Non-Nuclear Proliferation with Global Mediators
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is an international treaty with the objective to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. The goal of this paper is to stress the importance of non-nuclear proliferation through the use of a global mediator, the UNSC (used as P5 in this essay), and examine a case study for Iran, in order to prove that there should only be a select few to set the nuclear stage. First, I will examine NPT and its future. Second, I will take a look at the P5 as global mediators as well as examine the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).
Finally, I will explain why reducing the P5’s nuclear arsenal is bad for them. I will complete the essay using a case study concerning Iran as an example of why unstable regions should not be allowed to harbor nuclear technology without the consent of a global mediator.
Stated earlier, the NPT is a treaty designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. Ever since the NPT Review Conference in 2010, the international community had taken some time to consider what the conference will mean for the future of nuclear disarmament. The international community agreed that nuclear weapons policies and programs and their effect on the future of the NPT needs to be considered, but nuclear states have shown resistance to abide by the guidelines provided by the NPT. If these guidelines are ignored, the international community will lose confidence in the NPT process. This brings us to my first contention.
... with American blessings. Iran signed onto the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty in 1970 and since 1992 has allowed for ... the Treaty every five years. This treaty represents the foundation to keep the spread of weapons of ... on one point and that is Iran’s nuclear weapons and future ambitions will be number one ... facilities to enrich uranium and turn it into weapons grade material. They are using a number ...
The future of the NPT is in fragile hands and needs to be reworked. The international community has agreed to report on their progress concerning the NPT to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee and then to the 2015 Review Conference. According to Acheson, the purpose of the 2015 Review Conference is to “take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of Article VI”, and consider pursuing negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith. The rhetoric of the NPT is weak and undermining nuclear disarmament. Telling nuclear and non-nuclear states alike to consider pursuing negotiations in good faith are weak commitments. These weak commitments make states reluctant to agree to deal with non-proliferation challenges. Non-proliferation promotes international stability, peace and higher levels of security. Commitments through NPT rhetoric need to be ambitious and stern, but only with the support from a global mediator, the P5.
P5, or commonly known as UNSC, are global mediators supporting non-nuclear proliferation. The countries that make of P5 are the United States, Russia, France, China, and the United Kingdom (UK).
Current nuclear issues, government positions, tactics, international relations views to management, fairness, global peace and security can be found in the process that led to the creation of Article VI and the NPT. All states are willing to abide by the rules, but non-nuclear states argue that the P5 are hypocritical about nuclear disarmament. For example, at the end of 2009, there were approximately 23,360 nuclear weapons in the world held by China, France, Russia, the United States, and the UK. Also, the United States and Russia possess 96% of this global nuclear arsenal. It has been said on numerous occasions that the P5 intend to modernize their nuclear weapons and related infrastructure. The P5 modernizing their nuclear technology is nothing short of a positive idea. The P5 need to set the stage for positive nuclear proliferation and the P5 can choose candidates through a specific set of criteria, which I will get to later in my essay.
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The P5 is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security and its powers include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action. The countries that make up P5 are seen as legitimate players in the international community because they uphold respect for human rights and abide by the rule-of-law. The P5 have nuclear weapons and technology, but due to their democratic nature, they are needed because they are not states that engage in nuclear activities which undermine the NPT treaty.
Other states have engaged in activities that undermine the NPT treaty, such as sharing nuclear technology, supplying nuclear technology to non-nuclear states, conducting tests, and modernizing nuclear weapons. These states are not abiding by the rules set in the NPT treaty. Therefore, the P5 will be needed in order to mediate and control states pursuing nuclear technology. The candidate states need to be seen as democratic, legitimate, and trustworthy in order to receive help from the P5 to pursue advancing their nuclear technology. If a non-nuclear state is interested in pursuing nuclear technology, but is not viewed as a legitimate and stable player in the global community, then the P5 should not help out the candidate country until they abide by the rules.
A good example of the P5 acting as a global mediator concerns the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).
The P5 made a July 12 joint statement which hailed the treaty’s potential to help solve “key problems resulting from illicit trafficking and uncontrolled proliferation of conventional arms.” This document is not implying that a state’s legitimate right to self-defense is hindered. It is implying the illegal distribution of nuclear weapons and technology needs to be stopped and a set of global mediators, the P5, can control who gets what. Overall, the P5 has agreed that the ATT should be implemented at the national level and that each state is responsible for enacting measures to control trade. The rhetoric is strong and concrete in the ATT and shows promise in ending the illegal distribution of nuclear weapons and technology to unstable regions around the globe.
... contents. The treaty controls the export of nuclear technology to prevent the spread of atomic weapons. Iran does not follow this since they have ... . Ten private Russian companies were allegedly helping Iran with nuclear technology Since then the United States learned of Russian and Iranian cooperation and has ...
I have a disagreement against what the United States is doing now to help stop proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. Instead of acting as a global mediator along with China, Russia, UK, and France, the United States is pursuing disarmament. For example, in 2010 the United States and Russia had agreed to the New START treaty. This treaty is a nuclear arms reduction treaty aimed at reducing the nuclear missile stockpile between the United States and Russia.
Another example which undermines the legitimacy of the P5 was President Barack Obama’s April 2009 Prague speech. President Obama committed the United States to take seriously its obligation under Article VI of the NPT treaty to pursue nuclear disarmament. President Obama may have pursued ground that was different from the previous decade, but it is another way to de-legitimize the United States as a global mediator. The P5 is made up of superpowers and a hegemonic power, the United States. If President Obama continues to disarm the United States then its role as a global mediator could not be seen as legitimate.
The goal of a global mediator is to mediate the situation. The P5 was picked as “global security” because they are viewed as powerful states, but legitimate and stable as well. The goal is not to cease modernization of your nuclear weapons stockpile, but to insure future investment and longevity of their nuclear weapons. As I stated earlier, the P5 can supply nuclear weapons to states that are seen as stable and legitimate global players. Reducing the nuclear stockpile of any of the P5 mediators can de-legitimize the role of the P5 as global mediators.
Finally, I would like to implement a case study into this essay to prove that the international community needs global mediators in order to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. Iran’s weapons program, their reluctance to adhere to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran’s support of fundamentalist regimes, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s hostile nature pose a great threat to the international community. First, Iran is led by an unstable leader, President Ahmadinejad. Recently President Ahmadinejad said,
... the nuclear weapons towards the security model in relations to why states still seek to develop weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in the contemporary global ... purpose to develop nuclear weapons (Bosch, 2007 p. 16). According to the NPT, the current situation in North Korea and Iran are in ... the case of being outside of the normative framework. Only those state who act inside ...
“The annihilation of the Zionist regime will come and Israel must be wiped off the map, and God willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall soon experience a world without the United States and Zionism. I have officially announced that Iran has joined nations with nuclear technology.”
These threats against the United States and Israel coupled with advances in the Iranian nuclear weapons program clearly demonstrate Iran is indeed a global security threat to those who oppose it.
Second, Iran is resistant to adhering to IAEA guidelines. The IAEA is an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons. The IAEA and the UNSEC cooperate together. It has been proven there is a lack of cooperation between Iran and the UNSEC and IAEA. For example, Iran has proven its inability to produce or purchase fissile material (material needed for warheads) as its inability to correctly marry a nuclear warhead to a missile, given false statements to IAEA inspectors, carrying out experiments without proper knowledge, and violating the Uranium enrichment process.
The IAEA and the P5 are institutions who want to help states in their advancement of nuclear programs for peaceful purposes. The IAEA has offered Iran light weight reactors with the capability of achieving nuclear capabilities, but without the strength of a nuclear weapon. Iran has still refused the offer. This shows Iran’s irresponsibility in making peaceful decisions.
Finally, Iran’s instability is shown through its support, financing, and training of terrorist regimes such as the Badr Brigade, Wolf Brigade, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. For example, the founder of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fathi Shiqaqi, publicly admitted to receiving funds from Iran which ultimately helped their operations in the West Bank and Gaza. Overall, Iran’s support of terrorist regimes shows their ability to commit human rights abuses. Due to Iran’s instability, they are an example of why regions that cannot follow UNSEC and IAEA guidelines should not be allowed to advance their nuclear programs.
... -East is not destabilized enough, because of Iran’s current reputation as a growing nuclear state, both Egypt and Saudie Arabia now find ... as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that they do, indeed, have a degree of nuclear capabilities and are now in a ... stressed out global population. Unfortunately, it appears as though Iran is becoming more and more of a player on the nuclear world stage ...
In conclusion, non-nuclear proliferation is a slow and tedious process. It will take time, but the rhetoric and guidelines in the NPT need to be more ambitious and aggressive. I stand by my theoretical argument where global mediators such as the P5 and IAEA control the nuclear program. Non-nuclear states should not have control over nuclear technology until they are seen as legitimate among the international community. Think of the criteria to obtain nuclear technology similar to the European Union’s (EU) criteria given to states looking to obtain EU membership. The candidate states need to be democratic in nature, willing to respect human rights and abide by the rule-of-law. The IAEA is an institution that supports states who want to pursue nuclear programs in a peaceful way. The P5 are seen as legitimate international mediators that can control the flow of nuclear program technology into and out of states as long as the candidate states are seen as a legitimate player on the global field. Finally, Iran is a prime example of why the international community needs global mediators. Obviously Iran is not the only state with an unstable and predictable nature, but it is a great example. Overtime the NPT will succeed as long as institutions and global mediators step up their game and finally enforce more of an aggressive approach to non-nuclear proliferation.
Acheson, Ray. 2010. “Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference: What’s next for nuclear disarmament?” Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 66, no. 6: 77-87. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed April 22, 2012).
Miller, Steven E. 2012. “Nuclear weapons 2011: Momentum slows, reality returns.” Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 68, no. 1: 20-28. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed April 23, 2012).
U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy. “Is a Nuclear Iran a Global Security Threat?” Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Global Issues, edited by James E. Harf & Mark Owen Lombardi, 347-381. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006.
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Liang, Xiaodon. “P5 Commits to Arms Trade Negotiations.” Last modified September, 2011. //www.armscontrol.org/2011_09/P5_Commits_to_Arms_Trade_Negotiations.
[ 1 ]. Ray Acheson, Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference: What’s Next for Nuclear Disarmament? (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, 2010), 77.
[ 2 ]. Ray Acheson, Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference: What’s Next for Nuclear Disarmament? (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, 2010), 78.
[ 3 ]. Ray Acheson, Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference: What’s Next for Nuclear Disarmament? (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, 2010), 78.
[ 4 ]. Ray Acheson, Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference: What’s Next for Nuclear Disarmament? (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, 2010), 80.
[ 5 ]. Ray Acheson, Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference: What’s Next for Nuclear Disarmament? (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, 2010), 80.
[ 6 ]. Steven E. Miller, Nuclear Weapons 2011: Momentum Slows, Reality Returns (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, 2012), 25.
[ 7 ]. Xiaodon Liang, P5 Commits to Arms Trade Negotiations. Last modified September, 2011, Arms Control Association, //www.armscontrol.org/2011_09/P5_Commits_to_Arms_Trade_Negotiations.
[ 8 ]. Ray Acheson, Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference: What’s Next for Nuclear Disarmament? (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, 2010), 83.
[ 9 ]. U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, Is a Nuclear Iran a Global Security Threat? (New York: McGraw-Hill Press, 2006), 349.
[ 10 ]. U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, Is a Nuclear Iran a Global Security Threat? (New York: McGraw-Hill Press, 2006), 353.
[ 11 ]. U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, Is a Nuclear Iran a Global Security Threat? (New York: McGraw-Hill Press, 2006), 352-354.
[ 12 ]. U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, Is a Nuclear Iran a Global Security Threat? (New York: McGraw-Hill Press, 2006), 362-365.
[ 13 ]. U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, Is a Nuclear Iran a Global Security Threat? (New York: McGraw-Hill Press, 2006), 364.