Inhibition and Resistance to Interference:
An Introduction
Parents often tell their children to “Pay attention!” and, “Don’t watch television while doing your homework!” Although most parents attend to their children’s habits and behaviors, others do not realize how mental processes are responsible for their children’s thinking, behavior, and overall development. These cognitive mechanisms include a range of specific constructs, such as working memory capacity, information processing, metamemory, knowledge base, and inhibition, which all contribute to child development (Schneider & Pressley, 1989).
However, there is substantial evidence to suggest that cognitive processes are also present in infant development. Theoretical constructs in infant literature (Colombo, 1993) indicate that infants posses individual and developmental differences in attention, memory, and information processing. In addition, research has recently suggested that cognitive inhibition is present during infancy. Therefore, given that one aspect of this cognitive puzzle is not superior to any other mental process, this paper will primarily concentrate on cognitive inhibition during infancy.
The study of cognitive inhibition is still in an inchoate state in regards to infant development. The goal of this paper is to review and analyze recent studies on infant behavior as it pertains to cognitive inhibition. It is believed that research on infants may provide supplementary evidence in the understanding of cognitive inhibition. However, there are several implications in studying infant behavior that should be addressed. For example, infant temperament and their inability to vocalize the research experience pose a potential dilemma in researching infant behavior because both parties (i.e. the experimenter and the infant participant) cannot verbally express their intentions, feelings, etc. Also, infant research lacks predictive validity because the degree of predication is generally modest and “clinically irrelevant” (Colombo, 1993).
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Yet, despite these possible confounds, research has suggested that inhibitory function develops during infancy.
Cognitive Processes and the Development of Cognitive Inhibition
Contemporary models of cognitive development have defined cognitive inhibition as a mental ability that enables individuals to suppress task-irrelevant information once it has been activated in working memory (Harnishfeger, 1995).
The ability to effectively inhibit task-irrelevant information becomes more efficient during the course of child development. As infants and children become more adept in inhibiting distracting stimuli, changes in overall cognitive processing become noticeable. For example, a change in cognition occurs when infants comprehend the concept of object permanence. Object permanence refers to the understanding that objects continue to exist independently of one’s perceptions or actions on the objects (Bell, 1998).
Infants who lack object permanence do not understand that an object continues to exist although it is out of their sight. For those infants, “out of sight is literally out of mind” (Bjorklund, 2000, p. 84).
However, once infants become aware of object permanence, their behavior no longer resembles the pre-object permanence mentality that an object simply disappears when unattended. Instead, infants between 4 to 8 months begin to search and retrieve partially hidden objects. And 8 to 12 month-old infants gradually develop more complex abilities of locating fully hidden objects with subsequent time delays.
The Essay on Cognitive Development of an Infant and Toddler
Piaget based the sensorimotor stage on his observations of his own children The Circular Reaction: a. Circular reactions are the means by which infants explore the environment and build schemes by trying to repeat chance events caused by their own motor activity. b. These reactions are first centered on the infant’s own body. Subsequently, they change to manipulating objects and then to ...
As infants mature to become children, cognitive functioning becomes more advanced. An example of cognitive development among children includes improvements in selective attention (see Lane & Patterson, 1982).
Selective attention is the ability to focus on pertinent information and not to succumb to mental or physical distractions in the environment (Harnishfeger, 1995).
Young children are especially more prone to distraction and pay less attention to important information than older children. For young children, it is difficult to ignore internal and external intrusions, such as daydreams, random thoughts, or any other “noise” in their surroundings. Yet, changes in cognition over childhood have resulted in older children’s ability to maintain on task while ignoring peripheral stimuli. It is no surprise then that older children are better able to inhibit inappropriate mental or behavioral responses than younger children are.
Evidence of inhibition is not only detected through a series of behaviors or responses, but is also supported by neuropsychological research (Bell & Fox, 1997).
Research on brain development suggests that cognitive inhibition is biologically related to the frontal lobes of the brain. This portion of the brain is located in the anterior section of the cerebral cortex, and is responsible for executing various cognitive processes, such as planning and concentrating on tasks. Neuropsychological research has determined that the frontal lobes are one of the last areas of the brain to develop, requiring anywhere between 13 to 18 years to fully mature. Evidence of inhibition and its relation to the frontal lobes has been based on correlation by testing individual differences among persons with frontal lobe dysfunction or those who are highly creative or gifted (Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1994).
Cognitive Inhibition and Resistance to Interference
Cognitive inhibition is commonly confused with another related mental process, known as resistance to interference (Harnishfeger, 1995).
Resistance to interference refers to the ability to prevent irrelevant information from entering working memory. Its primary purpose is to maintain task performance by restricting irrelevant information from interfering with task-related information. If irrelevant information is not inhibited out of working memory, the irrelevant stimulus detracts attention from the relevant stimulus, and results in decreased task performance. Although some cognitive studies have used both terms interchangeably, resistance to interference should not be misinterpreted as being synonymous to inhibition. In fact, cognitive inhibition and resistance to interference have distinct characteristics. One basic difference between these two related constructs is that resistance to interference does not rely on active suppression of cognitive processes. Another difference between these two cognitive constructs involves the how they are tested. Resistance to interference occurs when irrelevant information that has not been suppressed from working memory becomes activated and competes with the stimuli. On the other hand, cognitive inhibition is an active suppression process that keeps irrelevant information from remaining activated in working memory, so that cognitive processes are not disturbed. Tasks, which include negative priming, intrusions in memory, and activation of relevant and irrelevant information during cognitive processing, are general measures of inhibition. Measures of resistance to interference include reductions in speed of access and response, as well as dual-task processing tasks.
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This essay will compare Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s theories of cognitive development in children. Also, show the differences between the two psychologist’s theories. Thus, by showing their similarities like in language and adaptation theories. Further, differences like Piaget’s theory on cognitive developmental stages and the schemas which are build to learn or accommodate new words or things. ...
Although inhibition and resistance to interference are not identical, these constructs are not entirely dissociated either. Like inhibition, the ability to resist interference from task-irrelevant stimuli is facilitated with developmental progression. Children can resist distracting stimuli better than infants can and adults are able to resist interference more readily than both infants and children. As is cognitive inhibition, resistance to interference is biologically related to the frontal lobes of the brain (Dempster & Corkill, 1999).
The study of inhibition and resistance to interference has extended into other domains of developmental interest. Researchers have investigated the role of inhibition and interference in relation to attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (Gaultney, Kipp, Weinstein & McNeill, 1999), reading comprehension (Kipp, Pope & Digby, 1997), directed-speech (Kipp & Pope, 1997), directed-forgetting (Harnishfeger & Pope, 1996), and intelligence (McCall, 1994).
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It is believed that cognitive inhibition is related to these other constructs as well.
Research on children’s cognitive inhibition provides a general background suitable to understanding infant inhibition. Yet research on children’s cognition is limited because it does not reveal when inhibitory functions first emerge. It is suggested that inhibition is first observed during infancy and becomes more advanced during childhood. Therefore, a much younger population is needed to confirm or deny if inhibitory functions are indeed present before the onset of childhood has begun. Even though there are implications in studying non-linguistic infants, such as infant temperament issues (i.e. fussing or crying) and moderate predictive validity, methodological designs have been constructed to asses infant cognition. For example, the A not B paradigm, habituation, violation-of-expectation, and disengagement are all methods of testing infant cognition. These designs have been used to measure infant memory, perception, and concepts. Yet, research using these specific measures on infant inhibition has not been fully explored. Therefore, this paper will introduce and interpret studies on the A not B paradigm, habituation, and disengagement as supporting evidence for cognitive inhibition in infants.
The A not B Paradigm
The tendency for infants to mistakenly believe that an object disappears when it is unattended by the infant has traditionally been explained as an inability to recognize object permanence, which has been demonstrated by utilizing the classical A not B paradigm (Piaget 1954).
The primary focus of A not B is to measure infant cognition and memory. It does so by examining infants’ search behavior in response to hiding objects into one of two adjacent locations. During the first set of trials, the object is continually hidden at one location in full view of the infant with the intent that the infant will locate and retrieve the hidden object. If the infant successfully obtains the object from the first location over a period of trials, the object is then hidden at the second location. The typical response in the second set of trials is for the infants to misjudge the object’s actual location by searching at the first location (Bjorklund, 2000).
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Contemporary research recognizes Piaget’s perspective that memory is related to infant behavior but researchers do not believe that a memory deficit is the sole cause of infants’ response errors. Diamond (1988) suggests that infants experience problems on the A not B task because it requires not only memory but also inhibition of motoric action in order to be successful at retrieving the toy. Diamond believes that infants fail to inhibit their previous response because the behavioral component of this task becomes predominant in their response tendencies. In all cases of the Diamond (1985) study, infants were made aware that the object was relocated to the second location, yet despite knowing this fact, most young infants could not stop themselves from reaching to the first location. These infants could not inhibit their previous knowledge of the immediate past, which at that time, was to reach for the object at the first location. As Diamond (1985) suggests that to overcome the tendency to reach for the object in the first location “indicates the beginnings of the infants’ ability to be guided by intention rather than by habit” (Diamond, 1988, p. 869).
Before infants can avoid making the A not B error, they must inhibit their previous response tendency. That is, infants must inhibit reaching for the object at the first location, and instead, reach for the object at the new location. This ability develops over the first year, showing both age and sex differences among the infants. Diamond (1985) investigated 6 to 12 month-old infants to determine the length of a time delay needed to produce the A not B error. Among the infants who participated in the study, approximately all of the six to nine month-old infants produced the A not B error at a delay of 2-5 seconds. When longer delays were imposed, infants responded poorly. Diamond found that a very brief delay yielded accurate responses, while an overextended delay produced a deteriorated performance. This deteriorated performance included a variety of behaviors, such as random reaching, fussing, and even crying. However, when there was no time delay on the task, response errors were rare.
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Social referencing is an imperative tool to any infant. Social referencing to an infant is when the infant is “seeking information about an unfamiliar or ambiguous object or event by observing someone else’s expressions and reactions.”(Berger, 2005, 185). These observations are in general acquired from mother, father, or caregiver. An infant will react differently to mother and ...
Older infants between 10 to 12 months showed a dramatic difference than younger infants between 6 to 8 months. All of these older infants were successful at locating the object from the correct location at a delay of seven seconds, and most were able to sustain a delay of ten seconds before correctly responding. Diamond (1985) found that the duration of the delay crucial for the A not B error to appear increased at a rate of 2-3 seconds per month of the infants’ first year. In addition, sex differences were determined, with females performing better on the object permanence task than their male counterparts. This finding may suggest a developmental variation between the sexes. Diamond proposes that this gender discrepancy of females performing better on the A not B task is due to the rate of development in the prefrontal cortex.
Given Diamond’s (1985) hypothesis that the frontal lobes are responsible for infants’ performance on the object permanence task and previous literature relating the frontal lobes to inhibitory function (Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1994), the change in infant behavior may be attributable to the change in their inhibitory control functions. Plainly stated, the ability to avoid making the A not B error may be related to cognitive inhibition. Thus, the infants’ performance on the object permanence task may be attributable to the ability of inhibiting their habitual, motoric response. According to Diamond’s (1988) perspective, memory does not fully explain the A not B error. By this account, it is evident that memory is not the only factor to consider in explaining the A not B error in infants. Therefore, the shift from not being able to locate the hidden object at the second location to being successful on the A not B task, can be interpreted as the cognitive development of the frontal lobes, and its inhibitory control mechanisms.
Research on Diamond’s (1985; 1988) studies on the object permanence task and its relation to infant inhibition has been validated by neurophysiological literature (Bell & Fox, 1997; Bell, 1998).
Based on the supposition that the frontal lobe may be involved with planning and inhibitory function, Bell and Fox utilized brain electrical activity (EEG) in conjunction with the A not B task among eight-month-old infants. Similar to the Diamond (1985) study, Bell and Fox imposed time delays of 0-8 seconds and recorded each infant’s EEG before testing, using a baseline condition to determine the level of brain electrical activity before the actual experiment in order to facilitate analyses of the results. It was found that most infants were successful at retrieving the object with no time delay. Infants who were unable to pass the A not B task showed lower levels of EEG power than infants who passed the task. There were no significant differences on EEG power levels between the infants who were successful on A not B without a delay and infants who could tolerate some delay. However, between-group differences were detected among infants with locomotor experience (i.e. hands-and-knees crawling) and those who could not crawl. For crawling infants, EEG power levels were higher than non-crawling infants, with crawling infants showing enhanced performance on the A not B task. Individual differences in the A not B performance were also detected in regards to the location of the brain activity. Infants who passed the object permanence task displayed greater power values in both the frontal and occipital EEGs during the baseline condition than infants who failed the task.
Based on Diamond’s (1985) research and Bell’s (1998) study, cognitive inhibition plays a fundamental role in infant development. The results from the Bell (1998; Bell & Fox, 1997) studies indicate that frontal brain electrical activity is related to cognitive development during infancy. As infants become more adept at inhibiting their prepotent responses, the tendency to produce the A not B error diminishes. Bell (1998) found between-subject variability among same-aged infants in their A not B performance to be associated with individual differences in frontal lobe development. Cognitive inhibition provides the theoretical construct needed to interpret the EEG power levels of the frontal lobes and supports individual differences in infants’ object permanence performance. Once again, based on the supposition that inhibition is related to the development of the frontal lobes and the EEG recordings during the A not B task, it is clear that cognitive inhibition is neither stagnant nor nonexistent during infancy.
Violation of Expectation Paradigm
In previous studies of the A not B task, researchers noticed that infants looked at the second location longer even though they falsely reached for the object at the first location (Diamond 1985; 1988).
By using the violation-of-expectation paradigm to explain this unusual behavior, it is suggested that infants know where the object is accurately hidden. Traditionally, the violation-of-expectation task involves placing an object into a possible and impossible event in order to compare the length of time infants’ look at each event. According to this model, infants look at the impossible event longer because it violates the expectancy of what should typically occur (Ahmed & Ruffman, 1998).
The main inference that the violation of expectation paradigm proposes is that infants look at an impossible event significantly longer than when they look at a possible event. Infants’ behavior of looking at the impossible event may reflect knowledge that they understand that the event should be impossible.
By converging the established interpretation of the violation-of-expectation method to the A not B paradigm, it can be inferred that infants actually know where the correct object is hidden by looking at the second location longer, even though they inaccurately respond to the task. Diamond (1988) suggests that infants’ performances reflect knowledge for the correct location, but that their behavioral tendency of reaching to the first location is too habitual to inhibit. Bell (1998) also found that eight-month-old infants exhibited higher EEG power levels during their “looking” version of the A not B task than at the baseline condition of the reaching version of the task. Based on Diamond’s research and the neurophysiological evidence by Bell, a cognitive inhibition interpretation supports the idea that infants cannot mentally inhibit their prepotent response to reach for the first location, even though they exhibit looking behavior, which leads one to the conclusion that know the object’s location. Thus, incorporating the violation-of-expectation paradigm may reveal that infants know the toy’s location although their behavior denotes otherwise.
Ahmed and Ruffman (1998) conducted a study to measure if infants between the ages of 8 to 11 months can remember the location of the toy in a nonsearch A not B task as compared to the standard A not B task. Three tasks were implemented. The first task was the standard A not B task, which provided information on the time at which infants made the A not B error. Delays of zero seconds (s), 15s, and the time at which infants made the search error in the first task were recorded. The second task included the violation-of-expectation paradigm, whereby the infant watched the experimenter place the toy at location A, retrieve, and then hide the toy at location B. After a time delay of zero, 15s, or the delay at which the search error was made in the first task, the experimenter retrieved the toy from location A (impossible event) or B (possible event).
The third task involved another nonsearch task but without incorporating the impossible event. The second and third tasks were used to compare infants’ performances with their performance on the first task. All infants participated in the three tasks.
The results indicate that all infants who erred in the standard A not B task looked at the impossible event longer than the possible event. This finding suggests that infants did remember the correct location of the toy in the nonsearch tasks. In addition, it appears that most infants could remember the location of the toy in the nonsearch tasks even when time delays of 15s were imposed. Therefore, the length of time was longer than the average delay time at which infants were required to search for the toy, which further suggests that infants knew where the toy was hidden in the nonsearch tasks (Ahmed & Ruffman, 1998).
Thus, the violation-of-expectation paradigm in the nonsearch task provides supporting evidence that the infants did have some idea about where the toy was correctly located. These results are consistent with Diamond’s (1988) study, which suggests that infants do know the location of the toy but cannot inhibit the retrieval of their previous response.
Cognitive inhibition provides a theoretical model of explaining infants’ performance on the A not B task. The fact that the infants looked at the impossible event longer than the possible event in the A not B task suggests that they knew the object’s location. Therefore, the inability to retrieve the object is not due to a memory or knowledge deficit; rather, the inability to retrieve the object strengthens the argument that the problem is due to inhibitory failure. The tendency to err in this task is due to the infants’ inability to inhibit their prepotent response to the previous stimulus. This behavior typifies an immaturity in frontal lobe development and thus the tendency to respond to the more salient stimuli. Thus, a cognitive inhibition interpretation is consistent with the results in Ahmed and Ruffman’s (1998) study.
Habituation Paradigm
The habituation paradigm is another method for assessing infants’ cognitive processes. Plainly stated, habituation refers to the tendency for infants to decrease their attention when a stimulus has been presented repeatedly (Colombo, 1993).
During this episode of decreased attention, the presentation of a novel stimulus is introduced, and the infant’s attention will typically recover to focus on the novel stimulus. Measuring infant habituation consists of two basic steps. The first procedure involves presenting the infant a visual stimulus by using a slide projector or some other viewing device that is suitable for attaining their attention. Then, the length of time an infant fixates to the stimulus is recorded.
Following this basic habituation procedure, research has modified the task to include different measures of assessments. For example, in experimenter-controlled procedures, the experimenter predetermines the length of time the infant is exposed to the stimulus, as well as the number of trials completed irrespective of the infants’ response to the task. This type of procedure is excellent in studying between-group differences but is limited because it ignores individual differences between infants. An infant-controlled procedure, however, takes into account individual differences between infants. In this particular procedure, the visual habituation rate is dependent on infants’ performance by using a relative criterion percentage that is usually 50%. The purpose of relative criterion percentage is to determine a general time frame when a decline in visual fixation will occur and allows individual differences between infants to be assessed. According to Colombo’s (1993) viewpoint, the relative criterion theoretically equates both within and between subjects in terms of the degree to which the stimulus is processed. Thus, infant-controlled procedures are better adapted to quantifying the actual habituation rate in order to determine individual differences between infants.
Evidence of individual differences in infant habituation has been documented in recent literature (Colombo, 1993).
By employing the infant-controlled procedure of the habituation paradigm, researchers have been able to measure different visual responses among same-age infants. Based on the infants’ duration of fixation to a presented stimulus, researchers can estimate the length of time required for the infant to habituate to a particular stimulus. According to the infants’ performance and their habituation rate, infants may be classified into two categories. The first group of classification is known as “long lookers”, which include infants who experience high or above average look durations. “Short lookers”, on the other hand, refer to infants that engage in low or below average look durations. Research has found differences between “long lookers” and “short lookers” among infants to be conversely related to other developmental trends. Long-looking infants, for example, have been found to be at a disadvantage in other realms of cognitive and behavioral development. Research has found that these infants generally perform poorly on recognition memory tasks than short-looking infants. Also, reaction times and slower development of motor skills have been recorded among “long lookers”. However, “short lookers” do not appear to be disadvantaged in their development. Colombo suggests that “short lookers” posses more efficient cognitive processes that enable the infant to habituate more readily. That is, “short-lookers” are considered to be more competent in their habituation ability than “long-lookers”.
Individual differences in cognitive inhibition are also a key concept in childhood development. In particular, a study by Harnishfeger and Bjorklund (1994) focused on children’s cognitive inhibition suggests that individual differences in inhibition affect later development. Individual differences in inhibition have been detected among children who are gifted or possess creative talent. Individual differences in inhibition among the adult population has found that those who suffer from frontal lobe dysfunction are not as effective at inhibiting behaviors and thought processes as average adults are capable of doing. Also, research has examined individual differences in cognitive inhibition among people with attention deficit disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, schizophrenia, mental retardation, as well as reading and learning disabilities. Harnishfeger and Bjorklund concluded that individual differences in attention and behavior reflect individual differences in cognitive inhibition.
Comparator Model and Dual-Process Theories
There are two central theoretical models that explain and provide distinct interpretations on infant visual habituation. The more widely accepted theory, known as the comparator model, posits that an increase of attention at the beginning of the habituation trial is due to a lack of memory or “engram” of the stimulus (Colombo, 1993).
But as the stimulus is repeatedly exposed to the infant, memory of the stimulus is internally represented, which invariably results in decreased attention. Basically, this theory suggests that the decrease in attention may be due to processing the information from the actual stimulus and comparing it to an established mental representation of the stimulus. The other theoretical model that explains infant habituation is called the dual-process theory. The dual-process theory suggests that infants display a state of short-term excitability on the habituation curve. This animated behavior is referred to as sensitization, which refers to the arousal of the initial presentation of the stimulus that is characterized by an increased visual attention. As the infant becomes less stimulated by the presented stimulus, it becomes redundant to the infant and the final result is decreased visual attention. This decrease in attention, according to the dual-process theory, is interpreted as being due to the interaction and conflict between habituation and sensitization (Colombo, 1993).
Given the parameters of the habituation paradigm and its interpretations, a cognitive inhibition perspective may fill a gap in explaining infants’ visual attention. Previous research has verified that infants’ reduced attention to repeated stimuli is not due to exertion because infants’ attention is regained when a novel stimulus is later displayed (Colombo, 1993).
Instead, another process provides a better account for infants’ behavior in this task. Cognitive inhibition explains infants’ behavior during the time period when infants do not attend to the previous stimulus but focus on the novel stimulus. A cognitive inhibition interpretation suggests that when the novel stimulus is introduced, infants must inhibit their prepotent response of attending to the first stimulus in order to focus on the new stimulus. The theoretical supposition is that infants are inhibiting the mentally represented image from working memory in order to process new information on the novel stimulus. In addition, cognitive inhibition may also explain individual differences in infant habituation. By adapting individual differences in habituation rate from Colombo (1993) to the cognitive inhibition model, it is suggested that infants who exhibit short look durations posses better inhibitory functions in comparison to infants who engage in long look durations. That is, “short lookers” are capable of inhibiting their prepotent response f
