One element in the current controversy over “political correctness” concerns the use of nonsexist language and policies promoting such practices. Conservative commentators dismiss the use of such words as “chair” or “chairperson,” ridicule women who prefer not to be addressed as “girls,” and challenge the overall concern with language as illustrations of “thought surveillance.” These criticisms of nonsexist language are hardly new, as conservatives have resisted contemporary reform attempts for the past two decades. Nor is criticism of nonsexist language reform unique to conservatives. Some feminists also express criticism of reform attempts, although such criticism typically focuses upon language reform as superfacial or misguided in its approach to linguistic theory and women’s oppression.
Feminist critiques of language reform, as well as the renewed attack posed by conservatives in the “PC debate,” raise questions about the nonsexist language policies we utilize in communication research and teaching. These policies range from research guidelines and publication style requirements (for example, those published by APA, MLA, and OSCLG) to suggestions for curriculum development and classroom practices (for example, those suggested by Jenkins, 1983).
The Essay on Using Language Reform to Change Gender Attitudes
If language mirrors the world, the generic use of masculine pronouns and other male-biased use of language in English would reflect a traditionally male-orientated view of the world, in which case it is interpreted as reinforcing the low status of women in the society (Crystal 368:1997). To please prescriptivists and feminists, Cheshire and Prentice endeavoured to argue that language reforms could ...
Despite a common concern with language reform, however, feminists and conservatives differ in their understanding of discourse and the strategic function of criticism.
Feminist critiques of language typically locate sexist language in relation to the oppression of women. In this sense, feminism assumes that the reduction of oppression requires envisioning a “utopian” component to what constitutes the “good life.” Young (1990) identifies self-expression and self-determination as two values necessary for justice or the “good life.” Self-expression, Young states, includes “developing and exercising one’s capacities and expressing one’s experience” while self-determination includes “participating in determining one’s action and the conditions of one’s action”. Young continues by arguing that “these are universalist values, in the sense that they assume the equal moral worth of all persons, and thus justice requires their promotion for everyone”. Sexist language, from this perspective, functions as a disabling constraint on women to the extent that language–as an institution–trivializes, insults, and excludes women in ways it does not trivialize, insult, or exclude men. The point here is not that sexist language prevents an individual from developing her capabilities and expressing her experiences (which it may well do), but that sexist language is an institutional condition of society which does not treat women and men as being of “equal moral worth.”
Cameron (1992) argues that while feminists typically unite in their condemnation of sexist language, they do so for different reasons. Cameron distinguishes between those who assume that sexist language causes women’s oppression and those who assume that sexist language is a symptom of women’s oppression. The causal approach, illustrated by writers such as Spender (1980) and Penelope (1990), argues that language determines how speakers perceive, categorize, and think about the world. The causal approach is critiqued for its determinism by writers such as Graddol and Swann (1989) and Cameron (1992).
The symptomatic approach is the focus of this essay because it is the most common application of nonsexist language reform in communication research and teaching and the approach most often cited as illustrative of “political correctness.”
The Term Paper on Adapting Communicative Language Teaching Approach to China’s Context
1. Introduction With the development of market economy, China is accelerating its steps to join the world family in commerce and cultural partnership. With the recent accession to the WTO, the long-awaited Olympic Games in Beijing, China has made learning English a national priority. English, with its unique status, has been taught in China for more than 100 years. Today, English is becoming more ...
The use of a symptomatic approach to language reform in the area of research is illustrated by the statement on “Avoiding Sexism in Communication Research” (1989) adopted by the Organization for the Study of Communication, Language, and Gender. Another example, provided by the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (1983), warns that “language that reinforces sexism can spring from subtle errors in research design, inaccurate interpretation, or imprecise word choices”. In the area of teaching, Jenkins (1983) begins a discussion of student-faculty communication with the premise that “college professors are competent, conscientious, and$professional individuals who neither desire nor intend to be biased, prejudiced, or offensive in their interactions with students”. In other words, a symptomatic approach assumes that most people are well-meaning and use sexist language because they are “unaware” of the problem or unable to think of more appropriate alternatives. Language reform, in this case, works first to educate groups within society about sexism in language and then to provide nonsexist alternatives. In addition to these examples, the classic version of this approach is Miller and Swift’s (1988) Handbook of Nonsexist Writing.
Cameron argues that while nonsexist language is less offensive, it obscures the ways in which apparently “neutral” language can be used to camouflage sexism. For example, when a speaker uses the term “chairperson” to refer to women and “chairman” to refer to men, then “person” functions as a euphemism for female. Reformers argue that this example illustrates the problem of non-parallel terms (akin to the classic example of “doctor” and “lady doctor”) where a supposedly neutral term becomes sexist in the context of its use. In semiotic terms, symptomatic language reformers adopt an analytic position on discourse which assumes a digital, either/or logic (Wilden, 1987).
The Term Paper on Changing Role Of Gender In Language
Examine the language in relation to gender, and observe its changing role in society. A businessman is aggressive; a businesswoman is pushy. A businessman is good on details; she is picky.... He follows through; she doesn t know when to quit. He stands firm; she is hard.... His judgements are her prejudices. He is a man of the world; she s been around. He isn t afraid to say what is on his mind; ...
Language, from this position, is a digital choice (either A or not-A) of either sexist or nonsexist selections. Therefore, the use of non-parallel terms, which is both nonsexist in its selection of a neutral term (such as “chairperson”) and sexist in its application (when applied only to women), constitutes a contradiction (both A and not-A).
Symptomatic language reformers urge speakers to “correct” such contradictory language. No matter how well-intentioned, contradictory language remains a “biased, discriminatory, or demeaning” choice which responsible language users should avoid.
On this basis, Cameron criticizes nonsexist language policies as being “lip service” and “cosmetic changes” which fail to do justice in reducing women’s oppression. Two different types of criticism are contained in this charge of superficiality. The first type of criticism points out that reformers tend to overemphasize the role of language to the exclusion of other aspects of daily life. As Ehrenreich (1992) comments:
Now, I’m all for verbal uplift. I like being called Ms. I don’t want people saying “man” when they mean me, too. I’m willing to make an issue of these things. But I know that even when all women are Ms., we’ll still get sixty-five cents for every dollar earned by a man. Minorities by any other name–people of color, or whatever–will still bear a huge burden of poverty, discrimination, and racial harassment. Verbal uplift is not the revolution. (p. 336)
Nonsexist language reform, in other words, is an inadequate response to women’s oppression because it fails to challenge or alter existing economic and social relations.
The second type of criticism of nonsexist language reform suggests that the issue is not merely a question of whether or not to privilege economic or social concerns. For Cameron, in distinction from writers such as Ehrenreich, the example of non-parallel language use demonstrates an important theoretical point: that is, the failure of an analytic position on discourse to define lists of words as either neutral (nonsexist) or biased (sexist).
“In the mouths of sexists,” Cameron notes, “language can always be sexist”. Other critics, such as Morris (1988), argue that meaning does not reside in a particular word but in the ways words work together in discourse. Language reform attempts, such as nonsexist language policies, are doomed to failure because they espouse a “politics of subverting isolated signs, not discourses”.
The Term Paper on AP language rhetorical terms list
Look up the words and fill in the chart as best as you can. Some of the terms are review and some are new. We will use this list throughout the year so keep an updated copy with you in class. You may choose to make note cards for study but they are not required for a grade. Periodically, you will be quizzed on how well you know the terms by using in your writing and recognizing in text. Terms When ...
These writers argue that instead of an opposition between choice and contradiction (or between nonsexist and sexist language) suggested by an analytic position, language use involves a hierarchy of levels which contextualize choice. A dialectic position on discourse, in other words, does not reduce discourse to a single level within an either/or logic. Instead, competing discourses (both not-A and A) contextualize choice (either A or not-A).
The struggle among discourses which both maintain and contest the dominant culture is exemplified by the very use of the term “nonsexist” instead of other possibilities such as “gender-neutral.” “Nonsexist” marks both the presence of the dominant culture as “sexist” and contests its presence in advocating the possibility of “nonsexist” language.
In sum, feminist writers such as Cameron reject the assumption of sexual neutrality adopted by nonsexist language policies. “I believe that it is less important for feminists to establish a particular set of nonsexist conventions as ‘standard’ than to make people aware of the non-neutrality of language” (Cameron, 1992, 127).
An analytic perspective on language reform implies that the choice of neutral terms alone would end the sexist utilization of linguistic and metalinguistic resources. While Cameron criticizes the assumption of neutrality, she does not discard nonsexist language policies. Rather, she reformulates the goal of such policies as a type of “stop-gap measure” or “visibility” tactic within an overall dialectical position on discourse. Cameron argues that neither traditional language conventions nor feminist alternatives are politically neutral. “We should therefore be honest enough to defend our tampering not in terms of its purported linguistic merits, but in terms of its political utility for raising consciousness, denouncing sexism and empowering women”.
The Term Paper on American Political Hofstadter Tradition History
WORKS of philosophy can last for millennia, novels for centuries. Works of history, if they " re really good, survive maybe a generation. But Richard Hofstadter's The American Political Tradition: And the Men Who Made It is now celebrating its fiftieth year in print and remains a solid backlist seller. High school students, undergraduates, and graduate students read it, as do lay readers. ...
Both Cameron and the language reformers she criticizes emphasize the ability of language change efforts to serve as consciousness-raising. In this sense, both positions emphasize the importance of language as an institutional constraint on self-development. Both positions agree that sexist language contributes to women’s oppression and constitutes a social condition of injustice. Cameron differs from language reformers, however, in that she emphasizes the second general value identified by Young: self-determination. Cameron rejects the static “fixedness of meaning” and the neutrality of language assumed by typical nonsexist policies. Instead, she sees nonsexist language policies as a way of “shaming the devil” or calling into question what is taken as common sense, a tactic Young describes as “politicizing culture.” As Young notes, “cultural politics has primarily a critical function: to ask what practices, habits, attitudes, comportments, images, symbols, and so on contribute to social domination and group oppression, and to call for collective transformation of such practices”. Thus, feminists who adopt a dialectic position on discourse utilize nonsexist language policies to embody two tactics: consciousness-raising and cultural politics.
It is this latter tactic which occasions much commentary and resistance. Young (1990) states that “many resist such thorough politicization of everyday habits, because it seems onerous to reflect upon and deliberate about what pronouns to use or whether one is interrupting other people too much”. The use of “one” here raises the question of who will find such reflection onerous. As Cameron (1992) notes, the resistance to language reform comes not because of the added effort of deliberate reflection, but because of the disruption of privileges taken as “immutable truths” by those who benefit from oppression and domination. What people fear, Cameron states, is “that in tampering with language, feminists may be able to tamper with reality”. Thus, both Young and Cameron anticipate the conservative reaction to what has come to be called “political correctness.”
The conservative resistance to language reform epitomized by the “anti-PC” advocates shares an initial resemblance to feminist critiques of nonsexist language policies. Both share a concern that the focus on offensive words betrays a superficial understanding of language. As Kimball (1992) remarks about the “ritual invocation” of “correct” terms, “it costs nothing yet nonetheless imparts a warm glow of superior virtue”. Even popular news magazines participate in ridiculing nonsexist language reform. In a brief report on the new Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, for example, Newsweek (“No Sexism Please, We’re Webster’s,” 1991) concludes an otherwise neutral description with a “humorous” remark: “The terms ‘waitperson,’ and ‘waitron,’ however, they [dictionary editors] report, have not yet replaced the traditional designations for those folks who take so long to bring you the womenu”.
George Orwell Language Political Essay
In this Essay, I will present the Life and the works of George Orwell who offers a portrait of a political writer whose major themes are man and his state, surely among the most significant issues of the 20 th century experience. The most important thing to know before the beginning of this Essay is that Orwell identified himself as a democratic Socialist and a "political animal", deeply involved ...
Whereas feminist critics seek to displace the analytic position on discourse utilized by language reformers, conservative critics seek to retain the analytic position but to shift the terms of analysis to ones more favorable to their political position. This maneuver is captured in the very term “political correctness.” The use of “correctness” implies criticism of the analytic view which presupposes that there are correct and incorrect words (or actions) from which to choose. The use of “political,” however, suggests the same either/or logic which would categorize language reform as “political” and the status quo as “non-political.” Thus, feminist critics adopt a dialectic position on discourse which defines meaning in terms of “how words work together in discourse,” while conservative critics maintain the analytic assumption of neutrality in how language represents reality.
The argument for neutrality is illustrated in the defense of terms such as “chairman.” If language reformers fail to see the obvious neutrality of such a term, then conservative critics cite “history,” common sense, or personal intention as authority for sexist language use (see Blaubergs, 1980, for an extended analysis of these arguments).
For example, “chairman” is argued to be preferable to the inelegant “chair” or “chairperson” because “historically” the term “man” includes “woman.” When language reformers point out that this view of an immutable historical determination for meaning cannot be supported by linguistic research, conservatives argue instead that “everyone knows” that “man” includes “woman.” When language reformers point out that empirical research does not support such determinism, conservatives argue instead that individual intentions should determine meaning–the supposed proof of which comes in the argument that if an individual uses “chairman” to refer to both men and women, then that individual does not discriminate between men and women. What is troubling about this example, beyond the willful ignorance of linguistic and communication research, is the denial of responsibility for language use and the accompanying projection of discrimination onto those groups targeted by such language.
This type of “concealing denial” and projection of discrimination forms the basis for the conservative charge of “political correctness.” The assumption behind this attack is that if the “politically correct” would stop going around and identifying instances of sexism, racism, and homophobia then there would be no sexism, racism, or homophobia. As Essed (1991) points out, this common trope enacts a reversal of responsibility which claims “racism is not the problem; people ‘who go around accusing’ others of racism are the problem”. In other words, conservative critics claim that civil rights legislation and social change have eliminated racism and sexism; and those who recognize differences of race and sex are the ones perpetuating racism and sexism, perpetuating divisiveness in society, and seeking to gain unfair advantage.
Only those who belong to privileged groups can afford the luxury of arguing that we should be “blind” to differences of race, gender, class, and sexual orientation. As bell hooks (1989) points out, “there would be no need to even speak of the oppressed and exploited coming to voice, articulating and redefining reality, if there were not oppressive mechanisms of silencing, suppressing, and censoring”. Young calls blindness to these oppressive mechanisms “cultural imperialism.” While such blindness may be an appropriate social ideal (and certainly one which deserves discussion), as practiced it functions to ensure the perpetuation of privilege and inequality. Those who claim to be blind to the identities of social groups assume their own group identity is neutral and universal. An example of this privileging can be seen in Hamerow’s comments reported in the Newsweek issue on “Thought Police” (Houston, 1990, 53):
Hamerow isn’t opposed to ethnic studies. “I do feel that students should know the history and culture of their own country first,” he says. “I feel that an American student should know American history before he or she turns to Afro-American history or Asian-American history.”
The claim for a supposedly universal “history and culture of their own country” in this example is in fact one specific part of “American” history–the Anglo-European part (often referred to as the history of “great white European males”).
Thus, the difference between specific histories at one level conceals a hierarchy wherein one history contextualizes other histories. As a result, any group that does not meet the standard for “universality” is judged as “deficient” with an “essence” that is “other.”
The practice of cultural imperialism is oppressive, Young argues, because it is institutionalized in our customary and habitual behavior. When critics charge the “politically correct” with being “overly sensitive” to language, they enact the taken-for-granted sexism and homophobia of the status quo. For example, in the previously mentioned Newsweek issue, two comic strips are reprinted which present the new superhero “PC Person.” “PC Person” confronts his archenemy “Insensitive Man” whose “crime” is using the term “chicks” to refer to “members of the opposite sex.” Such examples of ridicule suggest that the “politically correct” cannot “take it like a man.” Sensitivity, and the prohibition against sensitivity, in men is another way to mark individuals as other, that is as female or gay. Thus, the claim to neutrality attempts to conceal the sexist and homophobic practice it enacts.
What the charge of “political correctness” marks, therefore, is both an attack on language reform and a defense of the status quo. Raskin (1992) points out that “as a description of political ideas, ‘political correctness’ expresses, literally, nothing. It is an empty vessel of a signifier into which meaning is poured on a purely expedient and ad hominem basis”. The ad hominem attacks on those critical of the status quo is illustrated in the charge, taken up by Newsweek and others, that “political correctness” is “totalitarian.” As Hatlen (1991) comments, “the American Right long since persuaded itself that all people who ask critical questions are Liberals, and that all Liberals are ‘really’ Socialists, and that all Socialists are ‘really’ Communists, and that all Communists are ‘really’ Stalinists. Or at any event, the Right recognizes that tarring all dissenters with the Stalinist label is rhetorically effective”. The label “political correctness” is an “empty vessel” into which the meaning “totalitarian” can replace “one who criticizes the status quo.” Thus, it is more than a little ironic to hear conservative critics express concerns about “freedom of speech” while attempting to stifle dissent.
Finally, I note that conservative and popular press references to “totalitarianism” and “thought surveillance” in these cases reveal more than simple name-calling. They suggest an attempt to shift the focus of debate away from charges of sexism and racism within a politics of culture to a focus on charges of regulation and control within a “politics of authority” (Grossberg, 1992, p. 383).
The appeals to an objective history, a universal common sense, or individual intention are attempts to reclaim political and, especially, moral authority as the site of discourse rather than concerns for justice, fairness, or accuracy which typify the discourse of feminist critics. The challenge, as Grossberg emphasizes, is to ask “why this strategy has been deployed by the Right at this moment, and why it has been so successful, taken up within popular discourses and sentiments”.
The attack on nonsexist language reform suggests that the controversy over “political correctness” is an attempt to disrupt the increasing institutionalization of cultural politics in the university. In part, this conservative attempt to shift the grounds of discourse is successful because it plays into a distrust of institutions which can be found among the political left. Grossberg argues that one of the barriers to an effective politics which opposes, and not merely resists, the contemporary conservative hegemony is the tendency to reject hierarchy or organization as morally or ideologically impure. “Institutionalization is seen as a repressive impurity within the body politic rather than as a strategic and tactical, even empowering, necessity”. Institutionalization, in other words, can be seen as part of the problem and as one of the “master’s tools” which cannot dismantle the “master’s house.”
Nonsexist language policies provide a clear illustration of Grossberg’s argument. One of the reasons nonsexist language reform has succeeded during the past two decades, despite theoretical and philosophical deficiencies, comes from the extent to which nonsexist policies have been institutionalized. For example, students in the university encounter nonsexist guidelines just as they would other regulatory practices concerning such issues as plagiarism, class attendance, the composition of essays, and the mechanics of style. As a result, even when the actual employment of nonsexist language on campuses is sporadic and only partially successful, the burden of labor to organize and articulate opposition to these language policies and practices shifts to conservative elements. Institutionalizing nonsexist language permits the reallocation of resources around other sites of engagement. Nonsexist language reform may only serve as “verbal uplift,” but even so, it provides one less pressure under which we work to reduce the oppressive burdens of discrimination, poverty, and racial harassment.
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Eric E. Peterson, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor and Chairperson in the Department of Speech Communication at the University of Maine, in Orono.