Federal Department for Media Harmful to Young Persons The Voluntary Self-Regulation of Television Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia Protection of Young Persons Act -Jugendschutzgesetz Telecommunications Act Commission for the Protection of Minors in the Media Age Verification System Closed User Group 3 Introduction Media accessibility via internet is rapidly increasing within the last decade. Reaching every kind of data,including media content have become easier due to the widespread internet access and fastly improving technologies, especially mobile devices.
Likewise providers have found an opportunity to reach the user faster and easier than before. Although benefits of improvement of internet technologies are inestimable, technologies can also bring risks. Nowadays communication technologies help not only reaching information but also harmful content which is harmful for the minors, usually for people under pecific age. Lots of scientific researches shows us that these harmful contents such as pornography and violence have impairable effects on growing of minors.
Such Undesirable minors’ contact with harmful contents necessitates some new regulations on providing content in internet. Luckily, there are already some public institutions, nongovernmental organizations working towards protecting minors from harmful media content. For the case study about harmful content regulations and minors protection. I am going to look at the situation in Germany, that there is no other country in western society having such system . German regulations and laws against harmful content, especially pornography, have lots of similarities with other western countries.
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For example age limit regulations up to 16 or 18 years for buying pornographic content or time scheduling for softcore broadcasting like after 22:00 or 23:00. But pornographic and any other adult materials webcasting has very strict rules in Germany compared to other EU countries. German media laws made to reach harmful material in internet very hard for children and adolescents via unique webcasting regulations without national level censorship like in China, Iran or North Korea.
Elaborate legal base was grounded for internet media by Interstate Treaty on the Protection of minors (further JMStV) . The Commission of the Protection of Minors in the Media (further KJM) is appointed by JMStV, which determines current criteria of technical procedures of the internet media regulations about protecting of minors. Internet is the hardest media field to control but the Age verification systems (further AVS) and Closed user group (further CUG) procedures made the criteria of KJM as the most effective solutions against harmful content in internet media.
The main objective of this work was to summarize German media regulations about protecting minors from harmful media content with a stress on technical measures such as AVS and Closed user groups . The work is divided into several chapters. Explaining the protection system in sequence. Firstly, I am briefly overviewing the 4 development of the protection of Youth against harmful content in media since mid19thcentury to present. Further, JMStV is presented and discussing its’ illegal contents as well as relations with other German laws.
The third part is for explaining briefly KJM and its’ competences. Sanctions and administrative offenses according to the JMStV and other German media laws are also discussed. Next, AVS and closed user group regulations and plausibility and reliability of the AVS concepts are explained by criteria of KJM defining main elements, problems such as identifications and authentications of the CUG users and possible risks concerning the submitting of financial and personnel data .
Social media has brought about a lot of changes both in the society at large and various work places. Law enforcement organizations have also not been left behind by the impact of social media whereby many law enforcement officers have engaged in the use of social media in nearly every place that they go (Brunty, Helenek, & Miller, 2013). It has become quite an issue of great concern among the ...
Finally in the conclusion part the apprehensions about JMStV and censorship, technical disabilities of the AVS and CUG procedures are overviewed, finishing with some facts about , the internet economy and adult content industry in Germany and around the world. 5 1. Overview to the Protection of Youth in Germany Youth protection is known in Germany since the existence of the mass media in the middle of the last century and has the traditionally an important position.
The protection of minors is based on the assumption that media could have a harmful effect on children and young people, and thus media can adversely affect minor’s development. At the end of the 19th century politicians and educationalists influenced by the idea “the ethical and moral decay, the cultural impoverishment or the crime caused by mass media. The idea that children can be efficient and healthy members of the society only a shelter, is not very old. Even in the 19th Century children were regarded as small but defective adults.
They were treated as adults and were used to hard work. Therefore the first Youth Policy regulations were health and safety regulations. Media laws concerned the entire population because children and young people were still not at the focus of the protection. Civil administrators appointed by the government were charged with ensuring the public decency of printed material within the German Empire. The Imperial Press Law of 1874 ended the government’s right to censor materials before publishing. The story of the child and youth protection had begun early 20 th century.
Early in the the 20th century, the idea of the protecting of minors against harmful media in an institutionalized form originated in Germany. Numerous clubs and associations’ councils were founded all around the Germany. The youth councils came together to form regional associations, and later they confederated in imperial organizations. Already in 1920 a law was introduced by the government and film inspection authority. The Article 118 of the Weimar constitution forbade censorship with the text “No censorship will take place”.
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The only exception of this article was film. The film industry was regulated by the the Film Review Office (German: Filmprufstelle ).
The purpose of this organization was to censor films released in Germany for pornography and other indecent content. In 1926 another media law was introduced named under “Law for the Protection of Youth from Trash and Filthy Writings” (Gesetz zur Bewahrung der Jugend vor Schund- und Schmutzschriften ).
Since in 1993 the Nazi regime started, all was controlled by this regime directly, and so the laws.
In 1933 ”Law for the Protection of Youth”was replaced by a regulation of the Reichstag President. The protection of minors became the protection of the Germany by other nations’ cultural influences and political views. The aim of censorship under the Nazi regime was simple: to reinforce Nazi power and to suppress opposing viewpoints and information. After World War II, the measures for the protection of minors were relying on pedagogic measures. In this period two key institutions were created to deal with the 6 rotecting of the minors from harmful media. One of these was at the federal level, the Federal Department for Media Harmful to Young Persons (BPjS), the other one was at the country level, The Voluntary Self-Regulation of Television (FSF).
Immediately in the period after the Second World War, the West German youth protection saw his role mainly as a control mechanism. According to BPJS, main task of the law of protecting of minors was “to preserve, to guard and to shield the next generation of potential hazards”.
Later on the situation started changing, in the 80’s and 90’s the new educational vision, which has been underlined by the evolvement of the new rights of children and youth such as health, freedom and also protection from harmful influences, was created for minor’s needs to express their needs without interference from the adult world. Children and young people, after the necessary personal space was secured, should protect from health also morally from danger. The main task of youth media protection was to evaluate media content and their potential risks on the minors and to regulate their public distribution by law.
Which came first, the chicken or the egg This question is mimicked when addressing the topic of violence in the media. Which came first, violence in the media or media in a violent society There are strong arguments for both sides of this issue. Although violence in the media is very prevalent in todays society, it is not directly the cause of violent acts by children and adults because there are ...
In the last century the protection of minors faced major challenges. Firstly due to the globalization and new technologies, media contents crossovered all possibel protection borders. Next, enormous amount of media content, and the electronic crossborder transmission paths are made very difficult to generate effective control mechanisms. After rapidly growth media technologies such as internet and mobile devices, media laws like JMStV plays a very important role for protecting of minors in harmful media .
For protecting minors besides the pedagogic measures tecnical measures are as well extremely important. Due to technological improvement in media, JMStV and its technical procedures became inseparable part of the protecting of minors. 7 2. Interstate Treaty on the Protection of Human Dignity and the Protection of Minors in Broadcasting and in Telemedia – JMStV JMStV is a Interstate Treaty on the Protection of Human Dignity and the Protection of Minors in Broadcasting and in Telemedia. Treaty was signed between all German States at 10 September 2002 and it came into force at 1 April 2003.
The objective of the treaty is providing consistent protection of children who are under the age of 14 years and adolescents who are at the age of between 14 and 18 years ,against the content in electronic information and communication media which impairs or harms their development or education. It is also stands for the youth protection against content in electronic information and communication media which violate human dignity or other legal goods protected under German Legal Code.
JMStV applies to electronic information and communication media (broadcast and telemedia services) and it shall be applicable without prejudice to the the Telemedia Act and to the provisions of the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. Contrary, JMStV does not apply to electronic information and communication services insofar as they are telecommunications services as defined in Article 3 no. 24 of the TKG which consist entirely in the transmission of signals through telecommunications networks, nor to telecommunications-supported services as defined in Article 3 no. 25 of the TKG 2. 1
Illegal Contents and Responsibilities of the Providers The illegal contents are well defined by the JMStV with many references to the other German laws such as German constitution, German Criminal Codes and JuSchG. Following, I am listing the Contents with its definitions that are admited as illegal according to German Laws ? Representing the propaganda instruments of the content which is directed against the free and democratic order or the spirit of understanding among the nations. The content is defined in Article 86 of the German Criminal Code as Dissemination of propaganda material of unconstitutional rganizations. ? Using insignia of organizations which are prohibited under the German Constitution as defined in Article 86a of the German Criminal Code. The German Criminal Code in § 86a outlaws “use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations”. This concerns Nazi symbolism in particular and is the part of denazification efforts following the fall of the Third Reich. The law prohibits the distribution or public use 1 of symbols of unconstitutional groups, in particular, flags, insignia, uniforms, slogans and forms of greeting. Inciting to hatred against parts of the population or against a national, racial, religious or ethnic group, encourages violent or arbitrary action against such a group or violates the human dignity of a person or group by insulting, maliciously degrading or defaming parts of the population or any of the aforementioned groups. ? Denying or playing down acts committed under the National Socialist regime as specified in Article 6 (1) and Article 7 (1) of the International Criminal Code in a manner suited to disturb public peace. Article 6 and Article 7 of the International Criminal Code define the Genocide and Crime against humanity.
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According to the Article 6 of the International Criminal Code, Genocide means means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: Killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
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According to the Article 7 of the International Criminal Code, crime against humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law, torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual iolence of comparable gravity, persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, enforced disappearance of persons, the crime of apartheid, other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. Presenting cruel or otherwise inhuman acts of violence against a person in a manner devised to glorify or trivialize such acts of violence or devised to present the cruel or inhuman nature of the act in a manner which violates human dignity; this also applies to virtual presentations. Also the acts in this articles are defined in Article 131 of the German Criminal Code such as Representation of violence 2
Outlaws the dissemination or public display of media “which describe cruel or otherwise inhuman acts of violence against human beings in a manner which expresses a glorification or rendering harmless of such acts of violence or which represents the cruel or inhuman aspects of the event in a manner which injures human dignity”. ? Serving as an instruction to any of the acts specified as illegal under Article 126 (1) of the German Criminal Code.
These specific illegal acts are clearly defined in Article 126 (1) of the German Criminal Code under the title of “Breach of the public peace by threatening to commit offenses” such as murder, genocide, crime against humanity, war crime ( section 8,9,10,11,12 of the Code of International Criminal Law), robbery or blackmail with force or threats to life and limb, a felony or a misdemeanor endangering the public. ? Glorifying war .
According to German Criminal Codes, preparation of a war of aggression is a federal crime which defined in article 80 of GCC such as “Whosoever prepares a war of aggression (Article 26(1) of the Basic Law) in which the Federal Republic of Germany is meant to participate and creates a danger of war for the Federal Republic of Germany, shall be liable to imprisonment for life or for not less than ten years“. ? Violating human dignity, especially by presenting persons who are or were dying or exposed to serious physical or ental suffering while reporting actual facts without any justified public interest in such form of presentation or reporting being given; any agreement granted in this respect shall be irrelevant. Article 130 of GCC. ? Presenting children or adolescents in unnatural poses; this also applies to virtual presentations. ? Pornographic content and has as its subject acts of violence, the sexual abuse of children or adolescents or sexual acts of persons involving animals; this also applies to virtual presentations. The contents are included in parts A, B, C and D of the list of media harmful to young persons pursuant to Article 18 of the German Protection of Young Persons Act or is wholly or largely identical in content with any work included in this list such as works that are harmful to young people (part A), works whose distribution is prohibited under the German Criminal Code (part B), all indexed virtual works harmful to young people whose distribution is prohibited under Article 4 of the JMStV (part C) and all indexed virtual works, which potentially 3 ave content whose distribution is prohibited under the German Criminal Code (part D).
? The content which is evidently suited to seriously impair the development of children and adolescents or their education into self-responsible and socially competent personalities, taking into account the specific effect of the media via which the content is provided. ? The pornographic content in any other manner. In deviation from this article, content is legal in telemedia services if the provider has ensured that such content is accessible for adult persons only (closed user group).
According to the JMStV, the providers who are transmitting or making accessible content which impair the development of children or adolescents into self-responsible and socially competent personalities shall ensure that children or adolescents of the relevant age groups do not normally see or hear such content. obligation pursuant to above by making access and perception of the content impossible or very difficult for children or adolescents of the respective age group via technical or other means. ?
A provider may fulfill his ? scheduling transmission of or access to the content in a manner devised to ensure that children or adolescents of the respective age group do not normally see or hear the content. 2. 2 Overview of the Sanctions and Administrative Offences The statement of Article 24 of JMStVregarding fines for breaching child-protection regulations is accurate; JMStV in fact stipulates other infringements by private broadcasters and online media for which a fine of as much as EUR 500,000 can be imposed.
However, fines for such breaches are not foreseen for public service media. Editors of these (and all) media are bound to comply with strict child-protection regulations in the criminal code (The responsible person of an infringing publication may be sent to prison for up to one year if the publication contains content that is forbidden by the law, e. g. violent, animal or child pornography, racism or glorification of violence, according to the JuSchG).
There are also several provisions that mitigate how fines are assessed. First, state media Authorities are obliged to give several warnings before giving the maximum sanction, and if such a fine were to be levied, it could be appealed in a regular administrative court. Second, State Media Authorities are bound to common administrative law and principles when it comes to determining the height of fines. For this reason, a sanction of EUR 500,000 is formally foreseen in media law but it has never been issued so far and 4 uite likely never will be. Furthermore, stipulations in the law on youth protection provide extra protection for news content. These stipulations, especially in the case of online activities, provide an additional safeguard for media freedom. Provisions stating the amount of possible fines can be found both in JMStV as well as in the RStV. According to Article 24 of the JMStV: “A provider commits an administrative offence if the provider, either intentionally or through negligence [… transmits broadcasting programmes which are assumed to be suited to impair the development of minors pursuant to Article 5 …The administrative offence may be penalised by a fine of up to half a million Euro. ”There is also a prison sentence up to one year which shall be imposed who in violation of Article 4. 2 of JMStV. In practice, that most strictest monetary sanction would be an extraordinary measure in Germany’s media regulatory system. The infringement would have to be severe, continuous and clearly intentional.
Before that, other penalty fines are supposed to be issued since, State Media Authorities are obliged to use softer measures before. This principle of graduated sanctioning starts with a formal objection, an order of omission and— in case of continuous breaches—fines, followed by a possible temporary suspension of license and, as a last measure, the revocation of the license. Despite of the well construction of such principle, the effectiveness is not enough proof. The competence for determining the size of the fine lies with the respective State Media Authority.
It has to consider common law provisions for administrative sanctions, including the rule of law and proportionality. Formal criteria for assessing the size of the sanction—based on the relevance of the infringement, the gravity of accusation and the severity of the contravention (intention versus negligence)—are outlined in the Administrative Offences Act. In cases of negligence, for instance, the State Media Authority may not assess a fine higher than EUR 250,000.
Although a fine of EUR 500,000 has not been imposed by any State Media Authority to date, there have been many instances in which a State Media Authority issued lower fines against broadcasters or telemedia services for breaches to child-protection regulations. In February 2007, for instance, the higher Regional Court in Celle confirmed the legitimacy of two penalty notices against a telemedia service provider for publishing images of minors posing unnaturally. (The fines were EUR 3,000 and EUR 7,000, respectively).
Recipients of penalty notices are free to raise a formal objection with the relevant state media authority. If the penalty is confirmed, it can then be subject to judicial review. Decisions by State Media Authorities can be appealed in administrative court. According to general administrative laws, both the objection against the regulatory body issuing the administrative act as well as the plea for annulment before a court have a suspensive effect. The next higher court responsible for these appeals are the administrative 5 ppeals tribunals (Oberverwaltungsgericht) as well as the higher administrative courts (Verwaltungsgerichtshof).
In case of a possible infringement of basic rights by the highest court decision, there is the possibility for a constitutional complaint at the federal Constitutional Court. the procedure is too complicated for the violated person to start it, for what it does not work effectivelly. 3. Commission for the Protection of Minors in the Media – KJM After the Interstate Treaty on the Protection of Minors in the Media (JMStV) entered into force, the KJM was put in charge of the control of the internet and JMStV.
KJM as an authority shall take the provisions of JMStV. The KJM consists of 12 experts and the members are defined in Article 14 of the JMStV such as six of the members are delegated by the directors of the state media authorities following consensual appointment by the state media authorities and four members are delegated by the supreme state youth authorities in charge of the protection of minors and the last two members are decied by the supreme federal authority in charge of the protection of minors.
During the decision making processes of the KJM, commission shares their recognitions with some voluntary organizations such as FSM (The Voluntary Self-Monitoring of MultiMedia Service Providers) and FSF (The Voluntary Self-Regulation of Television) and cooperates with official administrative authority of the German government called BPJM (Federal Department for Media Harmful to Young Persons) as well as works together with jugendschutz. net which has a organizational connection with KJM.
The main responsibility of the KJM is being in charge of the definitive assessment of content pursuant to JMStV Interstate Treaty. The competences of the KJM are as following; ? ? corresponding decisions in accordance with the monitoring the application of the provisions of JMStV Interstate Treaty, certifying organizations of voluntary self-regulation and taking back or revoking the certification. scheduling transmissions pursuant to Article 8 of the JMStV. scheduling transmissions pursuant to Article 8 of the JMStV. eciding on exemptions pursuant to Article 9 of the JMStV assessing and licensing an encryption and blocking technology. certifying technical systems for the protection of minors and taking back or revoking the certification. ? ? ? ? ? 6 ? providing assessments on listing applications presented by the Federal Review Board for Media Harmful to Young People, and filing applications for listings with the Review Board. deciding on administrative offenses pursuant to this Interstate Treaty. When KJM applies the competences, it cooperates with the Federal Review Board for Media Harmful to Young People and conducts a regular exchange of information with the Review Board. The decisions of the KJM are always made regarding the majority of the votes of the statutory members. In the case of parity of votes, the chairman is the only that has the decisive vote. For competent decision to be made all the reasons for decisions should be provided. The reasons shall include the main factual and legal arguments. The decisions of the KJM should be tied with the other bodies of the competent state media authority.
Respectivelly they should be taken as a basis for the decisions of the state media authority. For the first time in two years after its establishment, and in every two years thereafter, the KJM should present reports on the implementation of the provisions of this In terstate Treaty to the commit-tees of the state media authorities, the supreme state youth authorities and the supreme federal authority in charge of the protection of minors. 4. Closed User Groups Closed User Groups (CUGs) are there for limiting access to specific pages that reside within a published internet site.
Those pages then require the assigned members to login and provide their security credentials. The providers in Germany have to ensure the Harmful content which are defined in JMStV shall not be reachable by children and adolescents but CUG users adults. The providers have to use Closed user Group system ( Article 4 of the JMStV) to make their access and perception of the content as hard as possible for the children and adolescents. KJM has no enforcement on the providers to make them use specific system for Closed User Groups.
Nevertheless KJM has a competence to positively evaluate new technologies, assessing and licensing encryption and blocking technologies and certifying technical systems, as it is done in the case of Closed User Gropus. KJM is ensuring it is proper usage Closed User Groups through Age Verification System that I am describing and presenting next. 7 5. Age Verification System Age Verification System (AVS) also known as Adult Verification System is a computing system used by a website to confirm the information about the user attempting to access their website .
The data needed to be provided by user is the age, asrequired by law of that land to view the website’s content, which typically includes sex, nudity, violence or profanity or Entertainment Software Rating Board rated content. The system is used to attempt to legally protect companies from punishment under laws against (for example) Jugendsmedienschutz. This systems often use a credit card and are usually provided by a third-party company. 5. 1 Current Criteria of the KJM KJM presents current criteria for evaluating concepts of Age verification systems for ensuring closed user groups in Telemedia .
In accordance with the Youth Policy of the State Media Authorities, AVS for Closed User Groups has interconnected steps to ensure: First, age verification must be done through personal contact by at least one unique identifier (legal age verification).
Secondly, age verification must be done through authentication to reduce the risk of transfer of access rights . It is between a plausible age verification for single-use process (Keyword: time key) and a reliable age verification for the repeated use process (keyword: master key) to distinguish.
In both cases, the access to closed user group must be enabled, when each process is completed successfully. A preliminary validation of the access (so-called “Trial Access”) is not accepted. The JMStV contains no recognition procedure for closed user groups or AV Systems. Therefore, the KJM developed a process for positive evaluation that is the concepts of the related companies or providers. This serves to improve the protection of minors on the Internet and also provides a service for the provider for more legal and planning security.
The content provider must ensure that pornographic and other adult content offered just for adults-only (closed user group).
The content providers can use technical parental control concepts which are evaluated by KJM. But keep them secure additional duties, such as backdoor protection time, limit a session time-out after a certain idle time and so untouched that can be checked in KJM Test methods (Prufverfahren).
The content provider must ensure that absolutely no illegal content according to Article 4 of JMStV is available for Closed User Group.
For the prudential assessment the implementation of the closed user groups in practice is critical. The grid is based on the current state of technology. It is not exhaustive and can be adjusted and further refined according to criteria, at any time. 8 5. 2 Concepts of Plausible Age Verification for Single Use Process (headword :”session key”) Age verification, which is performed immediately before each use or any access to a closed user group (“session key”), is e. g. the use of the age confirmation of e-ID feature of the new ID card also conceivable.
In addition to – comparable to the apparent control in a video store – procedure may be sufficient, which are suitable, the majority with a high probability determine (validation).
A plausibility check is sufficient because the entire process must be run through unlike concepts of reliable age verification for the reuse of process – each time you use. This can be guaranteed an effective life recognition and is a sufficient image quality e. g. given by a method with the user in the webcam taken appearances, in case it is used by only trained personnel. live detection and sufficient image quality are required to ensure that it is a real person sitting in front of the camera and to current possibilities of circumvention to exclude for example by films or rehearsed masking. Doubts who are given by the appearance, behavior and statements of the impression that it might be a minor, must be cleared by checking of both side of the ID card of the user. If there are still doubts the user is not allowed to access to the content. If the user is not clearly of age, an additional identification test by ID card must be carried out.
Mere identity card root tests (“per-check process”) or the submission of a copy of your passport, however, are not sufficient. Provide a certified copy of your passport is not enough, because the accordance of a document is confirmed not identification of a person. 5. 3 Concepts of Reliable Age Verification Process for Repeated Use (headword: “master key”) The reliable age verification for the repeated use of process consists of two comprising : a unique identification and authentication of the identified person at each usage case.
After the onetime identification is given to the age of majority and therefore a “master key” for all subsequent usage events given to the legitimate users. Thus it is granted access to an arbitrarily large number of different deals. Compared to named above session key or in comparison to a retail store with offerings for adults (e. g. video store), where you can buy or borrow limited number of products, the requirements are accordingly higher. An age verification on mere inspection of the person is not enough to meet the re quirements. 5. 3. 1 Identification Ensuring a closed user group for adults is only possible by means of a reliable age verification or major age testing. Prerequisite for majority reliable personal check is to identify natural persons, including an examination of their age. The personal identification is necessary thus forgery and evasion risks wherever possible. The requirements of the KJM are specified as follows: Identification and verification of ages: ?
Identify the personal contact: The identification of at least one user for a closed groups must be made by person- al contact. The mandatory meaning of “personal contact” is one given control under present (” face-to-face “- Control) compared with data from official identification (passport, ID card).
This is e. g. the case method as “post-identification”, or similar procedure. It is also possible to use, under certain conditions (see below) an already-effective “face-to-face “control. This is e. g. n the case of identification by means of method certified persons and age or birth dates on already attending certain services or completion of certain contracts (eg, mobile phone contracts, MLA compliant bank account opening; participation in the communication service DE-mail; Use of the eID function of the new ID card) if the official Identification data were collected before. Mere identity card Root tests (“per-check process”) or the submission of a copy of your passport, however, are not sufficient. Provide a certified copy of our passport is not enough, because the accordance of a document is confirmed not identification of a person. Also provides an identification with webcams as initial age test for a repeated using no sufficient reliability and thus is not enough to meet the requirements for a reliable identification for the purposes of the KJM benchmarks. Collection and storage of data necessary for the identification: The age for each age verification required personal details of the identified person should be collected at the required level in compliance with data protection and storage rules (eg, date of birth, name, address).
Only the recording of the age of the identified person is sufficient if this is associated in the same step with unique authentication features. ? ? Requirements for registration points: The identification data can be collected at different locations (eg, post office, 10 various outlets such as stores of mobile operators, lottery collection points, as banks and savings banks, etc. ).
Ensuring is a complete acquisition of the relevant persons age test data in an offline or online form and its transmission to the AVS providers. Alternatively, it is sufficient forwarding the transmission of a reference pointer to the recorded data (stored position specific reference) from the AVS operators. The suitability of a registration point in meaning of JMStV assumes businesslike by offering reliable and in the task adequately trained personnel. ? Final Age check: Access to the closed user group (the clearing of user data authentication) first permitted to carried out if the AVS provider has checked identification data or a reference point to this receiving and age.
Only with the data of the initial identification of the AVS providers may check the each enter to the closed user group, whether there is a legitimate adult user (authentication).
Transmission of access keys to the user: Access keys are (eg registration codes, hardware components or similar) not already assigned during the personal registration of the user or generated in the context of registration but in preparation or other transmission Subsequently required must be ensured that the access key be sent only to a identified adult person.
For the case of the usage of an already-effective “face-to-face” control, the delivery of an access key by registered mail by hand or by a similarly qualified variant must be carried out. Then a vari ant is similarly qualified when it guarantees that only the person identified as an adult receives the access data. The reason for this is that initially only claimed identity must be verified compare with an actual identity. An anonymous submission or delivery of access rights, for example using simple e-mail or via bank statements, are not sufficient.
Rather, it must be assumed with sufficient safety that only the adult identified person receives accessing the information, transmitted in this way: e. g. notification by DE mail under certain circumstances, through opportune and secure compared of accounts for example name of the account holder or authorized ages. 11 5. 3. 2 Authentication The authentication is used to ensure that only the identified, respectively and proofed by age person receives access to closed user groups, and the transmission of access rights to unauthorized parties should be difficult.
The following must be guaranteed: Granting access to persons using: ? ? Carrying out an authentication process, beginning each use (“session”) Content security within the meaning of Article 4 of the JMStV by a special, individually allocated password (not necessary for biometric techniques because the authorized person is unambiguously identified) Preventing the dissemination / multiplication: There are sufficient safeguards for complicating the multiplication and the use of access permissions to be taken by an unauthorized party.
The dissemination safety can be either realized through technical measures for complicating the multiplication (Solution Option 1: hardware solution / Unique Identifier solution) or by personal risks in the sphere of the user (Solution Version 2: Risk-solution) Solution Option 1: Possible control measures for complicating multiplication of access permissions ? HARDWARE or UNIQUE IDENTIFIER SOLUTION: ? Testing of biometric data: access to closed user group can only get identified users (then on biometrics such as fingerprint, iris recognition to authenticate).
Access permissions cannot multiplied or used by third parties, in case that in the collection of biometric data and the authentication sufficiently secure verification components are used. ? Active Hardware: Active hardware has (eg ID chip, SIM card) the capability that can be performed on-chip computing operations. They may be reproduced only with great effort. The access authorization (hardware + password) can be passed only sequentially each to an individual person. Passive Hardware: Passive hardware solutions (eg passive chip cards, and DVD, CD-ROM) have only ability to save data contrary to active hardware and they are not equipped with its own CPU. Under certain circumstances, however, these components can be read out and reproduced, or the communication of the terminal with the hardware can be emulated. Therefore, these components can not be 12 trivially copyable and – as far as they can be read – improper use of the read-out must be not possible. One-Time PIN procedure (eg token generator or one-time PIN via SMS to registered SIM card ) : PIN-TAN lists do not provide adequate protection multiplication, because in principle a variety of approaches are available. However, onetime PIN procedures are sufficient where there is a copy-protected usable hardware to generate or receive only once access permissions. ? Identification of the terminal: Here the computer itself or the output device for protection against multiplication and dissemination of credentials is used (e. g. , query the processor ID).
By an appropriate combination of access software and hardware of the terminal with sufficient safety can be ensured, so that access is authorized and a single terminal can be used. Solution Version 2: Subjective difficulty of unauthorized use of access privileges in the sphere of the user (risk reduction the Transmission) ? RISK SOLUTION: The risk that the authorized user’s access privileges to itself passes unauthorized party can be reduced, that the user thereby can occur significant material or immaterial disadvantages. Then, the users are informed as part of the registration rocess considerably. Whether a sufficient deployment risk is in the suspected “noticeable” to exemplify the disadvantages in each case. It is not sufficient if it is only reflected in pure virtual life. Significant disadvantages in named above sense, for example be assumed, when during the transfer of data, the permanent risk exists that high cost and / or important secrets are surrendered : Cost-Risk: A high financial risk is given for example, when the usage of the access authorization of account or credit card to the legitimate user may be charged by relevant and enduring the amount .
Prepaid procedure without further financial risk are not sufficient. Secret-Risk: A high risk in terms of the surrender of secrets is e. g. given when an unauthorized third party Usage of the Access authorization insights into relevant (highly-) personal area of the user’s life and also by possible change of this information optionally without authorization eg Health data, payment information, etc. Typically, such risks occur in combination. If it is not the case, it is required regarding to the cost risk that access has to be canceled immediately. 13 6 Conclusion
In Germany censorship forbidden by German constitution Art. 5. 1 “Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and ? lms shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship”. According to some anticensorship groups such as Liberal groups in EU parliament and Pirate political party in Germany , KJM and its technical and legal regulations on internet seems like a censorship on internet .
Nevertheless JMStV and KJM find their legal grounds in same German constitution article “These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honor”. Despite the article disagreements within the constitutional law, the KJM was successfully introduced and put into practice with goals clarified and functions defined. Nowadays, having the Media Law and AVS system working, there are still a lot of discussions an criticism about its technical process, especially from the user side.
Users are complaining about “identification” procedures as not being user-friendly. Postidentification is the most effective way for “personnel contact” and “face-to-face control” which are necessary for identification procedure, but in the post-identification method user has to go to the post office, which is found to be very inconvenient. Due to the reliability described procedure cannot made online. Furthermore, registration of the user and sending password to the user takes 3-4 days.
This ”password traveling time” users , who usually make all operations and commerce instantly in internet, find this as taking too long. Talking about the other part of procedure such as “authentication”the users are supposed to buy some services from specific AVS operators, which counts more additive costs, making the system more inconvenient to use. All in all, there was still no solution found to overstep those technical problems, for what the youth violation on Media has not been reduced.
Indeed, the Youth Protection against harmful media content problem is even growing, since the large part of the rapidly growing internet economy consists of pornography and similar adult content. In 2010 World wide pornography revenue was nearly 10 billion USD. There is approximately 420 million total web pages around the world and 12% of the all web pages contains pornographic and adult contents. The biggest provider of such pages is USA with over than 244 million pages and Germany is the second biggest provider with over than 10 million pages.
Apparently, most of these German web pages have no AVS and Closed User Group protocols as those page providers are web casting from outside the Germany. Disparity of the technical 14 requirements, different laws and regulations between countries and some political approaches make difficult to create common policy against pornography. This situation maybe the weakest point of the AVS and Closed User Group protocols of the KJM, since it can be applied just within a specific scale, where laws let it be applied and for now it is just Germany.
Due to there is no AVS and Closed User Group protocols obligation for abroad providers and no censorship against foreign broadcasting, all technical measures of the KJM are not effective against overseas adult content web casting. Personally, I find the system and the laws supporting it great, because despite that system protecting youth against harmful content is not perfectly working regarding the law differences, the appearance of a system as such draw more attention to the Youth problems.
Youth protection against harmful media content in internet regarding German media policies has a strong influence on the European Union in spite of regional, judicial and cultural differences within EU members. For example, Publication of pornography is illegal in Iceland and in February 2013, Iceland’s parliament began debating a ban on online pornography but In 1969, Denmark became the first country in the world to legalize pornography and people in Denmark still have a free access to pornography. With the such conflicts between countries, in 2013 March European Union voted for the new media regulation against pornography.
Due to liberal group of EU and the support of the Pirate party of Germany the draft law of the new media regulations were refused. Therefore, as it was mentioned above in the paragraph, without an international cooperation all kinds of technical means and ways for protecting Youth against harmful impair of the media are still not effective. 15 Literature http://www. jff. de http://www. hans-bredow-institut. de/webfm_send/50 http://www. gesetze-im-internet. de/englisch_stgb/index. html. German Criminal Codes http://www. gesetze-im-internet. de/vstgb/index. tml International Crime Codes ,Volkerstrafgesetzbuch. http://www. bmfsfj. de/RedaktionBMFSFJ/Abteilung5/PdfAnlagen/juSchGenglisch,propert y=pdf,bereich=,rwb=true. pdf http://www. bundespruefstelle. de/ http://www. landesrecht-bw. de/jportal/? quelle=jlink&query=JMedienSchStVtrG+BW &psml=bsbawueprod. psml&max=true&aiz=true http://www. artikel5. de/gesetze/jmstv. html http://www. bundespruefstelle. de/bpjm/Jugendmedienschutz/arbeitsgrundlagen,did=3911 4. html http://www. bmfsfj. de/BMFSFJ/gesetze,did=5350. html http://www. kjm-online. de/de/pub/recht/gesetze_und_staatsvertraege/