In 1995 William Brotby was hired by Computer Task Group, Inc. (CTG) as an information technologies consultant. Upon hiring, Brotby had to sign an agreement stating that he would be restricted to work for any CTG customers if he left the company. No more than two years later, Brotby left CTG and began to work for one of CTG’s customers known as Alyeska Pipeline Service Company. CTG, plaintiff, filed a suit against Brotby, defendant, in a federal district court alleging breach of contract.
During the production of discovery, Brotby refused to fully respond to CTG’s interrogatories, never gave truthful answers, filed unwarranted motions, made flimsy objections, and never disclosed all of the information that CTG sought. Brotby was fined twice by the court and was issued five separate orders ordering him to cooperate. Because of Brothby’s continuous refusal to cooperate, CTG eventually filed a motion to enter default judgment against him in 1999. The court granted the motion; however, Brotby appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Is continuous refusal of the defendant to produce discovery enough to warrant a default judgment by a federal district court? The federal district court granted CTG’s motion to enter a default judgment. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Therefore, the appellate court held that “in light of Brotby’s horrible record of discovery abuses” and his “abiding contempt and continuing disregard for the court’s orders,” the lower court properly exercised its discretion in entering a default judgment against the defendant.
The Term Paper on Court of Appeals of Ohio,First District, Hamilton County
On a morning in early December 1993, plaintiff-appellant Paul Nadel was driving his son, plaintiff-appellant Christopher, and two younger daughters, Ashley and Brittany, to school.1 Paul’s mother, plaintiff-appellant Evelyn Nadel, was seated next to the passenger window. Christopher was seated in the front seat between Evelyn and Paul, with one foot on the transmission hump and one foot ...
The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 allows the district court to enter a default judgment against a party who fails to comply with an order demanding discovery. In addition, the district court must weigh five factors in order to appropriately decide if a sanction of default for noncompliance with discovery is grounds for dismissal.
These five factors are: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its ocket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the opposing party; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. ” When a court order is violated, the first and second factors will favor sanctions whereas the fourth will challenge the order. With regards to the first factor, Brotby’s actions were deliberate; he intended his actions to be as they were. Moreover, in determining whether abolishing sanctions are appropriate in Brotby’s case is reliant on the third and fifth factors.
Brotby violated court orders by failing to produce sufficient and factual documents, and by failing to pay one of the fines. These deceitful tactics delayed the litigation process while burdening the court, and prejudiced CTG. Brotby failed to produce documents ordered by the court, and most of what he did submit came after discovery. The withholding of important information and the time delay is sufficient prejudice towards CTG.
There are three factors considered in deciding whether the district court adequately considered lesser sanctions: “(1) explicitly discussed the alternative of lesser sanctions and explained why it would be inappropriate; (2) implemented lesser sanctions before ordering the case dismissed; and (3) warned the offending party of the possibility of dismissal. ” The district court judge appropriately considered the alternative of lesser sanctions by ordering Brotby to comply with CTG’s discovery request five times and imposing two lesser sanctions against him.
The Essay on Fred Korematsu Court Case Order
Fred Korematsu was born in the U. S. in 1919. His parents were born in Japan. Since he was born in the U. S. he was a citizen. He grew up like a normal kid in California. As he grew up, his life was normal, until the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1942. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Japanese Americans were regarded as a threat to the U. S. President Roosevelt issued Executive Order ...
However, Brotby never responded and therefore it is appropriate to discard lesser sanctions if the court anticipates continuous false misconduct. Brotby also had continuous awareness that his unwillingness to cooperate would eventually result in a default judgment against him; the judge warned him to “stop playing games” if he wanted to stay in the game. Therefore, the two monetary sanctions, five orders ordering him to cooperate, and repeated warnings proved enough notice that Brotby’s continued failure to comply would result in default.
