In his prison cell at Nuremberg, Hitler’s foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, wrote a brief memoir in the course of which he explored the reasons for Germany’s defeat. He picked out three factors that he thought were critical: the unexpected ‘power of resistance’ of the Red Army; the vast supply of American armaments; and the success of Allied air power. This last was Hitler’s explanation too. When Ribbentrop spoke with him a week before the suicide in the bunker, Hitler told him that, ‘the real military cause of defeat’ was the failure of the German Air Force.’ For the Allies in World War Two, the defeat of Germany was their priority.’ For all his many failings Ribbentrop was closer to the truth than he might have realised. For the Allies in World War Two, the defeat of Germany was their priority. Italy and Japan never posed the same kind of threat as the European superpower they fought alongside.
Their defeat, costly though it was, became irresistible. The key to ending the world crisis was the defeat of Hitler’s Germany. This outcome was not pre-ordained, as is so often suggested, once the British Empire was joined by the USSR and the USA in 1941. The Allies had to mobilise and utilise their large resources effectively on the battlefield and in the air. This outcome could not be taken for granted. British forces were close to defeat everywhere in 1942.
The American economy was a peacetime economy, apparently unprepared for the colossal demands of total war. The Soviet system was all but shattered in 1941, two-thirds of its heavy industrial capacity captured and its vast air and tank armies destroyed. This was a war, Ribbentrop ruefully concluded, that ‘Germany could have won’. Soviet resistance was in some ways the most surprising outcome. The German attackers believed that Soviet Communism was a corrupt and primitive system that would collapse, in Goebbels’ words ‘like a pack of cards’. The evidence of how poorly the Red Army fought in 1941 confirmed these expectations.
The Essay on Erika Riemann’s Oral Testimony on Life in East Germany During the Cold War
There had been massive destruction of the country’s infrastructure (Bessel 2011), it lacked political structure and economic activity had plummeted. There was a scarcity of food, fuel and housing and Germany was in no condition to clothe or feed its population (O’Dochartaigh 2003). Following conferences at Potsdam between the Soviet Union and the Western allies (America, Britain and France) in ...
More than five million Soviet soldiers were captured or killed in six months; they fought with astonishing bravery, but at every level of combat were out-classed by troops that were better armed, better trained and better led. This situation seemed beyond remedy. Yet within a year Soviet factories were out-producing their richly-endowed German counterparts – the Red Army had embarked on a thorough transformation of the technical and organisational base of Soviet forces, and a stiffening of morale, from Stalin downwards, produced the first serious reverse for the German armed forces when Operation Uranus in November 1942 led to the encirclement of Stalingrad and the loss of the German Sixth Army.
