Definition(Survivability)
Capability of a system or organization to withstand a disaster or hostile environment, without significant impairment of its normal operations.
————————————————-
Military survivability
In the military environment, survivability is defined as the ability to remain mission capable after a single engagement. Survivability comprises three elements:[2]
* Susceptibility – the inability to avoid being hit (by a weapon).
* Vulnerability – the inability to withstand the hit.
* Recoverability – longer term post hit effects, damage control and firefighting, capability restoration or (in extremis) escape and evacuation.
The concept of “Mission Survivability” whilst retaining the three core areas above, either pertaining to the “survivability” of a platform through a complete mission, or the “survivability” of the mission itself (i.e. probability of mission success).
The concept of “Force Survivability” which relates to the ability of a force rather than an individual platform to remain “mission capable”.
Definitions of Network Survivability[edit]
“The capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of threats such as attacks or large-scale natural disasters. Survivability is a subset of resilience.”[7][8]
The Term Paper on Airframe Structure Failure and Survivability
There are many different variables that come into play during an aircraft accident. It is an investigator's job to find out what caused the failure. Failure of an aircraft primary structure is ranked high on the list of risks aircrews would rather not face. Mechanical component failure which can lead to loss of control of the aircraft is not far behind. Another issue which must be addressed in any ...
“The capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents.”[9]
Combat vehicle crew survivability[edit]
The crews of military combat vehicles face numerous lethal hazards which are both diverse and constantly evolving. Improvised Explosive Devices, (IEDs), mines and enemy fire are examples of such persistent and variable threats. Historically, measures taken to mitigate these hazards were concerned with protecting the vehicle itself, but due to this achieving only limited protection the focus has now shifted to safeguarding the crew within from an ever-broadening range of threats, including Radio Controlled IEDs (RCIEDs), blast, fragmentation, heat stress and dehydration.
The expressed goal of ‘crew survivability’ is to ensure vehicle occupants are best protected. It goes beyond simply ensuring crew have the appropriate protective equipment and has expanded to include measuring the overpressure and blunt impact forces experienced by a vehicle from real blast incidents in order to develop medical treatment and improve overall crew survivability. Sustainable crew survivability is dependent on the effective integration of knowledge, training and equipment:
Prevention and training[edit]
Threat intelligence identifying trends, emerging technologies and attack tactics used by enemy forces enables crews to implement procedures that will reduce their exposure to unnecessary risks. Such intelligence also allows for more effective pre-deployment training programs where personnel can be taught the most up-to-date developments in IED concealment for example, or undertake tailored training that will enable them to identify the likely attack strategy of enemy forces. In addition, with expert, current threat intelligence the most effective equipment can be procured or rapidly developed in support of operations.
Analysis: summary of survivability definitions in current literature
Reference Definition of survivability is…
[1] To “provide quantitative measures for the network’s capability to tolerate failures and to provide continuous service.”
[2] Defined in terms of network survivability where it is “1) the ability of a network to maintain or restore an acceptable level of performance during network failure conditions
The Essay on Remote Access Systems Server Network Ras
Public phone lines and a modem are a typical communication conduit to connect to a company network. Although wireless technology will definitely change our options for connecting to a network from a remote location in the next few years, a modem is still the connection device most commonly used. To allow this type of remote access, Remote Access Services must be set up. Setting up remote access is ...
by applying various restoration techniques and 2) the mitigation or prevention of service outages from potential network failures by applying preventative techniques.”
[3] The “quality of a system to handle all essentially critical operation instances successfully.”
he “capability of a system to fulfill its mission in a timely manner in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents.”
[4] The “ability of a system to continue operation despite the presence of abnormal events such as failures and intrusions.”
[5] A “network’s ability to perform its designated set of functions given network infrastructure component failures, resulting in a service outage, which can be described by the
number of services affected, the number of subscribers affected, and the duration of the outage.”
[6] “Robustness under conditions of intrusion, failure, or accident.”
[7] The “ability of a system to maintain a set of essential services despite the presence of abnormal events such as faults and intrusions.”
[8] “That a system can be made robust to partially successful attack through general architecture features, through adaptability (flexible response to unanticipated changes) and
flexibility (ability to adapt to a range of adverse events without having to anticipate the particular response in advance).”
[9] To “provide network design and management procedures towards minimizing the impact of failures on multi-networks.”
[10] The “ability of a system to tolerate intentional attacks or accidental failures or errors.”
[20] Defined in terms of information survivability where it is “the ability of an information system to continue to operate in the presence of faults, anomalous system behavior,
or malicious attack.”
[21] The “ability of a system to provide service (possibly degraded) when various changes occur in the system or operating environment.”
[22] Where network systems “continue functioning even when under attack.”
[23] The “ability of a system/network to be maintained in the working state, given that a deterministic set of failures occurs to the system/network; therefore, the survivability is
The Term Paper on One System Network Company Security
Networking and Telecommunications Team B Assignment Terry Anderson Mary James Russell Thee NTC 360/ Network and Telecommunication Concepts Table of Contents Introduction Technology Involved Telephone System Network SetupCostSampling of Companies Possible Future Trends Global Implications Conclusion Introduction We have been hired to design a small network for a company that will utilize the newest ...
always “yes” or “no” for a given failure scenario.”
[24] “Phases of survivability are attack detection, damage confinement, damage assessment and repair, and attack avoidance focusing on continued service and recovery.”
[25] The “capacity of a system to provide essential services even after successful intrusion and compromise, and to recover full services in a timely manner.”
[26] “The availability within a crucial time period”
[27] “Network design and management procedures to minimize the impact of failures on the network.”
[28] Defined in the terms of a telecommunications network where it is “the ability of the network to maintain or restore an acceptable level of performance in the event of
deterministic or random network failures, such as link failures and node failures.”
[29] Defined in terms of performance where it will “ensure that, under given failure scenarios, network performance will not degrade below predetermined levels.”
[30] The “ability of a network to cope with facility outages, capacity overloads, and natural disasters.”
[31] The “robustness of communication networks vis-à-vis events that affect a significant portion of the network topology.”
[32] Where “integrity is not compromised at the occurrence of unexpected disasters.”
[33] The “measure of the degree of keeping the performances of a kind of military weaponry or equipments or other military forces, which undergoing enemy’s attacks.”
[34] The “ability of an item to perform a required function at a given instant in time after a specified subset of components of the item to become unavailable.”
[35] The “measure of a network’s endurance in the presence of possible component failures (of the measure of the magnitude of attack needed to render a network
nonfunctional).”
[36] Where “survivable network must achieve an acceptable level of performance under demanding conditions.”
[37] The “assurance of stored information’s integrity, confidentiality, and continuous availability guaranteed over time.”
The Essay on Targeted Attack On A Network Device
Company has been contracted to conduct a penetration test against [Organization] external web presence. The assessment was conductedin a manner that simulated a malicious actor engaged in a targeted attack against the company withthe goals of: Identifying if a remote attacker could penetrate [Organization] defenses. Determining the impact of a security breach on: The confidentiality of the ...
[38] Defined in terms of survivable information systems through adaptation where it is “allowing a system to continue running, albeit with reduced functionality or performance
in the face of reduced resources, attacks, or broken components is often preferable to either complete shutdown or continued normal operation in compromised mode.”
[39] Defined in terms of a survivable system where it “must be adaptable, able to respond to attacks and achieve its goals.”
[40] The “capability of a system to complete its mission in a timely manner, even if significant portions are incapacitated by attack or accident.”
[41] A “certain percentage of traffic can still be carried immediately after a failure.”
[42] The “degree to which a system has been able to withstand an attack or attacks, and is still able to function at a certain level in its new state after the attack.”
[43] The “capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents.” And was also defined as “preserving essential
services in unbounded environments, even when systems in such environments are penetrated and compromised.”
[44] Defined in terms of a survivable system where it is “available to fulfill its mission in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents.”
[45] Defined in terms of a survivable system where it “satisfies its survivability specification of essential services and adverse environments.”
[46] The “capability of a system to fulfill its mission in a timely manner despite intrusions, failures, or accidents.”
[47] The “capability of an enterprise to continue to fulfill its mission by preserving essential services, even when systems are penetrated and compromised.”
[48] “Service stream over time”
[49] “Assured continuity of essential infrastructure services under defined adverse conditions: natural, accidental, or hostile.”
[50] “Certain path-connectivity is preserved under limited failures of network elements.”
[51] Where systems “must continue to perform adequately in the face of various kinds of adversity.”
[52] The “capability of a network system to complete its mission in a timely manner, even if significant portions are incapacitated by attack or accident.”
The Essay on Ethics of Online Air Ticket Reservations Systems
Ethical issue is the belief in right or wrong with a particular area or system. In any organization ethical issue should be followed for the achievement of business objectives. Precision air reservation system, ethical issues are being considered for the achievement of company goal. The following are ethical issues relating to airline reservation system Security; Information’s which are being ...
[53] The “Extent to which the software will perform and support critical functions without failures within a specified time period when a portion of the system is inoperable.”
The Lazar BVT-SR-8808-MRAP is a Serbian built MRAP personnel carrier built by the company Yugoimport SDPR.It is named after Lazar of Serbia and it is a combination of MRAP and MRAV (Multi-role Armoured Vehicle).
It offers high protection so the people inside should be safe from gun attacks, land mines and explosions.
The MRAP has an high level of armour protection which was achieved by adopting an steel armour hull which includes ballistic glass panels and provides protection against heavy gunfire and attacks from RPG-7’s. The armour in the Lazar BVT-SR-8808-MRAP is an Reactive explosive armour provides effective protection against infantry of hand launchers such as RPG’s
III. Description of passive air defense measures
A. Hardening
B. Deception
C. Concealment
D. Dispersal
IV. Conclusion
A. Passive air defense: difficult, costly, necessary
Passive air defense, defines it as:
All measures, other than active defense, taken to mini-
mize the effect of hostile air action. These include
the use of cover, concealment, camouflage, dispersion,
and protective construction.1
passive air defense measures other than camouflage.
active air defense defined as:
Direct defensive action taken to destroy or reduce the
effectiveness of an enemy air attack. It includes such
measures as the use of aircraft, antiaircraft artillery,
The Term Paper on United States Missile Defense Nuclear
... Development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, mobile land-based, or space-based missile defense systems and their components is ... conflict arose that allowed for the stealing of nuclear weapons and equipment. Chris Wallace, Chief Correspondent of 20/20 ... subsequent measures. In addition, Western allies have also expressed concern about US deployment of a national missile defense ...
electronic counter-measures, and surface-to-air missile
systems.2
“Active Antiair Warfare” which includes our
attacks against enemy airfields and other air assets. These
are things every Marine can sink his teeth into: attacking
enemy air bases, shooting down enemy aircraft, and bombing
radar sites. Distinguished Flying Crosses and other decora-
tions come from such activities. Who ever heard of a medal
for properly dispersing aircraft around an air base or
cleverly disguising a fuel farm as something other than a
fuel farm?
Seriously, a good offense is always better than a good
defense. passive defense would result in destruction of our aviation units if our
active air defenses were to suffer the same atrophy as our
passive measures. However, a good defense is also required
if our forces are to survive on today’s battlefield.
What then are these passive defense techniques which may
be costly but are worth the effort?
cover, concealment, camouflage, dispersion, and pro-
tective construction.
PASSIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST AIR ATTACKS
It should be noted that to be effective these measures must
be considered a “package deal”. Employing only one or two
will not provide the desired effect which is to reduce the
vulnerability of our forces to air attack by enemy air forces
which break through our active air defenses.
Of the three objectives of passive measures, hardening
requires the least amount of imagination and planning.
Everyone understands the need to place aircraft in protected
revetments. Much of NATO’s aircraft are now sheltered in
hardened shelters which provide overhead as well as lateral
protection.
Construction of these revetments must be coordinated with the plans for
dispersal and deception.
Deception measures can be anything from an inflatable
decoy aircraft to an entire dummy airfield. The key to the
success of the deception is that the deception must be tied
in to actual operations and appear to be the real thing in
every respect.
Fueling, arming, and billeting areas must
be simulated as well as maintenance sites to present a complete
picture of an operating base. Simulated communication and
electronic emissions common to air base operations must also
be used. Realistic activity can be portrayed by having actual
aircraft land and takeoff from the site. The goal of all this
effort is to direct the enemy’s attention away from an actual
airbase.
The implementation of a deception such as a dummy air
base such as the one just described requires thorough planning,
increased manpower, and additional equipment.
The deceptive measures can not be effective if there is
not an equally well developed plan to impair the enemy’s
target acquisition attempts. Tonedown, camouflage, and
concealment measures are interrelated and have the obvious
objective of hiding something from the enemy. Dispersal
causes the enemy to look for more targets. The combination
of these four measures and the deception measures already
discussed will complicate the enemy’s targeting process.
A brief description of each of the target acquisition impair-
ment measures is needed to complete the discussion on passive
air defense measures.
Tonedown refers to the masking of brightly constrasting
features such as an 8000 feet long concrete runway in the
middle of a green countryside. Anyone who has flown over the
EAF at 29 Palms, California can also attest to the need for
tonedown in the desert. Tonedown will not hide the runway
from the target analyst, but it may cause the enemy pilot
conducting a low level, visual attack to spot the airfield
too late to commence an attack on his first pass. If he is
forced to commence a second attack it doubles our chances to
shoot his down.
Camouflage is much more difficult today with the various
electronic, infrared and radar sensors which are not as easily
fooled as the camera or naked eye. Camouflage netting can
hide a squadron command post from an enemy pilot traveling
at 500 miles per hour; however, an infrared photograph will
identify the netting as false vegetation and the electronic
signature of the equipment and communications from the site
will help determine what is under the netting. Also, radar
imaging can “see” through common netting or vegetation and
locate tanks, trucks, aircraft, and other objects hiding
underneath.
Is there anything that can be done to counter these
sensors? Of course there is! But, it takes more equipment
and effort. A squadron at a dispersed site needs enough
camouflage netting to prepare dummy positions around its
area. Most communications from the site can be made by wire,
commercial telephones, or courier. Radio transmissions can
be limited to burst transmissions using remoted, directional
antennae to reduce the probability of detection. Camouflage
nets now exist which absorb and diffuse radar pulses, thereby
masking the radar signature of whatever is beneath it.
Concealment is the final aspect of hiding from sight.
It may be thought to be synonymous with camouflage, but
camouflge is only one aspect of concealment. The objective
of concealment is to prevent recognition or to hide from view.
Camouflage is concealment by disguise. For example, covering
tents, aircraft, andvehicles with netting is concealment
by camouflage. You are trying to make the area look like
the natural vegetation. Concealment may also be accomplished
by hiding personnel and equipment in existing buildings or
in caves. Concealment of an aviation unit can be accomplished
by basing it among structures not normally associated with
the unit’s activity. For instance, a helicopter air group
could base itself away from an airfield and use warehouses
or other large buildings around an urban area to hide the
aviation supply and maintenance vans. Operating sites for
the aircraft squadrons would be dispersed around the urban
area or nearby countryside.
This leads to the last passive measure, dispersion.
Dispersion is of two kinds: on-base and off-base. On-base
diepersion spreads the aircraft out over a large area of the
air base. Ideally, each aircraft parking spot is revetted
and camouflaged. The advantage of this dispersal system is
that no one attack could destroy all of the aircraft as
could be done if they were lined up in a row. The disadvan-
tage is that a damaged runway traps any aircraft which has
not already taken off. Off-base dispersal spreads aviation
units out between a main base and several satellite bases.
On-base dispersal is employed at each site but the force as
a whole is not limited to the runways of one air base.
Passive air defense is a difficult business. It costs
time, money, and manpower. It takes constant attention to
details and close coordination between many people.
Nuclear Warfare
Nuclear weapons have profoundly changed the way war is fought. Along with more powerful bombs have to come control and countermeasure considerations. The way in which the world thinks about war has changed. The development of nuclear weapons started rather innocently as a physical phenomenon but has become a source of constant terror among many. How did it all start? What can be done about the spread of nuclear weapons?
Nuclear weapons are able to inflict far greater damage within a few hours than previously resulted from years of warfare!
Countermeasures
Nuclear Deterrence
Over the past few decades, ways of living with nuclear weapons have evolved, creating political systems that everyone hopes will prevent such weapons from ever being used. The main feature of these systems is known as nuclear deterrence. Quite soon after the destructive power of nuclear weapons was realized, people understood that an active defense, such as shooting down bombers, was impossible. But a passive defense (building air raid shelters, evacuating peple, etc.) would not do much good either. Safety could only come from persuading potential attackers not to attack at all. This could best be done by convincing them that they would suffer an equally bad attack in return. This threat of retaliation, therefore, would perhaps serve to deter the possible aggressor.
Ways to Control Nuclear Forces
Early-warning Systems
The destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and the danger of escalation to higher levels of warfare if even one or two were used, makes governments possessing nuclear weapons anxious to guarantee their use only when absolutely necessary. Consequently, great care has been taken to perfect the systems that control nuclear weapons, and systems for Command, Control, and Communication, or C3.
Closely connected to this system for controlling forces are the systems used to determine the size and capabilities of potentially hostile forces and to provide warning of an impending attack. Most of these activites are now performed by the many kinds of sensors carried by space satellites and by ground-based radars such as the three U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS) that are located in Alaska, Greenland, and England.
The systems for preventing unintended use of nuclear weapons can be divided into three categories:
* safety devices to prevent accidental explosions or launching of weapons
* laws and military discipline for making sure that people obey orders
* devices to prevent people from acting without authority
Surveillance Satellites
Satellites provide their owners with much information about the activities of other countries and also provide useful reassurance that nothing too dangerous is happening or that an atttack is not imminent. If nuclear war were tragically to occur, satellites could help to control it by providing reliable information about what was actually happening and therefore, could reduce the typical confusion that is often referred to as the “fog of war.”
Antimissile Weapons
It takes only a very few of the larger nuclear weapons to create great destruction. Power nuclear warheads are now only a few feet in length so they can be delivered by ballistic missiles, which cannot be stopped by traditional air defenses. For many years, it was thought that no defense was possible against ballistic missiles, but now the situation has changed. This is an important development because the revolution created by nuclear weapons would be significantly reversed if effective defenses against missiles were to be developed.
In the past, developments in rocketry and in electronic guidance made it possible for one rocket to intercept another and destroy it. But while it was possible to intercept single test rockets, catching all of a numerous incoming attack still seemed impossible. As it only took a few penetrations to cause a disaster, U.S. experts did not think building a defensive network was worth the great expense. A further reason to be doubtful about ballistic missile defenses then was the probable ease with which an attacker could make the defender’s job more difficult. Although the most expensive, the simplest way would be to buy more offensive missiles to “saturate” the defense. Cheaper ways would be to equip reentry vehicles with devices such as chaff and decoys–lightweight imitations that acted like the real thing while outside the atmosphere–to confuse the defensive radar.
There are also broader arguments against ballistic missile defenses, and one is that such defenses could accelerate an arms race such as the Cold War mentioned in the nuclear past section. Many people believe that if all parties in a nuclear balance of power know they have no defense, they will be cautious and content with fairly small attacking forces. But if an attacker faced with defenses, tries to get through by increasing the size of its attack, the result might be more rather than less destruction if the defenses failed. On the other hand, if one side were confident in its defense, it might be more tempted to use its own offensive forces. It was this kind of thinking that led to the U.S. and the Soviet Union signing the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. That treaty limited each side to one defended area. The Soviet Union has one around Moscow, but the United States has yet to build the system permitted by the treaty.
Star Wars
Because space operations played such an important role in these efforts, the U.S. program, officially called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), became known as Star Wars.
Many differeny technologies contributed to this new optimism. Radars had become more efficient, and computers were much more capable of rapidly processing the information they received. Interceptor rockets could more quickly meet attacking warheads and, where earlier systems had to rely on nuclear explosions to destroy hostile reentry vechiles, more accurate interception made it possible to employ non-nuclear kill methods such as conventional explosions and shrapnel-like clusters of solid projectiles, or kinetic kill. the most Star Wars-like idea was to use laser beams from the ground or from satellites to damage offensive vehicles. As rockets rose slowly and vulnerably from the ground with all their later-to-be-dispersed multiple warheads aboard, they might be destroyed by kinetic or laser deviecs in satillites over enemy launch-sites. These ideas offered the possibility of a layered defense, whereby the offensive force would be attacked during all three stages of its flight: the boost phase, the mid-course phase, and the reentry, or terminal, phase. Thus, the defense would have several chances to attack and could enjoy a good overall performance, even if each phase had been only partially successful.
There are still many difficulties with a layered defense, however, and many of the necessary devices are still in the experimental stage. It is particularly difficult to get the necessary energy for lasers into space because the atmosphere has the effect of shielding the ground. Moreover, the attacker can use countermeasures such as decoys and can “harden,” or strengthen, its weapons against lasers. It can also increase the acceleration of its boosters to permit the separation of the warheads while they are still within the atmosphere, which will give them some shielding from lasers. They enemy can, of course, also nicrease the attack by aircraft or cruise missiles, which means the defender must also have a good antiaircraft system.
Once an option becomes technologically possible, its usefulness always depends on the cost. for instance, can an attacker afford to maintain the effectiveness of its attack? Most experts belive it will be a long time, if ever, before a “leak-proof umbrella of defense” can be built. But before then, defenses may become efficient enough to reduce an attacker’s confidence in success and thus promote deterrence.
Nuclear Terrorism–something bad to consider
So far in this nuclear age, nuclear weapons have been in the possession of only very few nations. While the danger of an increasing number of countries gaining possessiong of these powerful new weapons has long been recognized, much less attention has been given to the possibility that private groups might gain access to a nuclear weapon. In an age of widespread terrorism, it is not difficult to imagine the attraction that such a terrifying instrument might have for those seeking power for coercion or blackmail. In theory, terrorists might either seize an existing weapon or set up a secret organization to make one.
On the whole, obtaining nuclear weapons by unauthorized individuals or groups seems unlikely because nuclear materials are difficult to acquire and to handle. Military weapons and nuclear power stations and manufacturing facilities are closely guarded, often by special police forces or by technological devices. Also, nuclear weapons often contain mechanism that not only prevent accidental explosions but also disable the weapon if an unauthorized person tampers with it.
Radioactive material is so dangerous, however, that it might not be necessary for terrorists to obtain a weapon. Instead, they could create immense fear and panic if they were only suspected of possessing a nuclear bomb and threatened to release radioactive material. As the amount of radioactive waste in the world increases, this might offer one of the easier methods for terrorists.
