reckless expansionist policy. Furthermore, actions taken upon Disraeli’s own initiative, such as the purchase of Suez Canal shares was simply a clever method of improving trade efficiency between Britain and India, therefore protecting and improving both countries’ interests. It is fair to state that Disraeli, somewhat opportunistically, tailored his speeches to suit the mood of the public at the time, especially in his 1872 speeches, but the evidence assessed proves that his views and policy on the maintenance of Empire are consistent and reliable.
WORD COUNT: 2936
Bibliography
• Disraeli by Blake, Eyre and Spottiswoode 1966
• Disraeli by Walton, Routledge 1990
• Disraeli by Dicken, Harper Collins Publishers Ltd 2004
• Disraeli Volume II by William Flavelle Moneypenny and George Earle Buckle 1920
• Gladstone and Disraeli by Lynch, Hodder and Stoughton 1991
• Disraeli by Smith, Cambridge University Press 1996
• Disraeli by Feuchtwanger, Oxford University Press 2000
• British Foreign and Imperial Policy 1865-1919 by Goodlad, Routledge 2000
• Journal of British Studies by S.R.Stembridge, Chicago University Press 1965
• Flagships of Imperialism by Freda Harcourt, Manchester University Press
• www.wikipedia.com – Crystal Palace Speech
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[1] A speech given in 1872 at Crystal Palace by Disraeli on the maintenance of the Empire
[2] Ibid
[3] Smith, Disraeli, Cambridge University Press 1999, pg. 163
[4] Blake, Disraeli, Eyre and Spottiswoode 1966, as quoted in…..
[5] William Flavelle Moneypenny and George Earle Buckle, Disraeli, second book, pg. 276
[6] S.R.Stembridge, Journal of British Studies, University of Chicago Press 1965 – derived from the internet
[7] Ibid
[8] Smith, Disraeli, Cambridge University Press 1999, pg. 164
[9] Disraeli’s first political pamphlet, What is he?, 1933. Quoted by Walton, Disraeli, Routledge 1990, pg.87
[10] Dicken, Disraeli, Harper Collins Publishers Ltd 2004, pg.32
[11] Walton, Disraeli, Routledge 1990, pg.37. Quoted by S.R.Stembridge , Journal of British Studies, University of Chicago Press 1965
[12] Ibid
[13] Walton, pg.38
[14] Smith, Disraeli, Cambridge University Press 1999, pg.163
[15] Walton, Disraeli, Routledge 1990, pg.39. Quoted by Harcourt, Disraeli’s Imperialism, 1980
[16] Eldridge, Disraeli and the rise of a New Imperialism. Quoted in Walton, Disraeli, Routledge 1990, pg.39
[17] Quoted in Dicken, Disraeli, Harper Collins Publishers 2004, pg.38
[18] A speech given in 1872 at Crystal Palace by Disraeli on the maintenance of the Empire
[19] Smith, Disraeli, Cambridge University Press 1999, pg.199
[20] A speech made by Disraeli in the House of Commons, 8 February 1876
[21] Feuchtwanger, Disraeli, Oxford University Press 2000, pg.175
[22] A speech given in 1872 at Crystal Palace by Disraeli on the maintenance of Empire
[23] A speech given at Guildhall, November 1878 by Disraeli
[24] Blake, Disraeli, Eyre and Spottiswoode 1966, pg.663
[25] Dicken, Disraeli, Harper Collins Publishers Ltd 2004, pg.38
[26] Ibid
[27] Blake, Disraeli, Eyre and Spottiswoode 1966, pg.700. Quoted from a letter written by Disraeli to Lady Bradford
[28] Feuchtwanger, Disraeli, Oxford University Press 2000, pg.200
[29] William Flavelle Moneypenny and George Earle Buckle, Disraeli, Volume II, pg.1243
[30] Blake, Disraeli, Eyre and Spottiswoode 1966, pg.656
[31] William Flavelle Moneypenny and George Earle Buckle, Disraeli, Volume II, pg.1287
[32]Walton, Disraeli, Routledge 1990, pg.41. A letter from Disraeli to Lord Carnarvon
[33] Dicken, Disraeli, Harper Collins Publishers Ltd 2004, pg.36
[34] Walton, pg.41.
[35] Blake, Disraeli, Eyre and Spottiswoode 1966, pg.662. A letter from Disraeli to Lord Cranbrook
[36] Walton, Disraeli, Routledge 1990, pg.41
[37] Blake, pg.663
[38] Blake, pg.657
[39] Ibid
[40] Walton, pg.42
[41] Walton, Disraeli, Routledge 1990, pg.40
