Days after the murder, when the prisoners began naming Raul Salinas de Gortari as the mastermind of the killing, Mario Ruiz Massieu-whohad told me that he was in constant touch with President Salinas and talked to him almost daily-must have told Salinas, ?Mr. President, we have a problem: Your brother killed my brother.? The trafficking of drugs is clearly a “big business” in the current Mexican economy. In the mid-1990s, for example, it was reported that the drug trade was the only part of the Mexican economy that was experiencing a “boom” (Oppenheimer 164).
The mid-1990s also spawned political corruption and assassinations. Drug related corruption and assassinations are not a problem for economic growth and stability, nor are they a problem for political stability in Mexico. They increase the stability of the government by weeding out those that do not belong. In fact, through presidential brother Raul Salinas, Mexican drug lords were allowed to ship drugs to the United stated as long as levels were ?tolerable? and the profits from the drug trade were invested back into the Mexican economy (Oppenheimer 306).
By ?encouraging? the drug lords to keep their profits in Mexico, the Mexican economy will become increasingly stable. The Mexican officials involved in this power play will also benefit. Their political power and eagerness to accept bribes are positively correlated with the intimacy of the relationship between the government and the drug lords. The drug lords also benefit by investing their money into the Mexican economy; they have the financial power to voice their opinion. They have the power to buy stability, not only for their drug market, but also in the Mexican political sphere. To better understand and refute this argument we must first analyze the scope of the Mexican drug trade.
The Term Paper on Mexican Economy
... aliens who entered the country illegally. The Mexican economy grew at a healthy annual pace during ... Mexican politicians are being killed off because of a power struggle related to money and drugs, ... great cities and developed an intricate social, political, and religious organization. Their civilization was ... was a deliberate hit by Mexico's powerful drug lords. News reports in the days following ...
Because drug trafficking is an illegal business, it is difficult to obtain precise figures regarding the size of the Mexican drug trade. It is apparent, however, that the bulk of the trade is geared toward meeting the demand for drug consumption in the United States. The U.S. State Department has estimated that as much as 70 percent of South American cocaine bound for the U.S. market enters through Mexico (Andreas 160).
The State Department has also estimated that Mexican traffickers dominate the U.S. methamphetamine market, and that they provide between 20 and 30 percent of the heroin consumed in the United States, as well as 80 percent of the imported marijuana (Andreas 160).
It has been further estimated that Mexican drug lords earn annual profits of between $10 and $30 billion as a result of the trade (Oppenheimer 164).
A 1997 issue of Forbes placed the estimated income of the drug lords at $35 billion per year. This higher amount was obtained as a result of adjustments for the devaluation of the Mexico peso that occurred after December 1994 (Brimelow 46).
Based on this estimate, the Forbes article further claimed that the profits of Mexico’s drug traffickers is the equivalent of 18 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP).
By contrast, “Pemex, the Mexican state oil company, has revenues of only about 15% of GDP… [and] total Mexican government spending is only about 27% of GDP” (Brimelow 46).
In addition, the Forbes article reported that there have been signs in recent years that the drug trafficking problem in Mexico has been growing worse instead of better. This indication can be seen, for example, in the fact that the U.S. State Department’s budget for fighting the Mexican drug trade was increased from $658,000 in 1995 to $5 million in 1997 (Brimelow 46).
The Essay on Future Invasion Of Mexico
... Micheal."The looming Mexican crisis" The Washington Quarterly Robinson, Linda. "An inferno next door: Mexico's drug gangs buy the officials they can ... Representatives. (Zarembo) The second reason that United States interests in Mexico are put at risk is because of economic ... to imagine how political instability in Mexico could aggravate our trade, immigration and drug problems, swamp our labor market, ...
On the other hand, there is a great deal of evidence to support the claim that this massive drug trade has corrupted many Mexican officials and is interfering with international relations. A recent article in the Los Angeles Times, for example, stated that Mexico “has been buffeted in recent years by charges that drug traffickers have spread their influence into the top levels of government and business” (Rosenzweig and Sheridan A1).
Numerous stories have surfaced in recent years that show evidence of such things as accepted bribes, tip-offs of suspected traffickers, police theft of confiscated drugs, government leaders (including anti-drug officials) involved in corruption scandals and, at a more extreme level, political assassinations that are apparently linked to the drug trade. Some U.S. officials have spoken out on the problem of Mexico’s drug corruption. As an example, Robert S. Gelbard, a State Department official for narcotics issues, has claimed that U.S. officials have “always” been aware of the existence of drug-related corruption in Mexican law enforcement (Golden “A Cocaine Trail” A14).
Thomas Constantine, head of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has made the similar claim that “there is not one single law-enforcement institution in Mexico with which the DEA has an entirely trusting relationship” (“Neighbours” 26).
There have been leaders in the Mexican government that have also acknowledged the problem of drug corruption. For example, the Mexican Attorney General, Jorge Carpizo, made the claim in 1992 “that Mexican political institutions had become infiltrated by the interests of narcotraffickers” (Rochlin 111).
Soon after that, the ex-president Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado likewise “acknowledged the complicity existing between narcotraffickers and important components of the Mexican government” (Rochlin 111).
Ernesto Zedillo, who became president in late 1994, has indicated that he is trying to reform a political and legal system, which he sees as being “80% corrupt” (“Mexico’s Great Salinas Soap” 39).
In his book Bordering on Chaos, Andres Oppenheimer cites a 1995 study by the Mexican Interior Ministry in which it was estimated that “more than 60 percent of the members of all police forces in the country had received bribes or had criminal records themselves” (301).
The Essay on Why Government Officials Take Bribe ?
Posted by Pulkit mohan singla why government officials take bribe ? Well everyone in India is talking about corruption. Frequent scandals and scams conducted by the ministers have created a sense of anger and revolt among people. The people are helpless and they know that things are not in there hands. They don’t know whom should they approach but still they hope for the best. Well everyone is ...
Oppenheimer also refers to an official report from the Mexican attorney general’s office. According to this report, “even with Mexico’s strong job protection laws, more than four hundred members of its Federal Judicial Police – or more than 10 percent of the force’s personnel – had been fired or suspended from their jobs over the three years ending in mid-1995 because of suspected ties to the drug cartels” (302).
Although the problem has grown worse in recent years, Mexico has long been involved in the trafficking of drugs designated for U.S. consumers. According to Rochlin, “Mexico’s role in hemispheric narcotrafficking began in the 1930s and revolved around opium production” (Rochlin 105).
This role grew to dramatic proportions in the 1970s, in part because of the development of a “drug counter-culture” in the United States, and in part because of the 1972 termination of the “French connection” of heroin supplies to the U.S. market (Rochlin 105-106).
Mexico’s role in narcotics trafficking became even more substantial in the 1980s, after the United States succeeded in cutting off the Colombian supply routes through Florida. As a result of this situation, the U.S.-Mexico border came to replace Florida “as the main passage for drugs to the U.S. market” (Oppenheimer 164).
For the past few decades, Mexico’s role in supplying U.S. drug users has been seen as a serious problem in the relations between the two nations. The Mexican government has often shown signs of cooperating with the United States in dealing with this issue. However, there is evidence that many of these signs of cooperation are intended merely to appease U.S. officials. In this regard, it has been alleged that Mexican officials often track down and prosecute certain known drug traffickers while at the same time protecting other known traffickers. An example of an alleged effort to merely appease the U.S. government can be seen in the early 1970s, when President Diaz Ordaz instituted a new program called “Operation Cooperation.” The purpose of this program was to show the United States that the Mexican government was cooperating in the effort to curb the drug trafficking problem. However, Rochlin says that this government program was not actually effective in terms of doing anything to solve the problem. As such, Rochlin claims that this event indicates that “the Mexican government learned early that it at least had to appear to be serious in the war against illicit drugs” (106).
The Term Paper on Drug Trafficking From Mexico To The United States
The media represents Mexico drug scene as a replica of the Colombian Model. Mexico did not begin to traffic drugs until sixty years ago before the Colombians decided to get into the trade. There are two different political systems in both countries; the history and the structural relationship of the drug traffickers to the political powers in Mexico. Where did drug trafficking begin and exactly ...
By the 1980s, drug trafficking had become deeply entrenched in the Mexican economy. This was especially true after the 1982 debt crisis, which resulted in “the promotion of illicit drugs as a key subsidizer of a bankrupt Mexican economy” (Rochlin 107).
The economic crisis of the time gave strong encouragement to government and police officials to fall into the lure of drug corruption. Clearly, the situation provided an opportunity whereby huge amounts of money could be made with a minimum of effort. According to Rochlin, it was during this time that “Mexican security structures became penetrated by narcotraffickers, severely weakening their credibility and legitimacy” (106).
Rochlin further describes a theory about the relationship between the growing problem of drug corruption and the debt crisis that existed in Mexico during the early 1980s. Rochlin argues ?that components of the government and traffickers essentially cooperated to satisfy mutual interests” (108).
As an example, Rochlin points out that “it has been alleged that the de la Madrid government failed to bother drug barons, in exchange for the deposit of immense sums of narcodollars in Mexican banks during the severe financial crisis that plagued most of the 1980s” (108).
In the mid-1980s, there was growing physical evidence relating to the corruption of Mexican officials by drug traffickers. For example, in March 1985, the bodies of two men were found, and it was apparent that they had both been tortured to death. It was soon discovered that the bodies were those of a U.S. DEA agent, Enrique Camerena Salazar, and his pilot. Two Mexican drug traffickers were arrested in connection with the case. Furthermore, the chief investigator into the case, Armando Pavon, admitted that he had accepted a $275,000 bribe from one of the drug traffickers in return for “a safe exit at the Guadalajara airport” (Rochlin 109).
The Essay on Mexican Drug Cartels
Several drug cartels are involved, such as: Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Juarez Cartel, Knights Templar Cartel, Tijuana Cartel, La Familia Cartel (disbanded), Los Zetas, Beltran-Leyva Cartel (disbanded), Jalisco New Generation Cartel, Independent Cartel of Acapulco, La Barredora. You could see them all as the bad guys. On the other team are the Mexican forces, consisting of the Army, Navy, Air ...
According to Oppenheimer, this case provides clear evidence that Mexican law enforcement officials had tried to protect drug traffickers. As such, the case shows that “Mexican police and army commanders had been on the criminals’ side” (300).
During the late 1980s, there were other outbreaks of violence which were clearly related to the activities of drug traffickers. There was hope that the situation would change after Carlos Salinas de Gortari became president in 1988. Like all Mexican presidents since 1929, Salinas was a member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (De Witt 6).
During his time in office (through 1994), Salinas made the appearance that he was cooperating in the effort to fight drug trafficking. Nevertheless, allegations and admissions of official drug corruption continued during that time. Furthermore, Rochlin notes that “the flow of Mexican narcotics into the States remained on an upswing” during the period of Salinas’s presidency (110).
In 1990, an investigative news program on American television revealed evidence that Sergio Garcia Ramirez, the attorney general under President de la Madrid, “was involved in both drug trafficking and in the 1985 murder of DEA agent Camerena” (Rochlin 110).
Thus, despite Salinas’s claims of cooperation in the war against drugs, “corruption of official Mexican institutions by narcotraffickers became more apparent in the 1990s” (Rochlin 111).
Drug corruption is prevalent in Mexico because of the nation’s ongoing economic problems. Because of these problems, many officials have been tempted to accept bribes from drug traffickers. In addition, Rochlin points out that many of the nation’s peasant farmers turned to the production of drug crops in the 1970s because they “appreciated the profits that drug crops could yield, especially in the context of an emerging economic crisis” (106).
It is interesting to note that the times of greatest corruption and violence in the drug trade (such as the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s) have also been times of economic crisis. Drug trafficking plays a role in the economy of Mexico by providing “jobs” to citizens who would otherwise be unemployed. Regarding this, Andreas says that the drug trade is a “significant employer” in the nation (160).
The Term Paper on Mexican Drug Cartels 2
Mexico was once sought a place to go and visit just south of the border. Many American Citizens would go to see the nice beaches, eat some delicious seafood that was surprisingly better priced than it was here in the U. S and just have a mini vacation that was only about a 2 hour drive. However those days are long gone. Ongoing violence has broken out, even Mexican citizens fear for their safety ...
Furthermore, drug traffickers have played a role in the development of certain parts of Mexico, where they have “financed schools, hospitals, and other social welfare projects” (Rochlin 107).
Regarding the pervasive role of drug trafficking in the Mexican society, Eduardo Valle once claimed that the nation’s leading drug lords had become “driving forces, pillars even, of our economic growth” (Andreas 160).
?If you don?t go along with the narcos they kill you? (Veronica Esperonza) This double sided sword was a way for the drug lords to weed out the individuals who didn?t fit into their game plan.
Regarding the increased evidence of official corruption, Andreas has said that “the extent of drug-related corruption in Mexico is revealed by the series of high-profile murders and scandals in recent years” (161).
In May 1993, a high-profile murder occurred with the assassination of Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo. At first, it was assumed that drug traffickers had killed the cardinal by mistake. However, the subsequent investigation into the case suggested that he may have been intentionally murdered because he “was the only major authority figure in Guadalajara not owned by the narcotics traffickers” (Rochlin 111).
This theory presumes that Posadas was killed either to provide a “warning” to the government, or because he was about to reveal information about the links between the government and drug traffickers (Rochlin 111-112).
Other cases of drug-related violence in the early 1990s involved clashes of certain police groups against each other. For example, in March 1994, a group of Federal police officers were about to arrest a drug cartel leader in Baja California when they were suddenly ambushed by members of the local police force. Apparently, the members of the local police department had been bribed to protect the trafficker. Ironically, the head of the Federal police unit was killed during the incident, while the drug trafficker was able to use the confusion to make his escape (Oppenheimer 301).
Two other high-profile assassinations occurred during 1994. The first of these was the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, a PRI candidate for the presidency who was shot to death in March while campaigning in Tijuana. Although he was a member of the dominant political party, Colosio was also interested in bringing reform to the party. Regarding this, Colosio had publicly claimed shortly before his death that he wanted to reduce the monolithic power of the presidential office and that he wanted “to end any vestige of authoritarianism” in Mexican politics (Oppenheimer 62).
The second assassination victim, Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, was a deputy leader of the PRI who was also in favor of reforming the nation’s political system. His death occurred in Mexico City in September of 1994 (Golden “Salinas’s Brother” A1).
As in the case of the Camerena and Posadas murders, the exact causes and motives of these two killings have not been determined. Nevertheless, various theories have been developed in an effort to answer these questions. In the words of De Witt, “though theories about these killings are numerous and varied, few of them exclude PRI rivals and/or drug dealers from their calculus” (8).
Some theorists feel that Ruiz Massieu and Colosio were murdered by drug traffickers as a warning to the government. Other theorists claim that the assassinations were related to “turf wars” between rival Mexican drug cartels (Oppenheimer 306-307).
Regardless these high profile murders are rocking the stability of the Mexican economy.
The theories regarding these two assassinations became more complex following a series of events that occurred in early 1995. In February of that year, Raul Salinas de Gortari, brother of the former president Carlos Salinas de Gortari, was arrested and charged with having ordered the murder of Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu. According to the New York Times article that reported the arrest, Raul Salinas had three possible motives for ordering the assassination: “some sort of personal vendetta, a fight for political power, or possibly a political struggle that involved drug traffickers” (Golden “Salinas’s Brother” A8).
The suspicions surrounding Raul Salinas grew deeper when his brother fled to Ireland soon after the arrest. Furthermore, in November 1995, investigators in Switzerland discovered that Raul Salinas had stashed away millions of dollars in secret accounts (“Mexico’s Great Salinas Soap” 39).
Despite the implication that this money was raised through illegal drug profits, the Mexican government did not open a drug investigation against Raul Salinas. Rather, the special prosecutor in the case, Pablo Chapa Bezanilla, sought to develop the initial charge of political assassination (Preston A3).
In October 1996, Chapa announced the discovery of important evidence in the case – a corpse which was found buried near Raul Salinas’s home. However, the authorities soon realized that the corpse had actually been planted on the property in an effort to frame Salinas. When a warrant was issued for the arrest of Chapa, the prosecutor fled the country, thereby jeopardizing the government’s case against Raul Salinas (Preston A3).
Later, in April 1997, Swiss authorities completed their investigation of Raul Salinas’s bank accounts and determined that the tens of millions of dollars deposited there had been obtained in return for his role in protecting the movement of drug supplies through Mexico. This was a significant announcement because it was the first time that a government law-enforcement agency had openly claimed that Raul Salinas “received payments from drug traffickers” (Preston A3).
Further connections to the murder of Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu were traced to the victim’s own brother, Mario Ruiz Massieu. Mario Ruiz, a former narcotics prosecutor, was the Deputy Attorney General in charge of the investigation into his brother’s death. In November 1994, Mario resigned from the investigation with the claim that government officials were standing in the way of his efforts. Then, in early 1995, Mario Ruiz was arrested when he tried to flee into the United States with $46,000 in cash (Rochlin 112).
In March, the Mexican government charged Mario Ruiz with attempting to cover up the role of Raul Salinas in the death of Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu (Golden “A Cocaine Trail” A14).
Meanwhile, authorities in the United States began an investigation into how Mario Ruiz was able to deposit more than $9 million in bank accounts in Houston and Mexico City. The investigation was based on “the possibility that Mr. Ruiz Massieu’s fortune may have come from protecting drug traffickers and that such a link might somehow explain his willingness to protect the former President’s brother rather than seek justice for his own” (Golden “A Cocaine Trail” A14).
A civil trial on the matter was opened in Houston in March of 1997. At the trial, Mario Ruiz claimed that the money did not come from bribes for protecting drug shipments, but rather from his personal investments in business and real estate. He further claimed that his purpose for depositing the money in a U.S. bank was to protect himself in case of another economic or political crisis in Mexico (Fritsch and Cordoba A18).
However, the federal jury in the case did not buy Ruiz’s testimony. At the conclusion of the trial, it was determined that the money in Ruiz’s Houston bank account “was mostly handsome kickbacks from Mexican drug lords” (“His Money Gone” 26).
On the basis of this decision, the U.S. government seized $7.9 million of the $9 million that had been stashed in the Houston account (“His Money Gone” 26).
Further evidence of Mario Ruiz Massieu’s connection to drug traffickers also came out during the trial. Thus, a former agent of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police testified that Mario Ruiz was linked “to the disappearance of several tons of cocaine from police custody in Zacatecas in 1994” (“His Money Gone” 26).
This was a reference to an incident that occurred on August 4, 1994, in which a jet carrying eight to ten tons of Colombian cocaine was forced to land near the town of Sombrerete in the state of Zacatecas. Mexican federal police agents seized the aircraft and its cargo. However, when the confiscated cocaine was rounded up later, “only two and a half tons of the drug were recovered” (Oppenheimer 165).
When similarly marked packages of cocaine were seized at the U.S. border a few days later, it became clear that “there was little question that local or federal Mexican authorities had kept the bulk of the cargo” (Oppenheimer 165).
The incident also gave rise to deeper implications regarding the corruption of Mexican officials. Thus, a New York Times article on the Zacatecas incident noted that the evidence in the case “suggests a partnership between traffickers and the police that is so open that it could not continue without the knowledge of senior officials” (Golden “A Cocaine Trail” A14).
At the civil trial in Houston, Mario Ruiz Massieu was implicated as being one of those senior officials. Thus, the former federal police agent who testified against Massieu claimed that he “personally delivered two suitcases of cash” to the former Deputy Attorney-General shortly after the disappearance of the cocaine shipment (“His Money Gone” 26).
As noted earlier in this paper, there have been various theories in the attempt to explain the connection between drug corruption and high-profile assassinations, such as those of Colosio and Jose Ruiz Massieu. In the wake of the foregoing evidence, a theory has also developed which links the death of Jose Ruiz Massieu to both Raul Salinas and Mario Ruiz Massieu. According to this perspective, it is alleged that both men had been collaborating with drug traffickers in a “lucrative real estate deal in Acapulco, Guerrero” (Rochlin 113).
However, this deal was opposed by Jose Ruiz Massieu, who was the governor of Guerrero at the time. According to Rochlin, “in this scenario, the interests of narcotraffickers in collusion with PRI officials were responsible for the death of Jose Ruiz, who challenged them” (113).
This message put Mexican officials in an interesting position, establish a ?warm fuzzy? relationship with the drug lords, or die. The lack of options, rather than two options, does not only decrease the stability of the Mexican government, but it murders it. The Mexican government has been taken over by the drug lords.
What Can the Mexican Government Do? When President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon came to office in the fall of 1994, he introduced a new set of policies in which he promised “greater federalism and the rule of law,” as well as an end to the long tradition of the president’s rule as “an absolute monarch” (“Centre and States” 38).
Similar promises were made by previous Mexican presidents; however, there are signs that Zedillo is more strongly committed to true reform than the others. One sign of Zedillo’s effort to overcome the PRI’s stronghold which would free the Mexican government from corruption, can be seen in his appointment of Antonio Lozano Gracia as attorney general. This appointment was significant because Lozano is a member of the opposition party known as the National Action Party (PAN).
In December 1996, however, Lozano was removed from his position, presumably because of his inability to find definitive solutions to the murders of Colosio and Ruiz Massieu (“Mexico’s Great Salinas Soap” 39).
Another sign of Zedillo’s effort to change the traditional political situation in Mexico can be seen in how he refused to involve himself in a cover-up of the scandal surrounding the former president’s brother, Raul. In this way, Zedillo indicated that he was serious about his promise “to turn Mexico into a country of laws and end the impunity that corrupt members of his party had enjoyed for decades” (Oppenheimer 203).
Regarding this, the New York Times reported that the arrest of Raul Salinas “shattered an immunity that has long been taken for granted by the families of former leaders of the political system that… the PRI has dominated for almost 66 years” (Golden “Salinas’s Brother” A1).
Despite Zedillo’s emphasis on reform, scandals relating to drug corruption have continued to exist in Mexico’s political system. For example, in February 1997, the head of the country’s National Institute to Combat Drugs, General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, was arrested “on charges that he protected and received benefits from a powerful cocaine baron, Amado Carrillo Fuentes” (“Mexico Names Anti-Drug Chief” A3).
Despite the scandal associated with this arrest, a positive outcome of the situation occurred with the subsequent appointment of Mariano F. Herran as the new anti-drug leader.
After being named to the position, Herran promised that he would bring an end to the corruption that “has arrived at the highest levels of the institutions charged with combating” drugs (Solis A18).
In addition, Herran was the “first high-level counter-narcotics official to be appointed under a new screening regimen ordered by President Ernesto Zedillo” (“Mexico Names Anti-Drug Chief” A3).
Specifically, Herran was required to pass not only a drug-screening test, but also a psychological test and a lie-detector test. According to officials within the organization, future employees of the National Institute to Combat Drugs will also have to pass a series of tests (“Mexico Names Anti-Drug Chief” A3).
The implementation of this policy marks a step forward in dealing directly with the drug corruption problem in Mexico’s government.
Another important effort, which came into effect in January 1998, is a new law that is designed to stop the practices of money laundering in Mexico. Among other things, this law requires banks and other financial institutions to notify authorities of any “suspicious transactions” (Solis A18).
This law barely came into effect when it was announced that the U.S. Customs Service had just completed a three-year sting operation against Mexican drug money-launderers. On the basis of the evidence gathered in “Operation Casablanca,” a federal grand jury in Los Angeles declared in May 1998 that it was charging three Mexican banks and numerous Mexican bankers with taking part in drug money laundering schemes (Van Natta A6).
During the three-year investigation, the U.S. agents told the bankers that they needed to launder money that they had obtained through drug profits. Despite being told this, most of the bankers were “eager” to help launder the money in return for a 1 percent commission (Rosenzweig and Sheridan A28).
The final phase of the sting operation occurred when the U.S. agents lured the Mexican bankers to “American soil for a weekend of fun,” and the bankers found themselves being arrested instead (“Yankee Drug-Busters” 31).
The U.S. Customs investigation is an important step in fighting Mexico’s drug trafficking problem, because it “represents the first time Mexican banks and bank officials have been directly linked to laundering profits for the cartels” (Rosenzweig and Sheridan A28).
As noted in a report in The Economist, the significance of the case lies in the fact that “the American government – or parts of it, anyway – has dealt its first serious blow to Mexican traffickers” (“Yankee Drug-Busters” 31).
At the conclusion of the operation, U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin claimed that it marked an important step in the fight against drug trafficking because it enabled U.S. agents “to crack the elaborate financial schemes” used by the traffickers (Van Natta A6).
The U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno announced that, although the sting operation did not crush the Mexican drug cartels, “the arrests and seizures disrupted a major money laundering operation that had served as an engine of the international drug trafficking trade” (Van Natta A6).
Thus, there have been recent signs of positive change in Mexico’s drug corruption problem. Nevertheless, it is not likely that the problem will be completely solved at any time in the near future. One of the main reasons for this is because the problem has been going on for so long it has become entrenched in the social and political systems of the nation. An example of this entrenchment can be seen in the fact that some of the Mexican drug lords have systematic “pay scales” for determining the amount of each bribe. In this regard, a “fee schedule” obtained as a result of the capture of the trafficker Juan Garcia Abrego indicated that the national leader of the Mexican federal judicial police was entitled to a $1 million payment, whereas the federal police commander for the city of Matamoros was entitled to only $100,000 (Andreas 163).
Another example showing how deeply rooted the problem is can be seen in the fact that Mexican police agents often compete for the best posts, where the bribes are expected to be higher. Eduardo Valle, a former personal advisor to the Mexican attorney general, claimed that, “while he was in office, the top Mexican drug enforcement posts were auctioned off to the highest bidder” (Andreas 162).
According to Andreas, corruption is inevitable whenever illegal drug activities take on the role of a “big business.” Regarding this, Andreas says there is a “logic” to drug corruption, in which bribes are viewed as a means to “purchase an essential service monopolized by government officials: the non-enforcement of the law” (161).
Andreas also uses the analogy of describing bribery as a “tax” on the business operations of drug traffickers (162).
The deep-rootedness of the drug corruption problem can further be seen in the perspective of the average Mexican citizen regarding the link between drug traffickers and the government. On this point, De Witt says that “the hidden but all-pervasive influence of drug lords has induced a vast collective cynicism among the Mexican man and woman in the street” (8).
De Witt continues by noting: “If a big dealer is busted, the general belief is that the arrest came through collusion between a rival trafficker and an ambitious PRI politico – who can then masquerade as an anti-drug crusader” (8).
Obviously, the drug related corruption is a problem for economic growth and political stability in Mexico. They decrease the stability of the government by weeding out those who are virtuous. The problem is very deep, because not only Mexican officials but also American officials are corruptible. Regarding this, it was reported in 1997 that there was growing evidence that local sheriffs and judges in Texas border towns were “accepting money from Mexican drug lords to turn a blind eye to their activities” (“Neighbours” 25).
Furthermore, many experts argue that the policies for dealing with Mexico’s drug trafficking problem have been wrongly focused. Some say, for example, that the United States has been too lax on Mexico. This laxity has been blamed on the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the eagerness of the Clinton Administration to see Mexico attain its annual “certification” as a co-operator in the international war on drugs. In this regard, Rochlin says that during the NAFTA negotiations of the late 1980s and early 1990s, “it was very conspicuous that Washington was much harder on the Andean region than on Mexico in the crusade against narcotrafficking” (Rochlin 110).
Other commentators say that the United States has placed too much emphasis on trying to cut off drug supplies through programs for such things as the interdiction of traffickers or the eradication of crops. By contrast, it has been claimed that too little time and effort has been spent on trying to reduce the demand for drugs in the United States and other places. It has been argued that cutting off supply routes is often ineffective because of “the so-called balloon effect, whereby applying pressure in one region simply pushes the trade elsewhere” (Rochlin 107).
This effect can be seen, for example, in the rise of Mexico to prominence as a gateway for drugs into the United States during the 1980s. During that time, successful U.S. interdiction efforts in Florida resulted in the Colombian cocaine cartels developing new routes through Mexico (“Neighbours” 26).
More fundamentally, it is argued that efforts to curb drug supplies are bound to be ineffective, because full success in that area can never be attained as long as a demand for the drugs persists. On this point, Rochlin says: “If there were no demand in the United States and elsewhere for illicit drugs, there would be nothing to interdict or eradicate” (117).
Similarly, Peter Brimelow has written in Forbes that many Mexican officials have been corrupted by the drug trade, “but it’s our money that is doing the corrupting” (46).
Despite these claims, the U.S. government currently spends about 70 percent of its budget for fighting drugs on interdiction and eradication efforts, and “only 30 percent on programs designed to curtail the apparently insatiable American appetite for illicit narcotics” (Rochlin 111).
As noted by a writer for The Economist, “there is little evidence that this achieves much” (“Neighbours” 26).
According to Mathea Falco of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, the emphasis on cutting off drug supplies rather than dealing with the domestic demand is a sign of the United States’ “long tradition of blaming other countries for its drugs problems” (“Neighbours” 26).
A think-tank study conducted by Falco concluded that the U.S. effort to control international drug supplies has failed, and argued that it would be more cost effective to try to reduce drug usage through programs for reducing consumer demand (“Neighbours” 26).
In their study on the problem of illegal prescription drugs and “drug tourism” along the U.S.-Mexico border, Valdez and Sifaneck likewise concluded that it is difficult to stop the flow of drugs across the border when a demand for the drugs already exists in the United States (894).
In a recent article in the journal Current History, Peter Andreas notes that there are signs that the Mexican drug trade and its resultant corruption may diminish somewhat in upcoming years. According to Andreas, there are two forms of corruption: “crisis corruption,” which is disruptive, unstable and violent, and “normal corruption,” which is more subtle and stable. Andreas compares the current drug trafficking situation in Mexico to the oil boom that occurred in the nation in the late 1970s. At that time, a dramatic increase in oil profits caused the “corrupt arrangements” between politicians and the oil industry to become more “flagrant and disruptive” (165).
In 1982, when the oil boom ended, corruption continued, but it was no longer at a “crisis” level. Similarly, Andreas predicts that “the relationship between drug smuggling and the state may eventually settle down, resulting in a more stable, predictable, and less violent business environment” (165).
Andreas further notes that there are signs that Colombian drug lords are responding to “the high cost of moving their product through Mexico” by “redeveloping routes through the Caribbean and south Florida.” Regarding this, Andreas says that “a greater diversification of smuggling routes may help to reduce corruption in Mexico” (165).
Nevertheless, Andreas agrees with the overall view held by most other writers on the subject that, although the situation may change over time, the problem will not be completely resolved as long as a demand for drugs continues to exist. Thus, Andreas concludes his article by indicating that “Mexico’s close proximity to the United States market assures that the logic of narco-corruption will remain entrenched” (165).
Mexico?s only hope to ensure economic growth and political stability is to eliminate narco-corruption. High profile arrests need to continue being made when political officials are swayed by corruption. ?If these crimes are not addressed, the political reform will fail, because credibility of the institutions you are reforming is not going to be recovered? (Oppenheimer 336).
The United States can help rid corruption by placing more pressure on the Mexican government to pull itself away from openly accepting the drug trade. This would turn on investors who would likely reward Mexico with a capital inflow.
?Once again the atmosphere in government offices and Wall Street brokerage houses (could be) jubilant. And many Mexicans, with fresh memories of the country?s recent crises, ask themselves whether the men in power would ever learn from their mistakes??
Bibliography:
Works Cited Andreas, Peter. “The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico.” Current History 97 (April 1998), 160-165. Brimelow, Peter. “A Dirty Shade of Green.” Forbes 159 (April 7, 1997), 46-47. “Centre and States.” The Economist 336 (September 2, 1995), 38+.
De Witt, Addison. “Looking for an Alternative in Mexico.” The New Leader 81 (March 9-23, 1998), 6-8. Fritsch, Peter, and Jose De Cordoba. “Mexican Ex-Official’s ‘Family Fortune’ Was Drug Payoffs, U.S. Alleges at Trial.” Wall Street Journal (March 11, 1997), A18.
Golden, Tim. “A Cocaine Trail in Mexico Points to Official Corruption.” New York Times (April 19, 1995), A1+.
Golden, Tim. “Salinas’s Brother Charged In Mexican Assassination.” New York Times (March 1, 1995), A1+. “His Money Gone.” The Economist 342 (March 29, 1997), 26. “Mexico Names Anti-Drug Chief.” New York Times (March 11, 1997), A3.
“Mexico’s Great Salinas Soap.” The Economist 342 (December 7, 1996), 39. “Neighbours.” The Economist 342 (March 29, 1997), 25-26. Oppenheimer, Andres. Bordering on Chaos: Guerrillas, Stockbrokers, Politicians, and Mexico’s Road to Prosperity. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1996.
Preston, Julia. “Swiss to Seize Salinas Millions, Tying the Money to Drugs.” New York Times (April 4, 1997), A3.
Rochlin, James F. Redefining Mexican ‘Security’: Society, State and Region Under NAFTA. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997.
Rosenzweig, David, and Mary Beth Sheridan. “Mexican Banks Indicted in Drug Money Probe.” Los Angeles Times (May 19, 1998), A1+.
Solis, Dianne. “Mexico Replaces Its Disgraced Drug Czar.” Wall Street Journal (March 11, 1997), A18.
Valdez, Avelardo, and Stephen J. Sifaneck. “Drug Tourists and Drug Policy on the U.S.-Mexican Border: An Ethnographic Investigation of the Acquisition of Prescription Drugs.” Journal of Drug Issues 27 (Fall 1997), 879-897. Van Natta, Don, Jr. “U.S. Indicts 26 Mexican Bankers in Laundering of Drug Profits.” New York Times (May 19, 1998), A6. “Yankee Drug-Busters Head South.” The Economist 347 (May 23-29, 1998), 31.
