John Locke (1632-1704) is a great influential British philosopher, reputed by many as the first of the great English empiricists. He offered a comprehensive philosophy of language as well, which was the first of its kind in modern philosophy. In line with Descartes, he pushed reason to the forefront as a tool of philosophical enquiry and opposed authoritarianism and blind acceptance of dictates of religion or superstitions. Locke’s masterpiece, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, concerns itself with determining the limits of human understanding and the legitimacy of knowledge claims.
Specifically, Book III of the work investigates into language and its importance in the process of knowledge and epistemological enquiries. Let me brief the main aspects of his approach to language and the context from which it evolves out. Body of the Essay (Lockean Enquiry into Language) In the four Books of the Essay, Locke considers the sources and nature of human knowledge and as a part of it he takes up a study of language. (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke, 1. 1. 7. , p. 47).
Against Descartes, he claimed, that mind has no innate ideas (primary notions or inborn ideas).
Human mind is a tabula rasa (clear slate) and experiences write on it. In holding this view he subscribes to the axiom of empiricism that ‘there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses’. Ideas are but materials, out of which, knowledge is constructed. Neither speculative or innate moral principles, nor ideas, such as God, identity, etc. , are there in the mind of the new-born. ‘Children and the idiots prove it’, Locke says. His theory of substratum and substance, and the distinction he makes between primary and secondary qualities are all someway connected to his theory of language.
The Essay on Descartes And Locke Simple Ideas
DESCARTES AND LOCKE (Knowledge) One of the most important branches in philosophy, is Epistemology, which means, theory of knowledge. So far, philosophers have made many attempts to discover the source of knowledge, the standards or criteria by which we can judge the reliability of knowledge. We tend to be satisfied with think what we know about almost everything, even though sometimes we are ...
The distinction between real essences and nominal essences, which he makes, stems from his theories of substance and qualities. It seems Locke holds some version of the representational theory of perception, though some scholars dispute it. Locke is not at all skeptic about substances as did Hume. Since Berkeley, Locke’s theory of the substratum or substance has been attacked as incoherent. Since we have no such experience of such an entity there is no way to derive such an idea from experience, his critics argue. (cf. I. IV. 18. p 95) The real essence of a material thing is its atomic constitution.
The atomic constitution is the causal basis of all the observable properties of the thing. If the real essences were known all the observable properties could be deduced from it. These real essences are quite unknown to us according to Locke. Ayer interprets: ‘substance in general’ means whatever it is that supports qualities, while the real essence means ‘the particular atomic constitution lying behind observable qualities. Ayer treats the unknown substratum as the same as real essence. This interpretation eliminates the need to explain particulars without properties.
But it is to be accepted that such reductionism lacks textual support from Locke and it conflicts some of Locke’s own positions according to some critics. A theory of meaning (semantic theory) is central to any philosophical account of language Locke also develops one when he claims that our words (general terms) refer to our (abstract) ideas. Abstract ideas and classification are of central importance to Locke’s discussion of language. Words that stand for ideas can be distinguished as ideas of substances, simple modes, mixed modes, relations etc.
Not all words are ideas, for example, particles that relate. In his analysis of language, Locke gives more attention to nouns than to verbs (II. 7. 1. p 471).
The Term Paper on Compare And Contrast Locke And Bayle
Compare and contrast Locke and Bayle XVII century was a century of rise and updating of human spirit, radical breakage of becoming obsolete social and economic and political orders, out-of-date spiritual, scientific, moral, aesthetic, philosophical traditions not only in England, but also in continental Europe. Bright representatives of that time were Pierre Bayle and John Locke. The purpose of ...
Though Locke’s main semantic theory claimed that “Words in their primary or immediate signification signify nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them”, it was vehemently criticized as a classic blunder in semantic theory. For J. S. Mill, Locke seems not distinguishing the meaning of the word from its reference. But as Norman Kretzmann rightly points out Locke distinguishes between meaning and reference (Tipton, 1977, pp. 123-140).
In Locke’s discussion on substances, he says, physical substances are atoms and things made up of atoms. But we have no experience of the atomic structure of horses and tables. Horses and tables are known through secondary qualities such as color, taste, smell etc and primary qualities such as shape and extension. Hence he held that real essence cannot give meaning of names. Ordinary people are the chief makers of language, he believed. Conclusion Locke brought in a tradition in language theory that influenced James Campbell and I. A.
Richards, rhetoricians like Edward P. J. Corbett, Condillac, Saussure and structuralists like Claude Levi-Strauss. Linguistic philosophy (logical positivism, logical atomism and so on) in 20th century had something to respond to Locke if not to receive from him. However, I wouldn’t reckon Locke as a linguist than an empiricist.
References
Locke, John (1995) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Aemherst, New York: Prometheus Books. Kretzmann, Norman (1977) “The Main Thesis of Locke’s Semantic Theory”. in Locke on Human Understanding,(ed) I. C. Tipton. pp. 123-140.
