afrika spectrum 33 (1998) 1: 57 – 79
Axel Harneit-Sievers1
Igbo ‘Traditional Rulers’:
Chieftaincy and the state in Southeastern Nigeria
Since the 1970s, the institution of chieftaincy has gained much prominence in the
social and political life of Nigeria. The growing importance of Traditional Rulers
(sometimes even called ‘natural rulers’) in everyday affairs, in local and national
politics in Nigeria has received comparatively little attention by social scientists –
especially so for areas where no strong chieftaincy institutions existed in pre-colonial times.2
The expansion of the chieftaincy institution, in terms of influence and quantity
of office-holders, and its increasing visibility are irritating facts, compared to the
prognoses of social theory. Classical modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s
assumed that the principles of ‘modern’ formalized bureaucratic office and of functional differentiation would become more important than ‘traditional’ leaders. In a
parallel way, underdevelopment and dependency theory hardly foresaw a renewed
boom for an institution which they thought to be rooted in a pre- or non-capitalist
setting.
Such conceptual difficulties can, of course, easily be resolved if contemporary
chieftaincy institutions in Nigeria are understood not only, and not even primarily,
as belonging to a pre-modern, pre-capitalist past; but rather as institutions which
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1. Brief Demographic Background of Nigeria: The demographic characteristics of Nigeria set the platform for an understanding of the case for conflict based National early warning system. A historical analysis of major conflicts in Nigeria since independence points to strong linkages to its demographic composition. It has been unarguably regarded as the most populous country in the Africa and also ...
have either (been) adapted to the contemporary socio-political setting, or even
have been specifically created for or by it.
Obviously, the Nigerian experience provides numerous examples for the compatibility between chieftaincy institutions based on the principle of tradition on the
one hand, and ‘modernity’ and capitalism (or, rather, Nigeria’s peculiar version of
1
The author is a member of the research group ‘Locality and the State: The Construction of Spatial and Social Order in Modern African and Asian History’ at the Center for Modern Oriental
Studies, Berlin. He wishes to express his gratitude for the funding provided for the research by the
German Research Council and the Senate of the City of Berlin. Special thanks for comments on
an earlier draft (which has been put for discussion on the igbo–net Internet mailing list) go to
Kevin Ani, Maurice O. Ene, Chima J. Korieh, Marion Pape, and Ute Röschenthaler.
2
Much of the information about contemporary chieftaincy and Traditional Rulers in Nigeria can be
found within literature on local government in Nigeria, for example Aborisade (1985) and Orewa
(1991).
Vaughan (1997) looks at contemporary relations between Traditional Rulers and national
politics; Barnes (1996) studies the symbolic dimension of public performances of chieftaincy. All
the works mentioned focus on the North and the West and contain hardly any information about
the post-civil war development of the chieftaincy institution in Igboland; for aspects of this see
Hahn-Waanders (1985), Awa (1992), Inyama (1993) and Nwaubani (1994).
57
Axel Harneit-Sievers
it3) on the other. Throughout Nigeria, there are numerous well-educated holders of
chieftaincy titles with strong business interests; conversely, virtually every successful businessman attempts to acquire such a title, this practice being so common that titles are nowadays widely perceived to be ‘purchased’ (rather than hereditary, or earned as a matter of honor).
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Important politicians accumulate several
dozen titles.4 Such honorary titles, however, are of a secondary nature, in so far as
they are usually conferred by officially-recognized holders of traditional titles: the
Traditional Rulers.
This article mainly focuses on this latter group, reserving the term ‘Traditional
Ruler’ (capitalized) as the widely accepted designation for a government-recognized title-holder since the mid-1970s. In contrast, the more general term ‘chief’ is
used here to refer to all holders of leadership positions and honorary offices who
carry titles which refer for their legitimacy to the principle of tradition.
Obviously, the chieftaincy institution in Nigeria is modern, to a high degree, and
well adapted to capitalism. At the same time, chieftaincy is always understood and
legitimized as being founded on the principle of tradition; chieftaincy without reference to tradition seems an unimaginable concept – a contradiction in itself.
Numerous Nigerian societies in fact had elaborated chieftaincy institutions, whose
holders individually and effectively ruled qua office, in the pre-colonial era. This
was the case not only in the Islamic core areas of the North (Sokoto Caliphate,
Bornu) but also in the large-scale states of the South, like the Benin Empire and
the Yoruba city-states. In these cases, the reference to tradition of chieftaincy
makes some sense – if (as is widely done in Nigeria) the term ‘tradition’ is
understood to refer to a continuity from some pre-colonial status quo, at least in the
late 19th century if not at some much earlier period in history. Even then the fact
may frequently and conveniently be overlooked that the functions and meanings of
the institution might have drastically changed, transformed, and possibly even
perverted, during the last century, and increasingly so in recent decades.
However, there are many areas of the country where chieftaincy institutions did
not exist in pre-colonial times, or, at least, were much less significant than in the
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Not much is known about idiocy in colonial America. A state equivalent to psychological retardation, idiocy has been abandoned in studies of the American colonies partially because of the scarcity of documentation and partly because of the unconcern of scholars. Those studies, which do touch on idiocy, leave disjointed, unfinished, and, sometimes, inexact impressions of the ways colonists thought ...
above-mentioned cases. The largest single ethnic group of this kind (with certain
exceptions, see below) are the Igbo; there are many others in Southeastern
Nigeria as well as in much of the so-called ‘Middle Belt’. In these societies, chiefs
as rulers emerged only during the colonial period. Among the Igbo, colonial chiefs
were at times strongly resented by the population; and it will be shown in this
article that neither the colonial state nor the governments of independent Nigeria
did always provide a guarantee for their continued existence. Igbo chieftaincy has
3
Post-Civil War Nigerian capitalism and the relationship between economy and the state has
been conceptualized in various ways, most of them starting off from the ‘rentier state’ concept: as
‘prebendal politics’ (Joseph 1987), ‘pirate capitalism’ (Schatz 1984), or ‘predatory rule’ (Lewis
1997).
In a variation of this theme, Forrest (1995: 255-6) judges at least some groups of private
capital owners to be more independent of the state.
4
Chukwuemeka Odugmegwu-Ojukwu, the former leader of the Biafran secession, was reported in
1996 to have just acquired his 90th title, see ‘Igbo Debate: Whose King?’, The Week Magazine,
June 12, 1996 (reproduced on igbo–net, June 14, 1996).
58
Igbo ‘Traditional Rulers’
few pre-colonial roots, and even its colonial foundation is comparatively weak. If
the term ‘tradition’ is applied to Igbo Traditional Rulers, one has to be aware that it
does not refer to pre-colonial historical facts, but primarily constitutes a strategy of
gaining legitimacy for a rather contemporary phenomenon.
Since the late 1970s, the chieftaincy institution in Igboland has flourished remarkably. By the late 1980s, there were 820 government-recognized Igbo Traditional Rulers – ‘kings’ (Inyama 1993:216) carrying the titles eze in Imo State, and
eze, igwe or obi, officially addressed as ‘His Royal Highness’ (‘HRH’), in Anambra
State. Most of these Traditional Rulers are not ‘traditional’ in that their position has
no direct pre-colonial pendant; if any, their office is based on a tradition created
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rather recently. Nor do they ‘rule’ in a formal sense. Nonetheless, as Ebere Nwaubani (1994: 347) in one of the very few long-range historical analyses of the
institution, has put it, in contemporary Igbo society, Traditional Rulers have
become permanent and influential ‘guest[s] on the center-stage’.
This article, firstly, sketches the emergence of the Igbo chieftaincy institution in
the 20th century. Overall, the institution was created, supported, and decisively
shaped by the colonial and post-colonial state, even though there were periods
when government policies diminished the role of chiefs in favor of more participatory forms of local administration. Secondly, the article analyzes in a more detailed
way the development of Igbo Traditional Rulers since the late 1970s. It studies the
legal and political framework in which they have emerged, their social background,
their relationship with government, their roles in the local setting and the
symbolism they employ. It turns out that contemporary Igbo Traditional Rulers form
a heterogeneous group of local leaders which forms an interface between the
locality they ‘rule’ and the modern state. Still, ongoing debates about the legitimacy
of Igbo Traditional Rulers show that their role remains contested.
1 Igbo chieftaincy in historical perspective
Most classical social anthropological and historical accounts of Igbo society have
described it as prototypically ‘stateless’, ‘acephalous’, or ‘segmentary’ (Meek 1937,
Green 1947, Forde/Jones 1950, Jones (1957), Uchendu 1965 – for a review see
Goltzsche 1976; Isichei 1976, Ifemesia 1978), consisting of autonomous villages
and village groups (obodo, ‘town’) ruled by ‘diffused’ authority without formalized,
permanent, or hereditary leadership positions. Uchendu (1965) described the prototypical Igbo traditional local political organization as ‘an exercise in direct democracy’ (41) on the village level, with a ‘representative assembly’ (46) on the level of
the village group. To be sure, there were exceptions to this general picture: Some
Igbo communities, especially trading cities along the Niger like Onitsha and Oguta
The Essay on The Captaincy System: Differences Between Portuguese Rule and Local Authority in Colonial Brazil
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(Nzimiro 1972) and the ‘holy city’ of Nri (Afigbo 1981:31-68) had elaborated chieftaincy institutions in pre-colonial times. Especially the case of Nri has fuelled both
academic and popular imagination, because the stirring archaeological findings at
Igbo-Ukwu seem to suggest to some authors (especially Onwuejeogwu 1980,
59
Axel Harneit-Sievers
1981; see also Hahn-Waanders 1985, Grau 1993) the existence of a one thousand
year-old tradition of Nri sacral kingship and ‘hegemony’ over large parts of
Igboland. This theory is welcome in current popular and political debates about
Igbo chieftaincy, as it seems to be able to prove the traditional character of
contemporary Igbo Traditional Rulers’ titles. Nonetheless, even in current debates
in Nigeria, most people continue to view Igbo society as being traditionally based
on ‘democratic principles’ (Aguwa 1993:20), as expressed in the common proverb
igbo enwe(ghi) eze, ‘the Igbo have no king’.
However ‘democratic’, inner structures of pre-colonial Igbo communities were
far from egalitarian. Igbo society had its ‘slaves’ (ohu) and ‘cult-slaves’ (osu) on the
one hand, and it had leaders on the other. Depending on what sub-cultural area of
Igboland we are talking about, there were lineage headships, influential age
groups, and powerful titled and secret societies. There were also individuals carrying the title eze or obi, indicating a special degree of influence and power, though
not independent of the person and, especially, the wealth it could mobilize. The
majority of such leadership positions were held by men. However, there were also
female assemblies and individual leaders, and female titles in some places, in what
has been described as a ‘dual-sex political system’ with gendered complementary
structures (Okonjo 1976; for a critique of the concept see Amadiume 1997:112-13).
Some of the leadership positions were restricted to elders, often of certain lineages
only; others were based on individually achieved status and purchasing power, especially the ozo-titles.
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The Case for a Vital and Strong National Government Taking the Initiative in Order to Achieve Social and Economic Justice Social and economic justice is the necessary prerequisite of our future. What are the main characteristics of a social government? What is social justice? What is the social policy of our government? What is economic justice? Finally, what initiative might the federal ...
As regards these leadership positions, a common feature is their high degree
of local diversity, in two ways: First, the rules by which an individual obtained a
position differed from place to place. Second, while certain Igbo communities
(especially Nri and Arochukwu) exerted a certain wide-range commercial or ritual
influence, the leaders even of these communities did not exert direct power outside
of their own community.
1.1 Colonial chieftaincy
The story of how British colonialism introduced the so-called ‘Warrant Chiefs’ in
Igboland is well known (Afigbo 1972), and will only be touched here briefly. In their
occupation of Igboland (the 1890s to about 1917), the British instituted Native
Courts and installed chiefs by warrant (hence the name) who controlled them. Frequently, Warrant Chiefs were installed arbitrarily: In some cases, personalities
were installed who actually had been local leaders before, but more often than not
it was an accidental affair. Sometimes, the villagers forwarded people of little
standing in the community to the British; on the periphery of Igboland, sometimes
even persons of external origin were installed. The Warrant Chiefs of Igboland
were installed without much recourse to local traditions of hierarchy and status,
without taking into account the details of pre-colonial local political structures.
However, this arbitrariness resulted mainly from the fact that the British knew very
little about the pre-colonial organization of the communities which they had brought
60
Igbo ‘Traditional Rulers’
under control. The British believed that African people had to be governed by
chiefs, somehow – it was a very crude version of indirect rule, but still believed to
constitute indirect rule, at least in its early years.5
In effect, many Warrant Chiefs solely constituted colonially-backed usurpers of
power and had little legitimacy beyond the fact of their being installed by the colonial state. Nonetheless, they held power and used it for their own gain. Their main
source of power was the control of Native Courts and of labor, for example for
colonial road and waterway construction (Ofonagoro 1982).
Enugu Warrant Chief
Onyeama, described as an ‘African God’ by his grandson (Onyeama 1982), controlled the flows of labor to the emerging coal mining industry and established himself as powerful ruler, combining wealth with terror and magical power over his
people. By the 1920s, the Warrant Chief institution had, in many places, become
synonymous with greed and corruption, and British administrative officers were
increasingly aware of this. But the system did not break down before the famous
1929 Women’s War which took place in large areas of Southern Igboland and of
the Ibibio-speaking areas further Southeast. Thousands of women attacked Native
Courts and besieged Warrant Chiefs (‘sitting on a man’, Van Allen 1972).
The
Women’s War made unmistakably clear the little legitimacy of Warrant Chief rule,
which since then has become paradigmatic for the errors about African societies
and their traditions and rulers committed by British colonialism.6
After 1929, Warrant Chiefs were removed from their positions of power,
although some of them remained local big men who themselves, or their descendants, even regained chieftaincy positions later on. The British began to reform
local administration in order to create a ‘proper’ indirect rule. By means of writing
Intelligence Reports, the colonial administration began a more systematic survey of
what it believed were traditional local African political and judicial institutions.
These reports revealed the existence of a considerable variety of pre-colonial local
political institutions and jurisdiction.
Based to some extent on these reports, in the 1930s new local Native Authority
Councils and Courts composed of elders and other members of the local elite were
created (ishi ani).
They were believed to resemble traditional structures of local
government more closely. In reality, however, many of them hardly did so, not the
least because the councils were based on large-scale ‘clans’, ‘federations’ and
other units which were much larger than communal units in pre-colonial Igbo society. The councils soon received much local criticism, both for what was seen as
their non-traditional character and, again, because of corruption (Afigbo 1981:3225
This is stressed by Afigbo (1967) – in contrast to the colonial discourse of the 1920-30s which, at
hindsight, deplored the Warrant Chief as system of direct rule against which a more acceptable
indirect rule would have to be constructed.
6
The reasons behind the riots were more multifaceted: the immediate critical issue was the
rumour that, after the introduction of direct tax on men in 1928, women would also be taxed; at the
same time, the fall in palm produce prices due to the world-wide recession aroused much anger
and was attributed to manipulations by the European trading firms, the premises of which were
also attacked in several places. But overall, attacks on Native Courts and sieges on Warrant
Chiefs constituted the most important aspects of the women’s war.
61
Axel Harneit-Sievers
23).
Surviving female power roles and executive positions were not transformed
into the new local administrative system which became an all-out male affair
(Amadiume 1987:147-50).
This fact was deplored already by Sylvia Leith-Ross, a
British ethnographer who studied Igbo women in the 1930s and felt, by that time,
‘too many vested interests’ were operating against formal administrative roles for
women. If such positions had been introduced earlier, she believed, Igbo men
would not have resisted (Leith-Ross 1983:95).
The system of the new Native Authority Councils remained in flux; the newly
emerging educated elite increasingly exerted pressure to be represented in local
politics. By the 1940s, the British administration followed what was called the ‘Best
Man Policy’ (okacha mma), by not any more insisting on elders as representatives
in the Councils, but encouraging communities to chose younger educated representatives. This fitted well into the early years of British West African decolonization policy after 1947, with its stress on local government reform and democracy as
a first step towards self-government on higher levels (Pearce 1982).
Thus, at the
end of the period of direct British colonial influence in Nigeria in the late 1940s and
early 1950s, for the first time, there was a conscious move in the field of local
administration away from the legitimizing principle of ‘tradition’, towards the legitimizing principle of ‘democracy’; both principles were perceived to be contradictory
at the time. Chiefs played no formal role any more in this system. The democratic
reality, however, seemed to have been little encouraging, as is, for example,
shown by frequent regional government intervention into the system of elected
local councils.
1.2 Chiefs in the era of decolonization
However, chieftaincy returned as an important political issue in the mid-1950s –
this time as a result of African, not any more of British colonial initiative. This return
cannot be understood without reference to the wider political framework of Nigeria.
By the mid-1950s, the three Regions of Nigeria had more or less achieved internal
self-government. Besides the elected parliaments, the Northern and Western
Regions established ‘Houses of Chiefs’ (on the Westminster model) as second
parliamentary chambers. In the Eastern Region strong demands emerged to
establish an Eastern House of Chiefs as well, because, it was argued, otherwise
one would forego an opportunity to stand equally with the other Regions.
Furthermore, the regionally dominant party (National Council of Nigeria and the
Cameroons – NCNC) saw an opportunity to increase its local standing by allying
itself with local power elites (Sklar 1963:445-46).
An official inquiry was held by the former district officer and then Cambridge
anthropologist, G.I. Jones (1957).
He was not to recommend whether a House of
Chiefs should be established or not – this was a political decision taken by the
regional government, not the least to gain sympathy of some Southeastern
minority ethnic groups (Sklar 1963:137-8) which actually had distinct chieftaincy
traditions dating from the 17th and 18th centuries. Jones was to make proposals
62
Igbo ‘Traditional Rulers’
on how to integrate traditional institutions into a modern, Western-style political and
judicial system. With his wide ethnographic knowledge of the area, Jones was well
aware of the changing character of chieftaincy institutions, especially with regard to
the claims made on them by the educated elite. He recommended a limited
inclusion of chiefs as ex officio-members in the local councils, a procedure for their
official recognition (and its withdrawal) by government, and salaries (to be paid for
by the respective territorial unit) for those of them serving on higher (county and
district) administrative levels. Out of Jones’ recommendation for the practical
implementation of a House of Chiefs, a system of grading of chiefs emerged.
Accordingly, a number of ‘first class’ and ‘second class’ chiefs were officially
recognized in the following years.
The Eastern House of Chiefs was dissolved, along with all parliamentary institutions in Nigeria, after the military coup of January 15, 1966. During the Civil War
years (1967-70), holders of chieftaincy titles played little role politically. The postCivil War administration of the East-Central State (comprising the Igbo-speaking
areas of the old Eastern Region) under Ukpabi Asika (1970-75) followed a program
of mobilization for reconstruction and development – as did the federal military
government under General Yakubu Gowon at that time. Local participation in
development was understood purely in ‘modern’ terms: it was believed to mean
mobilization partly by a strong state, partly through self-help by Town
(Development) Unions and other communal associations (Harneit-Sievers 1994).
This concept left little room for a formal inclusion of holders of chieftaincy titles in
local government, and customary courts disappeared. Thus, during the post-colonial ‘developmentalist’ military regime of the early 1970s, for a second time the
principle of ‘tradition’ was driven to the background in local administration, this time
not against the competing principle of ‘democracy’, but of ‘development’. And
again, as in the early 1950s, the results were not encouraging, as a political
scientist who studied the local situation noted: ‘The masses of the people were
convinced that those who went into council work as councilors did so for purely
mercenary purposes’. (Awa 1992:89)
2 Igbo Traditional Rulers since the 1970s
Official recognition of and political backing for chieftaincy institutions returned in
the course of the Nigeria-wide local government reform of 1976 that created
structures still existing today. This reform wanted to ‘bring government closer to the
people’, and to strengthen the role of the local level as a third tier of government,
besides the Federal and State levels. ‘Traditional rulers’, as the Udoji Public
Service Review Commission had put it in 1974, were believed to be important,
even ‘in the context of a development-oriented society’, to act as ‘the impartial
fathers of their communities and embodiment of local custom’ (quoted in Anambra
State of Nigeria 1976:6).
This policy was applied not only in the North and
Southwest, with their strong traditions of chieftaincy, but in the Southeast as well.
63
Axel Harneit-Sievers
In the Igbo-speaking Anambra and Imo States (created in 1975 out of the former
East-Central State), a fourth level, below that of the Local Government Areas, was
subsequently introduced by the creation of ‘autonomous communities’. It was on
this level that Traditional Rulers were officially recognized, with only one Traditional
Ruler in any single autonomous community, and standards for their recognition set
up. These standards have provided a certain uniformity among Igbo Traditional
Rulers, not only in the core Igbo areas – comprising Anambra, Imo, and the three
States carved out of them later: Abia, Enugu (both 1991) and Ebonyi (1996) – but
even extending into Igbo-speaking areas of neighboring Delta and Rivers States.
2.1 Legal aspects and government policies
The establishment of autonomous communities and the installation of Traditional
Rulers originated in recommendations made by a committee consisting of academics and civil servants in 1976 (Anambra State of Nigeria 1976; Anambra/Imo
States of Nigeria 1976).
Its chairman was the most prominent historian of Igbo
society, Adiele E. Afigbo, then professor at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His
writings have strongly influenced our understanding of pre-colonial Igbo social and
political order. Very much like G.I. Jones two decades earlier, he did not expect to
be able to re-install a traditional political order which he knew was lost to a wide
extent. But in contrast to Jones who had made detailed proposals about specific
local communities (though he had always argued not to force something upon
them what they did not want), the 1976 committee came up with a rather formal
proposal, designed to divide, to a certain extent, local and government spheres of
action. This proposal was enacted into State legislation soon afterwards. Since
then, governments of the Igbo-speaking States began to recognize (within certain
formal restrictions as to personal qualification) Traditional Rulers proposed by
autonomous communities; according to the law government should refrain from
intervention into the details of the selection process, but it reserves the right of
deposing a Traditional Ruler, for example, if ‘necessary in the interest of peace,
order and good government’. Only government-recognized Traditional Rulers are
legally entitled to carry the titles of eze and igwe; they may confer honorary titles to
others.
The legal procedures involved in order to obtain official recognition require a
Traditional Ruler to prove ‘popular support’ by his formal, public presentation to the
Governor. Furthermore, an autonomous community has to provide a written
‘constitution’ and a ‘code of conduct’ for the Traditional Ruler. However, the law
makes little provision to define how, in detail, these documents emerge, and who
writes them – except by a rather general reference to ‘customary law’. Thus, this
legal instrument in effect forces communities to put into a fixed, written form what
they regard as their tradition. (Some communities even went beyond this and published book-size accounts of their local history and culture, see Harneit-Sievers
1997.) Different from the colonial era of Intelligence Report-writing, the state does
not any more itself fix tradition by reducing it into writing; the post-colonial state is
not any more interested to get involved into the meanings and contents of local tra-
64
Igbo ‘Traditional Rulers’
dition. Rather, the state leaves these frequently contested issues as much as possible to the local sphere, and contents itself with creating a formal framework within
which Traditional Rulers emerge. From the government point of view, the specific
contents of local tradition, as regards the election of its leaders, simply does not
matter, as long as the community succeeds in writing the required documents.
In practice, however, government set up not only the framework, but interfered
in numerous cases. In Anambra State, the Chieftaincy Edict of September 2, 1976,
(modified by the Traditional Rulers Law 1981) resulted in a rush for recognized
positions as Traditional Rulers under control of the then military governor of the
State. The first 124 Traditional Rulers were recognized already on December 14,
1976, another 84 chiefs in February and March 1977. Judging from the speed by
which the recognition of this group took place, one may assume that these Traditional Rulers had been among the strongest supporters of the new legislation. At
any rate, they were able to establish their position without serious local opposition,
in contrast to the situation in other communities where the Chieftaincy Edict
sparked off local disputes and litigation. In order to deal with these cases, the
Anambra State government set up the Justice Agbakoba Commission, the decisions of which were not allowed to be challenged in the courts. By September
1979, when a civilian federal government under President Shehu Shagari took
over from the military, altogether 405 Traditional Rulers had been recognized in
Anambra State (Chieftaincy Institution in Anambra State 1980:17-18).
However, a
number of positions have for extended periods remained vacant, due to disputes.7
In some cases, communities seceded in order to establish autonomous communities of their own.
Developments in Imo State (Nwaubani 1994:364-69) were similar, though
delayed. A commission to inquire into contested claims was set up, too. In Imo, the
civilian administration under Governor Sam Mbakwe seems to have played a more
influential role in shaping the institution (Chieftaincy Edict 1978, Chieftaincy and
Autonomous Communities Law 1981) than in Anambra.
Even after the period of large-scale recognition of Traditional Rulers, relations
between them and the State governments continue to be ambiguous. Legally and
technically, government remains in control of their recognition and deposition. Traditional Rulers are not holding any executive offices in the locality, but are subordinated to the local government authorities; they are not even ex officio-members of
local councils. During the Second Republic (1979-83), Traditional Rulers had to
renounce their recognition if they personally wanted to enter party politics, though
only one did so 1979 in Anambra (Chieftaincy Institution in Anambra State
1980:18).
Active participation in party politics was regarded as contravening their
role as an ‘impartial father’ of the community. Legally, the role of Traditional Rulers
is defined as largely informal, and ceremonial. Their ‘rule’ is restricted to the com-
7
See Okeke (1994:12-13); his (rather incomplete) list of 171 autonomous communities noted 31
positions of Traditional Rulers as vacant, only some of them explicitly because of the death of the
former office-holder. Anambra State (1988) listed 46 vacant positions in 410 communities.
65
Axel Harneit-Sievers
munity for which they are appointed; the law does not provide for a Traditional
Ruler of a larger region or the whole of Igboland.
Nonetheless, in practice Traditional Rulers exert a considerable influence, most
of it by informal means and within their community (see below), but also with
regard to their relations to the Nigerian state, in spite of their dependence on
government. The institution of the ‘courtesy call’ to the Traditional Ruler, paid by
visiting military governors and civilian politicians, is especially noteworthy in this
regard. While the term ‘courtesy call’ indicates some degree of informality, even of
detachment from everyday political affairs, in practice such visits are highly
formalized ways to meet ‘informally’, and they are strongly loaded politically. One
of their purposes is to prove to the (local) public the popular foundation of
government, and its proximity to the people; and sometimes Traditional Rulers may
be able to use such an occasion to voice criticism of government policy which few
others might be able to do (for an example see Nwaubani 1994:347-48).
The military regime under General Muhammadu Buhari (1984-85), after having
alienated many other interest groups by its autocratic and repressive political style,
strengthened the position of Traditional Rulers, not the least as a counterweight
against more radical political tendencies. Councils of Chiefs were created on the
level of the States. Under General Ibrahim Babangida’s rule (1985-93) ex-politicians and Traditional Rulers from the old Eastern Region even formed a lobby
group to advance the ‘eastern interest’. In contrast, the Political Bureau (1986-88),
set up by Babangida to discuss a future political system, wanted to keep
Traditional Rulers out of formal positions in local administration (Vaughan 1997:
418-27).
In spite of this contrast, as Vaughan (1997:427-29) has argued, it would
be misleading to construct an outright opposition between conservative
‘neotraditionalists’ supporting the military government of General Sani Abacha
(1993-98), and liberal intellectuals and businessmen opposed to it. In practice,
Traditional Rulers as well as considerable parts of the ‘political class’ have been
manipulated into supporting the military regime.
2.2 Personal profiles
Igbo Traditional Rulers do not belong to a separate aristocratic class, as Traditional
Rulers in some other areas in Nigeria do. For want of serious empirical research, it
is not easy to characterize Igbo Traditional Rulers in terms of social background;
statements on this topic have to be based mainly on a small number of (rather
incomplete) directories and a limited, through growing body of ‘hagiographical’8 literature, i.e. published biographies of Traditional Rulers, most of them probably
sponsored by themselves.
The variety of local conditions of the chieftaincy institution went along with a
considerable variation of wealth among Traditional Rulers, as became clear during
the government recognition ceremonies of 1976: ‘It was like a carnival occasion
when the first batch of traditional rulers were presented with their certificates of
8
I owe this term, which originally referred to Christian saints’ biographies, to Toyin Falola.
66
Igbo ‘Traditional Rulers’
recognition in Enugu by the then Military Governor, Col. John Atom Kpera. From
22 local government areas, the chiefs stormed the state capital with their
paraphernalia of office and distinctive traditional gear. […] The wealthy among the
chiefs sought to outdo each other in pomp and pageantry, and the venue of the
memorable occasion presented a riot of colors. Many of the chiefs brought a large
[r]etinue of supporters who sang in their praises, while the not-so-affluent had to
contend themselves with a couple of followers. There were also the lone chiefs
who had to travel to the state capital by public transport to receive their
certificates.’ (Chieftaincy Institution in Anambra State 1980:17)
From the few data available it seems that a large number, probably a majority,
of Igbo Traditional Rulers belong to the class of more or less educated businessmen (as common stereotypes hold, anyway).
However, some differentiation is necessary. In 1980, the Anambra State Broadcasting Corporation produced a booklet
(‘Chieftaincy Institution in Anambra State’) which contained a non-representative
sample of 44 short biographies of Traditional Rulers, i.e. about one tenth of all recognized office holders in the State.9 The Traditional Rulers were not necessarily
‘elders’: Less than one third of them was older than 60 years. 21, i.e. nearly half of
them mentioned an own business, 10 others had made a career as civil servants
(with several of them having been educated abroad).10 9 Traditional Rulers had
been installed for the first time already before 1960; 7 of them mentioned to have
been involved in local administration before the 1950s, for example Edward Nnaji
of Nike, Enugu, who since the late 1930s has made a life-time career out of acting
as a traditional leader, and about whom a remarkable body of hagiographic literature has been published (Nnamani (1985); Okoye 1993; Chidobi 1996).
10 Traditional Rulers described their positions as being based on rights devolving from
their family descent, referring to a ‘royal lineage’ or similar background; several of
them had succeeded their fathers in office. Many Traditional Rulers mentioned in
the booklet described themselves as supporters of local development projects,
sometimes in connection with Town Unions. Only a few Traditional Rulers
mentioned Christian connections (and only one of them was an ex-pastor),
although one may safely assume that nearly every one of them belonged to one or
the other Christian denomination.
Another directory with data for Imo State compiled in the mid-1980s (Osuji
1984/85) shows a similar structure: a majority group of men with own businesses
or in management positions of multinational companies; a strong group of civil servants; and a number of elderly Traditional Rulers who made their career as local
councilors or court members. Here as in Anambra, very few Traditional Rulers
described themselves in terms of a truly traditional rural leader: the ‘successful
9
Another directory, published a few years later (Anene/Akus 1985), largely confirms the data
presented here. The information compiled in these directories seems to have been provided by
the Traditional Rulers themselves.
10
In practice, the distinction between businessmen and civil servants is often blurred, because
many Traditional Rulers have been active in both fields at different times of their lives. However,
the self-description given in this directory is taken here to indicate the more important aspect of
their career.
67
Axel Harneit-Sievers
farmer’.11 Again, the Traditional Ruler’s role in development projects and their educational careers are given in much detail – only 3 cases mention ‘no formal education’. Nearly one-third of Traditional Rulers claim some tradition of office in their
family background, but this does not necessarily mean that they inherited their
position. Again, in a number of cases a direct succession from father or brother to
the current Traditional Ruler is documented (Osuji 1984/85).
On the background of
what we know about Igbo pre-colonial political structures, such claims have to be
viewed with much skepticism, of course. However, the claims may indicate certain
familial continuities in local positions of power existing for at least parts of the 20th
century, in some cases directly starting from the Warrant Chiefs of the first
decades of the colonial period. In this more recent sense, Igbo chieftaincy
traditions might, on a closer look, be stronger than often assumed.
Published ‘hagiographies’ and studies about individual Traditional Rulers provide examples for both types of legitimacy on which the position of Traditional
Ruler may be based: either on descent and tradition, or on popular consent.
Both Eze (Dr.) Onu Egwunwoke, Oha I of Ihitaoha Uratta, Owerri, Imo (Offonry
1993), and Eze Patrick I. Acholonu, Igwe X of Orlu, Imo (Okemezie 1990) are sons
of colonial Warrant Chiefs, received a good education and (at least judging from
their biographies) seem to have been able to take over the titles from their fathers
without serious challenges. Unsurprisingly, they claim a hereditary character of
their titles, as is otherwise common only among communities like Onitsha, Neni
and Awka in Anambra. Also, their hagiographies argue most consistently that the
Igbo used to have chieftaincy institutions in the pre-colonial period. Furthermore,
Ekwunwoke’s hagiography indicates tensions between him and the local Town
Union (Offonry 1993: 33, 37, see also Inyama 1993:228).
A markedly different picture emerges from the cases of Nathaniel Ogbonna,
Obi I of Nkpologwu, Anambra (Hahn-Waanders 1985), Eze Justus O. Ugochukwu,
Eshi II of Nkwerre, Imo (Ozurumba/Uzoechi 1990), Igwe Edward Nnaji,
Odezuligbo II of Nike, Enugu (Nnamani (1985), Chidobi 1996), and Lawrence N.
Ukah, Ohaire I of Mgbowo, Enugu (Akpa 1996).
Whereas Ugochukwu is a son of a
lower colonial chief and went to school, Ogbonna, Nnaji and Ukah do not claim any
‘royal’ background. The latter two have little education. Ukah’s life-story is that of a
successful businessman making his career from a very poor family background.
Ogbonna stems from an early Christian convert family and received university education abroad. All these Traditional Rulers acknowledge their communities’ active
support, especially by their respective Town Unions, in their gaining the title. With
such support, Ukah even succeeded against a competitor who was a descendant
of a Warrant Chief. All of these Traditional Rulers characterize their titles as
consensual and non-hereditary. Thus, contemporary Igbo chieftaincy allows for
11
The composition of the Imo State Council of Ndi Eze, comprising the politically most influential
Traditional Rulers, does not differ much, though there possibly is a larger share of former civil
servants and teachers and school principals among the Council’s members (data in Osuji
1984/85:122-160).
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Igbo ‘Traditional Rulers’
considerable variations, as regards forms of legitimacy and resulting political
styles.
2.3 Local roles, borrowed symbols, public criticisms
Most functions of Igbo Traditional Rulers lie within the autonomous community. For
example, the role of the ‘impartial father’ involves peace-making functions within
the community and in conflicts with neighbors. A Traditional Ruler should also promote local development, and achievements in this field play a major role in most
documents where Traditional Rulers present themselves publicly. A Traditional
Ruler should organize local consensus, by consultation with his ‘cabinet’, a council
of local representatives and elders.
At the same time Traditional Rulers act as instruments of state control on the
local level: They are frequently (though not ex officio) members of the customary
courts re-constituted since the late 1970s.12 They should not only ‘co-operate with
the local government council’, but also ‘assist […] in the collection of taxes’
(Anambra State Traditional Rulers Law 1981, para 15).
In Anambra State, those
Traditional Rulers who successfully manage the tax collection effort, receive a
commission on the proceeds (Anene & Akus 1985:2-3).
Governments like to see
Traditional Rulers as transmission belts for promoting their policies, for example
the ‘War Against Indiscipline’ of the Buhari years, into the local sphere (ibid.: 3).
Traditional Rulers have to be men of considerable own means, as government
‘stipends’ have not been consistent; only some well-connected Traditional Rulers
seem to receive government funds on a larger scale.13 In contrast to many areas in
Africa, Igbo Traditional Rulers do not receive a regular income from land rents; in
fact, the federal Land Use Decree of 1978, by which control over land was vested
in the government, deprived Traditional Rulers of a potential source of income
12
Customary courts were abolished by the post-Civil War Asika administration (Awa 1992:47) but
reconstituted in the late 1970s, see Anambra State Customary Courts Edict 1977, Imo State
Customary Courts Law 1981.
13
In its 1976 chieftaincy legislation, Anambra State had originally provided a government stipend
for Traditional Rulers on the state level, but the military governor soon rescinded this for lack of
funds, so that Traditional Rulers were depending only on the local government level for financial
support (Chieftaincy Institution in Anambra State 1980:20-21).
The Obi of Nkpologwu studied by
Hahn-Waanders (1985:187-189) up to the early 1980s had himself absolved from the duty of
residence at his hometown, but lived in Enugu (where his company was based) because the
autonomous community would not have been able to provide him with sufficient income. Later on,
new sources of finance from government were introduced, but direct government funding (on
whatever level) up till today, in general, does not seem to play a major role in the finance of Igbo
Traditional Rulers. In April 1997, however, the Abacha regime decided that Traditional Rulers
throughout Nigeria should receive five per cent of local governments’ allocations (‘Monarchs to
Retain 5% of Council Allocation’, The Guardian (Lagos), April 6, 1997), a decision confirmed in the
1998 federal budget (NNJ, January 16, 1998).
However, the politically well-connected chairman of
the Enugu State Council of Traditional Rulers, in early 1998, had received official cars and
personnel at his disposal and received a monthly salary of N 50,000 (‘Death of a Royal in Politics’,
Tell Magazine, February 16, 1998, 22).
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Axel Harneit-Sievers
(Nwaubani 1994:365).14 One important and much-deplored source is the income
which Traditional Rulers realize from the conferment of honorary chieftaincy titles.
This is a phenomenon common throughout Nigeria, and it may fit, as Afigbo (1997)
has argued, into the Igbo tradition of taking honorary praise-names. However,
many people perceive this practice as a process of ‘bastardization’ of chieftaincy
titles that seem to have become easily purchasable.
Igbo Traditional Rulers’ role as ‘embodiment of local custom’ – an important
aspect of their ceremonial role – is highly ambiguous. Much of what might be
regarded as a genuine local tradition in Igbo society is connected with traditional
religion – its shrines, practices and rituals. However, already many Warrant Chiefs
of the early colonial period supported Christianity, even if the alliance with the missions remained shaky (Omenka 1993:248).
Among contemporary Igbo Traditional
Rulers, there is hardly anybody not professing to be a Christian. However, contradictions between the Christian precept of monogamy and the polygyny generally
expected from a chief are sometimes obvious.15 Under these conditions, Igbo Traditional Rulers regard themselves as ceremonial overseers and keepers of culture,
as represented by specific local festivals, masquerades and other customs, though
without too much public reference to the religious meaning of these practices.
Igbo Traditional Rulers present themselves to the public with symbols
borrowed from various sources. For example, Nike Traditional Ruler Edward
Nnaji’s ‘chamber’ in his ‘multi-million naira ultra-modern palace’ (photographs in
Nnamani (1985):48; Chidobi 1996:56) contains an assortment of throne, tables and
chairs, the decoration of which reminds of 18th century French absolutist court
interiors. At the same time, he surrounds himself with (possibly artificial, see
Cole/Aniakor 1984:49) elephant tusks, a symbol of power in pre-colonial Igboland
as well as in Benin. At the same time, Christian imagery is present as well.
Furthermore, the idea of the chieftaincy ‘stool’ (throne) as embodiment of local
history and tradition, perceived to some degree as independent of the particular
office-holder, seems to gain currency in Igboland, similar to the symbolism
employed in Ashanti (Ghana) or Bamum (Cameroon Grassland).16 Thus, Igbo
Traditional Rulers self-confidently borrow cultural elements derived from European,
African, and Christian origins. They appropriate local and alien symbols of power
by means of bricolage, and thus prove their potency as representatives of a culture
which is, despite all public references to tradition, far from purely locally-based.
14
However, this restriction was more important in other parts of Nigeria, especially in the emirates
in the North where Traditional Rulers (as different from the Igbo case) had in fact received income
from land.
15
With regard to polygyny, the public self-representation of Igbo Traditional Rulers (in the published directories) is not consistent. Some Traditional Rulers freely provide information on this
topic, while others seem to hide their marriage status behind terms like ‘married with children’.
16
Nnamani [1985] presents a photograph of the ‘stool’ (without the holder) on the front page;
Okoye (1993) titles his book ‘Chieftaincy Stool in Igboland’. Jones (1984:116-18) notes that
decorated stools for members of the ozo titled society existed in pre-colonial times, though they
lacked the symbolism present in the Ashanti case.
70
Igbo ‘Traditional Rulers’
Igbo Traditional Rulers remain contentious, among intellectuals as well as
among the general populace. For intellectuals, Traditional Rulers are frequently
objects of ridicule and harsh critique. Already during the period of civilian rule in the
Second republic, Chinua Achebe, arguably the most famous Southeastern
Nigerian writer, mocked at Igbo Traditional Rulers as ‘traders in their stall by day
and monarchs at night; city dwellers five days a week and traditional village rulers
on Saturdays and Sundays. They adopt “traditional” robes from every land,
including, I am told, the ceremonial regalia of the Lord Mayor of London’. (Achebe
1983:48).
Arthur Nwankwo, a prominent pro-democracy activist, recently criticized
the ‘wanton prostitution of Igbo republican, cultural and political heritage by new
apostles of pseudo-traditionalism’ (Nwankwo 1996:16) which, in effect, helped to
stabilize military rule. Igbo intellectuals who used to take for granted the
‘democratic’ character of Igbo tradition, in recent years find themselves engaged in
debates about the ‘republican’ vs. the ‘monarchical’ principle in Igbo culture and
society.
Critical views like that of Achebe and Nwankwo may not be representative for
the majority of the population. But even to people not belonging to the intellectual
elite, Igbo Traditional Rulers hardly appear as ‘natural’ superiors – a marked contrast to the situation in some other areas of Nigeria. This is reflected in the consensual character of many chieftaincy positions, already mentioned. At the same time,
Traditional Rulers are widely perceived as belonging to an elite which, often
enough, is corrupt and does not fulfil the functions expected from it. This explains
outbursts of public violence directed against Traditional Rulers in recent years.
When in September 1996 riots erupted in Owerri after cases of ritual murder had
become public, the ‘outstanding’ palace17 of Eze Onu Egwunwoke, chairman of the
Imo State Council of Ndi Eze (pl. of eze) and ‘a close ally of the ruling military
junta’, was among the many buildings attacked in town.18 In July 1997, traders
rioted in Aba after the police had turned out unable or unwilling to protect them
against a series of armed robberies, and burned the palace of Eze Isaac Ajuonu
Ikonne, Enyi I of Aba, also a member of the Imo State Council of Ndi Eze.19
17
The palace was formally dedicated in 1985. A whole chapter of Egwunwoke’s ‘hagiography’ is
dedicated to its description, according to which it contained, among others, a ‘Red Room’ for
special visitors, an obi meeting hall ‘capable of sitting 1000 people at a time’, a chapel, a banquet
hall, a ‘mini-stadium’ with flood-light tennis court with a ‘Royal Box’, used also ‘as the venue for
gala nights, cocktail parties, chieftaincy installations, receptions and ceremonies of all kinds’.
Furthermore, outside the main buildings there were ‘The Thatched House’ (intended to be a
museum) and various effigies and clay works, among them ‘an unknown soldier’ and ‘river goddesses’ (Offonry 1993:11-20).
18
‘War of the Headless Bodies’, Tell Magazine, October 7, 1997, 21.
19
‘Extra-Judicial Killings in Aba, Abia State’, CLO Human Rights Update, August 18, 1997. Details
on Ikonnu in Osuji (1984/84:136).
71
Axel Harneit-Sievers
2.3 ‘Eze Igbo’: chieftaincy beyond the autonomous community
Legally, the roles of Igbo Traditional Rulers are largely restricted to the local
sphere. Law and government policy want them to be a symbolic embodiment of the
locality they ‘rule’. However, there are concepts of chieftaincy going beyond the
autonomous communities, referring to the various Igbo diasporas outside of the
Nigerian Southeast, or even attempting to represent the entire Igbo ethnic group.
One of these concepts of chieftaincy beyond the autonomous community is
what Osaghae (1994:23) has termed ‘migrant ethnic empire building’. A considerable part of the Igbo population spends the major part of their lives as migrants
‘abroad’, i.e. outside their communities of origin (to which they continue to keep
strong ties).
Igbo migrants, like migrants of other ethnic groups, have begun to create own chieftaincy institutions ‘abroad’ in order to forward their interests at the
places where they live and work. In Kano, an Eze Igbo was installed in 1986, and
other Northern Nigerian cities have followed. These chiefs represent migrants not
from one particular Igbo community, but of Igbo origin in general, in some cases
even including migrants from neighboring Southeastern Nigerian ethnic groups.
The influence of the Eze Igbo at Kano depends largely on the consent of the local
Igbo ethnic associations (which are, again, organized on the basis of communities
of origin, but federated into an Igbo Community Association).
His area of influence
is strictly limited to Kano. He does not possess any comparable status in the Igbo
ethnic home area.
A second concept of Igbo chieftaincy beyond the limits of the autonomous
community uses the same title – Eze Igbo – but with a very different meaning. On
May 4, 1996, the former Biafran Head of State Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu,
who returned from exile in 1982, received this title from a Nri chief (the Eze Nri
himself was not prepared to confer such a title).
Therewith, he laid claim to the
status of a ‘king of the Igbo’ in their very homeland. This act, widely perceived as
presumptuous, aroused a major conflict between Ojukwu and other influential Igbo
political leaders, especially those within the powerful conservative lobby group
Ohaneze20 which later split about this issue.21 It remains doubtful whether
Ojukwu’s ambitious attempt to overcome the factional conflicts in Igbo politics, by
once again establishing a singular leadership position for himself, will succeed.
Besides power politics, much of the conflict is about the true meaning of Igbo
tradition, with those believing Igbo society to be ‘republican’ by tradition – they
certainly still form a majority – standing against a growing public presence of the
‘monarchical’ principle, as represented by Nri.
20
‘Igbo Debate: Whose King?’, The Week Magazine, June 12, 1996; ‘Ojukwu – The Unmaking of
a Myth’, The Week Magazine, January 12, 1997; reproduced on igbo–net, June 14, 1996 and
February 4, 1997, respectively.
21
‘Who Will Save Ohaneze?’, Tell Magazine, March 2, 1998, 22.
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Igbo ‘Traditional Rulers’
3 Conclusion
This article has sketched the history of chieftaincy institutions in Southeastern
Nigerian Igbo society in the 20th century – a society frequently perceived to be
‘democratic’ by tradition, where chieftaincy institutions played little role in the precolonial era. To a large extent, chiefs in Igboland were created by the colonial and
post-colonial states, but their history was more complex and changing than is often
assumed. It was the state as well which defined their role in local administration
and politics. However, government policies were not always consistently in favor of
chieftaincy as a core institution of the local state: It has been shown that twice – in
the early 1950s and again in the early 1970s – the state pushed the chieftaincy
institution to the background of local affairs. However, in both cases chiefs reappeared soon afterwards on the political scene, because of pressures from local
elite groups, and because of the governments’ interest to have loyal local representatives.
Since the mid-1970s, the presence of the chieftaincy institution in public life of
the Igbo society has considerably expanded. Traditional Rulers are officially recognized, in a somewhat standardized form. They are regarded as embodiment of
local custom in administratively-defined autonomous communities; they act as
patrons and mediators within the community and serve as transmission belt for
government policies into the local sphere. This article has shown a considerable
variance in the social reality behind the term ‘Traditional Ruler’ in Igboland: Among
them there are numerous wealthy businessmen with excellent official connections,
but also a few Traditional Rulers who describe themselves just as ‘successful
farmers’. There are descendants of colonial Warrant Chiefs claiming a hereditary
character for their position; but there also are numerous Traditional Rulers whose
selection was based on support by Town Unions, and who seem to view their
office in more humble terms, as a honor given by the community. This article has
also looked at the roles of Igbo Traditional Rulers in local society, at the symbolism
employed by them, and at current debates about the character of traditional Igbo
society, increasingly developing along the opposition between ‘republican’ and
‘monarchical’ principles.
In order to understand contemporary Igbo Traditional Rulers, it is of little help to
trust the rhetoric of ‘tradition’ – in the sense of historical roots from pre-colonial
days – which they employ in order to legitimize their titles. Most Igbo Traditional
Rulers have few such credentials, even if a more thorough historical study might
reveal that Igbo pre-colonial chieftaincy institutions were stronger than functionalist
social anthropology (which has dominated Igbo Studies for a long time) has been
ready to accept in the past. Most Igbo Traditional Rulers can base their claims to
office to a rather recent tradition, if any at all. Igbo Traditional Rulers are usually
firmly based in private business or in the civil service; they have received formal
school or even university education and are adherents of the Christian religion.
They creatively combine local legitimacy, local and foreign symbolism, and modern
business spirit in order to assert their positions. Without doubt, they are first and
73
Axel Harneit-Sievers
foremost dwellers of a contemporary, modern, and not of any traditional world.
Their ‘rule’ has, in most cases, no ‘traditional’ (in the sense of ‘pre-colonial’) roots.
However, they may be said to rule a sphere called ‘tradition’, in so far as they
preside over some of the cultural symbols and events which are widely perceived
today as constituting ‘local custom’ or ‘local culture’.
On the regional and national level, Nigerian governments since the 1970s have
increasingly used Traditional Rulers in order to legitimize their power. Under the
military regime of General Abacha, this trend expanded into outright manipulation.
Igbo Traditional Rulers have not been left out. In early 1998, Traditional Rulers
from all over the country were carried to the capital, Abuja. Here they watched
videos which allegedly proved the involvement of a number of senior military
officers in a coup attempt against the incumbent government. After being shown
the videos, and before any tribunal had taken place, they publicly declared that the
officers detained were indeed guilty of the alleged offence.22 Among them was
Igwe Emeka Nnaji, the Atakata Abusie of Amagunze, chairman of the Enugu State
Council of Traditional Rulers, described to have ‘elevated political jobbery to higher
arts’.23 Shortly afterwards, on Tuesday, January 27, 1998, he died while on a
‘courtesy call’ to the presidency, in a suite of the Nicon Noga Hilton Hotel in Abuja,
Nigeria’s most prestigious hotel.24 Which place could have been more appropriate
for him to join his ancestors?
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Zusammenfassung
Der Beitrag zeichnet zunächst die Entstehung und Entwicklung der Institution des ‘Häuptlings’ im
Igboland Südost-Nigerias – einer der Regionen Afrikas, die in vorkolonialer Zeit vor allem aus
autonomen Dorfgemeinschaften ohne ausgeprägte Herrschaftsstrukturen bestand – im
20. Jahrhundert nach. Die Institution wurde vom kolonialen und postkolonialen Staat geschaffen
und ausgeformt. Doch gab es auch Phasen, in denen der Staat die Rolle der ‘Häuptlinge’ zugunsten von stärker partizipativen Formen der Lokalverwaltung zurückdrängte. Im weiteren analysiert
der Beitrag eingehender die ‘Traditionellen Herrscher’, die seit den späten 1970er Jahren stark an
sozialer und politischer Bedeutung gewonnen haben: den juristischen und politischen Rahmen
ihrer Entstehung und offiziellen Anerkennung, ihre soziale Position, ihre Beziehungen zum Staat,
ihre Rolle in der Lokalpolitik sowie die Symbolik ihrer Amtsausübung. Es wird gezeigt, daß heutige
‘Traditionelle Herrscher’ im Igboland eine heterogene Gruppe lokaler Führer an der Schnittstelle
zwischen lokaler Gesellschaft und modernem Staat bilden. Ihre Position bleibt allerdings
umstritten, wie aktuelle Diskussionen über den ‘republikanischen’ oder ‘monarchischen’ Charakter
der Igbo-Tradition belegen.
Résumé
Cet article retrace d´abord l´apparition et l´évolution de l´institution du “chef” au XXe siècle en
pays Igbo, dans le sud-est du Nigeria, une des régions de l´Afrique qui, à l´époque coloniale,
étaient surtout composées de communautés villageoises autonomes sans structures de
domination bien marquées. L´institution du chef y fut créée et développée par l´Etat colonial et
post-colonial. Cependant, il y eut aussi des phases pendant lesquelles l´Etat affaiblit le rôle des
chefs au profit de formes d´administration locale plus participatives. L´auteur analyse ensuite en
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détail le rôle des “chefs traditionnels” qui ont gagné en importance sociale et politique depuis la fin
des années 70, c´est-à-dire le cadre juridique et politique de leur apparition et de leur
reconnaissance officielle, leur position sociale, leurs rapports avec l´Etat, leur rôle dans la
politique locale ainsi que la symbolique qu´ils utilisent dans l´exercice de leurs fonctions. Il
apparaît ainsi que les chefs traditionnels en pays Igbo représentent un groupe hétérogène de
chefs locaux au point d´intersection de la société locale avec l´Etat moderne. Leur position reste
cependant sujet à controverses, comme le prouvent les discussions actuelles sur le caractère
“républicain” ou “monarchistes” de la tradition Igbo.
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