The political world is much like a stew, methinks. It is a conglomeration of what has been, what is, and what is to become. Since the dawning of the atomic age with the World War II invention of atomic/nuclear war capability, however, this stew has taken on a whole new taste, a piquancy that perhaps none of us were — or ever will be — truly prepared for in all of its possible mishmash. No longer were the world wars to be merely strategies, complete with trenches, tanks, and troops. Since the Manhattan Project and the dawning and dropping of ?Little Boy? and ?Fat Man? over Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively, our world of nations has both feared and toyed with the realities of nuclear growth, strength, and conduct. Bringing to the preparation the individual and collective perceptions and views regarding this new-age capability, the moral values of the peoples generating and possessing these capabilities have, in large part, determined the use and non-use of this truly annihilating concoction. Blended with these morals and societal standards of right and wrong mix the individual and combined interests of a people and its possessions. To heighten the brew — or, perhaps, ?balm? of nuclear conduct is the all-important ingredient of alliances, the influences of one?s ?buddies? — so to speak — on one?s choices and constituent interests.
Finally and continually, it appears, thrown into the nuclear potpourri pot is the aspect of time pressures, those moments in history when all ingredients are boiling, the troops are hungry, and the decision to serve or wait is paramount. The stew that almost cost the world its world — had it been served after stirring and simmering — was the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Poised in front of the pot were President John F. Kennedy and the 12 members of his advisory team known as Ex Comm. Tossed into the cauldron were those meaty nations well capable of annihilating one another — as well as others, the morals of those nations, their individual and collective interests, the views of their allies, and the distinct pressures of a strongly limited time factor. In October of 1962, the United States was a ?Great Nation? which possessed meaty weaponry. Our nation, at this time in history, far surpassed in nuclear capability that of our greatest enemy, the Soviet Union. True to the concepts of ?upper hand,? ?under dog,? and the ?haves versus the have nots,? the Soviets, as a union, were less than pleased with their nuclear/military position and lack of #1 stature.
The Essay on Water and World United Nations
“The only thing I want is to awaken all humans on the planet that we are living on Mother Earth”. Earth is unique in the Solar System as being the only planet which is able to support life in its breathable atmosphere, a suitable climate, availability of water and also because of its ideal distance from the sun, due to which it receives the perfect amount of heat and light to allow human life to ...
So, they did what any typical, aggressive under dog would do: they set out to change their standing. This maneuver is what triggered the Cuban Missile Crisis. Strongly desirous of being able to launch missiles against the United States, a capability which the Soviets then lacked, the U.S.S.R., under the helm of Premier Nikita Khrushchev, determined it would be in their best interests to station missiles in Cuba, a land considerably closer to America and well within the striking capability of the then Soviet nuclear weaponry. Prior to this maneuver, Soviet missiles were only capable of reaching Europe, not America. On the other hand, American technology had allowed already for nuclear missile strikes on the whole of the U.S.S.R. should it become necessary. America clearly had both the tangible capability, i.e., the geographic position, population and work force, resources, industrial and agricultural productivity, and strong armed forces it needed to engage in warfare. It also possessed the intangible capability needed to prevail against an enemy; it was the educational, social, and technological leader of the time with a high level of national morale. However, the question that reigned supreme during the discussions surrounding the entire Crisis was, ?How should the United States engage or respond to the Soviet Union?? Basically what was at stake here were both position and power, two concepts close to the heart of yet a third country concerned with ?capability?: Cuba.
The Research paper on Cuban Missle Crisis Soviet Nuclear Cuba
Cuban Missile Crisis When given the opportunity to write a research paper on any conflict or battle during recent American History, one has a number of options: World War Two, the War in Vietnam, and the Korean conflict to name but a few. However, I have chosen a brief period of two weeks during which the very existence of the United States was seriously threatened. To most of my generation the ...
Viola, into the pot comes Fidel Castro. Incapable of defending his small revisionist island country, and having suffered the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro clearly was receptive to Khruschev?s missile deployment ideas. Castro easily saw his path to military capability and strength through the weapons of his benefactor, the U.S.S.R. And so the pot of the ?upper hands? versus the ?under dogs,? the ?haves versus the have nots,? and the ?capables versus the incapables? ensued into the Cuban Missile Crisis. So, in October of 1962, the Soviet missiles were sent, constructed in Cuba, and finally detected by United States recognizance. The question now became one of not merely capability but of implementation of capability. A careful examination of the actual chances and qualifying factors on the United States within their given societal policies took place. In short, into the cauldron of capability was tossed the all-important ingredient of moral values. The tenet that the moral values of a people and its leaders influence both the policies and the decisions of those people is not a new belief. However, the degree to which these moral values create or generate their influence still remains a topic of discussion — point in fact, the current President Clinton moral issue debates.
Proof of this long-held belief that moral values both affect and, at times, determine our directions as a people, is demonstrated clearly by our national position and actions during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Here, the moral values of the then President John F. Kennedy and his team of advisors were integral to the formulation and implementation of a foreign policy which not only determined the fate of several countries, but a policy that survives today and is extended upon recurrently in countries such as Iran and Iraq. Support for the belief in the power and position of morals in political decision making are not solely the thought of the common man, advocacy for this doctrine comes from our historians, political analysts, and also from our leaders themselves. As Abdul Aziz Said, Charles O. Lerche, Jr., and Charles O. Lerche III, authors of Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective (4th edition) assert that although political theory and individual actualized mores are separate factors, these two elements of politics and morals become blended in the pot of the common good. Here in the political kettle whistles the moral call of the steaming masses. For instance, as Said (et.
The Term Paper on John Kennedy Cuban Missile Crisis
Introduction: John Fitzgerald Kennedy was a very interesting president and person. He was the thirty-fifth president of the United States. When JFK was born he lived in a small house and as he grew older the family moved to larger houses, because seven more children were born. He went to Dexter when he was in grade school and then he went away to Choate, because his brother went there and he ...
al.) points out, killing is both denounced and upheld by our country depending on the moral circumstances surrounding the death. Murder is a ?no, no.? Battle bravery is a ?yes, yes.? The cry of the masses is what President Kennedy so clearly heard and responded to in his decision making process during the Cuban Missile Crisis. From Robert Kennedy, the late President Kennedy?s brother, comes the notion that morals played an eminently important factor in both JFK?s path to decision making, as well as in the determinations of Ex Comm, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. According to Robert Kennedy in Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the formulation of policy during the 13 chronicled days of the Crisis and the moral holdings of America and its people were carefully considered by all members of the committee, even those who first held for military strikes against Cuba. First, all realized that even the best American intelligence operations were lacking of total information and must be viewed as such. Second, members realized that their decisions could not necessarily foretell the actual results of the actions they would empower. Third, members realized that time was clearly against them.
Fourth, many members realized they were suffering from mental and physical exhaustion, elements which were not always leading them to sound responses, but rather to more instinctive reactions. In this regard author, then Attorney General, Robert Kennedy recalls that JFK held fast to his firm belief that to bomb Cuba and its Soviet missiles would have been a decision that would have led to the moral decay of the United States as a international political power of values and moral standing. To strike Cuba from the air would have meant inviting the possibility of all-out nuclear war with possible world-wide implications and devastation. To invade Cuba would have meant a long and drawn-out bloody battle costing the lives of many Americans. As the world-wide promoter of democracy and moral uprightness, America should not and could not take either of these paths in the eyes of JFK. Morally the decision to either bomb or invade Cuba was unacceptable both to Kennedy and to the American people, a fact which Kennedy felt certain of and held to steadfastly during the Crisis. Given the possibility of non-military resolution and possible quarantine, other Ex Comm members agreed with JFK.
The Essay on Cuban Missile Crisis Kennedy Cuba Missiles
... proximity to the United States since the United States had put missiles in Turkey. Kennedy was concerned that wile he was making these decisions Cuba and the ... and simply wanted the confrontation with Khrushchev to prove the American nuclear superiority. Given Operation Mongoose, Khrushchev was able to test ...
Resounding loudest perhaps John F. Kennedy?s moral position were the value-based thinkings of three of his advisors, Robert Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States; Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense; and Adlai Stevenson, Ambassador to the United Nations. Additionally, all three men — as well as other committee members at varying points (save, perhaps, General Curtis LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff — recognized that a decision to implement air strikes of any kind on Cuba would have flown in the face of American national interests, objectives, and goals. Primary among these national interests, of course, was national security with the objective and ultimate goal being that of continuation as a nation and lastly a species. Tossed in with these more innate, Darwinistic survival-based national interests were the more political ones on the parts of Kennedy and his team of advisors who realized concretely the need for rational political decision making that took into account the public good and wherein a consensus of the American and European communities would agree. In this regard, Kennedy critically and carefully analyzed not just the immediate situation at hand but the true reasons behind the situation and the total present and future implications of the Crisis. In short, Kennedy took into account all three goal ranges (short-, middle-, and long-term) in his decision making process. Yes, Kennedy knew air strikes might have done away with the most immediate threat: the missiles. However, JFK also realized that even the short term would most probably see escalating, threatening military response on the part of the Soviets who, in the middle and long ranges, would have annihilated both American land and American global reputation.
The Essay on The Cold War American Time World
... at home. President John F. Kennedy, American University Speech, June 10, 1963 The Cold War was a time in American History during the twentieth ... or the ones leading the two sides were the United States and Russia. The United States led the fight against Communist nations, like Russia. ... that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. ...
Weighing heavily on Kennedy was his strong belief that the real political issue at risk in the Cuban Missile Crisis was Berlin, not Cuba. John F. Kennedy realized well that Soviet national interest was the spread of communism with the objective being the domination of other foreign lands. At the time of the Crisis their more immediate goal to their national interest and objective was Berlin. JFK quickly surmised the additional Soviet political ploy in the shipping of missiles to Cuba. Not only was the U.S.S.R. setting the stage for equalization of atomic capability by way of striking position, but the Soviets were setting the stage for taking Berlin. As Halford Mackinder points out in sum: the population who commands the “heartland” (that which extends from eastern Siberia to central Europe) will command the entire world population.
Additionally, President Kennedy clearly remembered that the Soviets had taken successful similar action against Hungary during the Anglo War in Egypt. The President also realized that, in the event that Berlin were lost to the Soviets because of American action, the Europeans would not longer be counted among American allies. Given that American national interests were perpetuation of democratic principles with the objective of spreading those principles to foreign lands, the goal was to keep Berlin safe for the European community while preserving American security and lives. With all national interests, objectives, and goals in mind, Kennedy believed that military action against Cuba would eventually lead to the loss of Berlin and the European view that the United States was as an aggressive nation who put Europe strategically in danger. Of course, JFK noted, therefore, that military action against was not recommended. Therefore, when air strikes were first tossed onto the dinner table, Kennedy balked. Later, when invasion was served up as a solution, Kennedy again refrained from sinking his teeth into the idea. Clearly Kennedy knew in both instances the importance of maintaining the national interests, objectives, and goals.
The Term Paper on United State Filipino Filipinos American
Dear Coche, I forgot my membership password (I'm not even sure if you guys sent me one) so I'm sending another paper to become a member. Thank you, Vicky In the present work, many essential facts were brought together in the history of the Filipino-Americans from their early contact with California to the present. There was, and still is, a discernible connection between the Filipinos and their ...
Second only to American national security in this regard was the maintaining of our allies. Alliances are an all-important factor in global survival and supremacy — if the later be what is sought by a nation. Under the theory of satisfying alliance a state searches among other states for a ?perfect? partner or partners in order to achieve or effectuate an alliance. However, under the theory of minimum winning coalition, a state will add alliance partners to its coalition until and in order to gain a distinct advantage over its enemy or opponent. In short, under the minimum winning coalition theory a state will stop adding alliances only when and if it has achieved at least 51% of total alliance potentiality. It is this later theory which the United States, methinks, operates under now and did operate under in 1962. Important to this theory at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the alliance of Europe and its nations with that of the United States of America. This was truly an alliance with which American was pleased — to say the least. Thoughts of endangering this alliance — which clearly gave America the ?edge? over the U.S.S.R. — in any way was unthinkable.
Alas it was this alliance difficulty and its endangerment which caused JFK and the Ex Comm to tread carefully. Of this concern, Adlai Steveson was keenly aware, as was John F. Kennedy, his brother Robert, and Dean Rusk. All of the aforementioned members agreed that any American action could not be viewed solely on a unilateral basis. Both Kennedy brothers, Stevenson, and Rusk saw and were concerned deeply with the larger global picture and accurately pointed out the fact that over 40 allied nations would be affected by United States action. In the view of these members, these nations and their peoples could not and should not be forgotten or sacrificed, beginning with Berlin, the true goal of the U.S.S.R. Additionally, not only the safety of American allies were considered in the Ex Comm discussions, but so too were the impressions of these people. A variety of questions were posed with regard to not only the effects of United States actions on Cuba, but also to how the world and, most specifically, our allies would view them. In this regard, the moral dilemmas which were poised at the United States door became issues not solely of American moral judgment and perceptions, but those of a global society.
Ranking high among these concerns were the perceptions of the peoples of other nations regarding the possible bombing of innocent civilians of Castro?s revisionist regime. Of course, these civilian Cubans had done no wrong. So, the question with regard to military air strikes became one of allied perception of unnecessary civilian deaths at the hands of the American military. What this perception might be and where it ultimately might lead was of great import to President Kennedy and his Ex Comm members. Alas, military movement on Cuba was viewed as holding a great potentiality for the loss of strong and necessary allies. Likewise, the impact of quarantine or blockading was another area which held possible allied considerations. If the United States imposed a blockade of Cuba and/or the Soviet Union, the response was equally sure: the Soviets would blockade Berlin. Again an allied problem inevitably would occur. Given this scenario, Kennedy was sure that the U.S.S.R. and its Premier would allege that the United States of America had started the whole Crisis. Soon, Kennedy believed that a reaction would grow in Europe, a reaction that Berlin was suffering because of the actions of its supposed ally, the United States. Alas and again, our European allies would be lost. The stew of the allied political world would be lost to the United States. Still yet, a decision as to a course of action had to be taken, and it had to taken quickly. Time was clearly not on the side of the Americans in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Time was, however, categorically on the side of the Russians and the Cubans.
The U.S.S.R. needed and relished the time of decision that the United States agonized through that October. The U.S.S.R. clearly saw itself strictly as a responsive, not a reactive, element in the equation of solution. Theirs was not to propose; theirs was to respond, reject, and restrain. The United States relationship with time was quite the contrary. Working against the United States were several time factors. First, while the clock ticked, Cuba assembled more missiles. Yes, the United States gained more recognizance information, but all of it disturbing. Clearly, as Cuba assembled more missiles, the United States was placed in more eminent danger. If a missile was launched while the United States stood poised on negotiations, what would the reaction be in America? The world community? More importantly, what would the devastation be? Also, what would the fate of Berlin and all of free Europe be? These questions plagued JFK and his advisors. Second, as the hours passed, the Soviets gained more time to think, plan, and devise strategies against their enemy. They sent letter upon letter, pushing the reactive burden onto the shoulders and into the cauldron of the American leaders desperately attempting to conjure up a healthy elixir to what could soon be a world crisis.
Oddly enough, it was time — or actually the ?fudging? of time which finally made the difference between deadly brew and wholesome remedy for the United States. Ignoring a final communiqu? from the Soviet Premier, Kennedy — upon the advice of his brother — responded and accepted the Premier?s prior letter agreeing to the dismantling of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Timing had made all the difference. The world was once again a safe place — for now. Yes, the political world is much like a stew. It is a mixture of past, present, and future. However, since the introduction of atomic warfare, this stew has taken on a whole new distasteful pungency. Blended into this veritable deadly mixture today are not just the great nations but also a growing number of second and third world nations now exceedingly more capable of annihilating one another. One must wonder as our world approaches its second millennium if the morals of those nations, their individual and collective interests, the views of their allies, and the distinct pressures of time will ever be able to avert another nuclear threat. Obviously, only the last factor, time, will ever tell.
