Chapter II OSCE reactions to the security threats of the XXI century SS 1. Combating terrorism Al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center in New York and on Pentagon in Washington, caused shock and condemnation among the population of the whole world. Overnight, terrorists dominated international thinking. Many international bodies had included fight against terrorism in their action programs, but now this issue became a major priority. The United Nations Organization, the European Council, NATO, the European Union, OSCE – all these international bodies declared their determination to fight against terrorism and initiated counteraction measures. UN have begun to pay special attention to the fight against terrorism since 1960.
UN adopted a series of declarations and conventions concerning the issue. The Security Council dealt with terrorism in a more specific way, including Osama bin Laden and Taliban’s from Afghanistan, etc. After September 11, UN developed a general framework for combating terrorism. The Security Council authorized the use of force in pursuing the responsible for attacks; a Commission for Combating Terrorism (CCT) was established, its goals being to monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by the Security Council. Terrorism was not a new subject for the Council of Europe either.
In January 1977, the EC adopted the European Convention on Terrorism Abolishment that focused on legal and legislative measures. After September 11, the EC appealed to the member states to ratify the Convention regarding terrorism and other relevant documents. A multi-disciplinary group of international action against terrorism was established to review the EC tools used for combating terrorism, including the European Convention. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is rather a beginner in combating terrorism. Before the terrorist attacks, NATO paid some attention to the challenges of international terrorism, especially in the press release of the Washington Summit in 1999. September 11 brought NATO to a new level, the Alliance deciding to consider the attacks as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
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Besides the fact that this step showed political solidarity, it was also a commitment to offer military support. In Afghanistan military campaign it was clear that the political, military, and logistical assistance offered by NATO were of great help to the USA. In the period preceding the attacks in New York and Washington, the European Union undertook measures to combat terrorism, implementing sanctions imposed by UN and strengthen the judiciary cooperation between its members. After the al-Qaeda attacks, the EU applied new measures of restriction against Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban. Until the attacks of September 11, 2001, OSCE did not consider terrorism problem to be a priority, except for certain member states, like Russia and the countries of Central Asia. After a certain period of time, the OSCE’s perception of terrorism has changed.
Analytically speaking, there are four types of terrorism as they appear in the OSCE documents: terrorism as an undermining tool of the Cold War policy; terrorism of the age of the Cold War, but without any connection to the Eastern-Western conflict; terrorism as a separatism tool within the OSCE region; and Islamic fundamentalism. In the middle 90’s, there was a general belief that OSCE should be used for specific measures of combating terrorism. However, the suggestion to organize a workshop on terrorism problems and to create a group of experts for stimulating the cooperation of the member states in combating terrorism that was made at a meeting in November 1996, was rejected. At the 1999 Conference the member states of the EU said again that OSCE should neither double the work of the United Nations, nor set an operational role in this area.
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The attacks of September 11 caused a dramatic increase of the attention paid by OSCE to the problem of terrorism, including the relations of OSCE with other international organizations. All member states of the OSCE expressed their strong condemnation of the attacks and created a special Work Group on the issues of terrorism and an action plan. These were adopted at the Ninth Ministerial Council, in Bucharest, on December 3-4, 2001. In the resolution regarding terrorism combating the Ministerial Council declared that the “terrorist acts in all their forms and manifestations, whenever, wherever, and by whoever performed, constitute threats to international peace, security, y and stability.” According to the Action Plan adopted in Bucharest, OSCE will support all the activities undertaken by other organizations, especially by UN, without duplicating their efforts. UN undertakes the role of the leader in combating terrorism, while OSCE can assume the role of coordinating inter regional and intra-regional initiatives. OSCE will also try to offer extra value to this process on the basis of the characteristics of the Organization, its strong points, and comparative advantages: the comprehensive concept of security that connects human, economic, and political-military dimensions; its enormous participation; experience in the area and the expertise it possesses in preventive forewarning, conflicts prevention, crisis management, post conflict rehabilitation and democratic institutions.
Moreover, many of the efficient measures of combating terrorism are from the areas like police training, judiciary and legislative reforms, and border monitoring – areas, which OSCE is already professionally working in. A huge list of measures used by OSCE is included in the Action Plan. However, these are formulated in general terms and it is not clear how they are to be implemented. At a deeper analysis, these measures do not offer OSCE a new approach to the problem. The Organization will continue to do what it has done before, although new other measures can be identified. It is clear that the five states of Central Asia will benefit politically and financially from the reactions undertaken after September 11.
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As a result, the international Conference held in Bishkek on December 13-14, 2001 adopted its own Action Program. In this program they appeal to the need for addressing economic and social problems that terrorists take advantage of. International community is hailed to offer technical and financial assistance to the states of Central Asia. Portugal, which undertook the Presidency-in-Office in 2002, identified the fight against terrorism as a major priority. On May 2, 2002, the President-in-Office of the OSCE notified the Permanent Council about his intention to develop the “OSCE Charter for Preventing and Fighting Terrorism” that would allow the “adoption of new measures of preventing and combating terrorism.” On April 12, 2002, a special conference of the Permanent Council of OSCE focused on the summary of the action maps developed by OSCE institutions as a result of the Action Plan adopted in Bucharest. Four “strategic domains” were identified: police, border monitoring, trafficking (of drugs, weapons and people) and financing terrorism (money laundering).
A special unit for dealing with issues on combating terrorism was created at the OSCE Secretariat e. Combating terrorism was also the subject of the 11-th yearly session of the Parliamentary Assembly of OSCE held in Berlin, on July 6-10. The fight against terrorism has a second side that has not been ignored by OSCE. In the process of combating and persecution of terrorists, human rights and democratic freedoms have to be respected. The ex-Chairman of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODI HR), Stoudman repeated these concerns at the Bishkek Conference. He stated that “we can not persecute terrorists using the same methods they do.” He also added that the comprehensive action of combating terrorism has to combine measures used by law bodies with strategies of including all the sectors of the society in public life in order to intensify dialog between religions and improve civil society.
Thus, the attacks of September 11 generated a huge wave of activities on the international arena. The question is: what can each organization do and how can these various activities achieve the desired objective? In other words, how can the duplication of efforts be avoided? What can OSCE offer for this? The fact that the organization did not try to use new, operational methods but continued to do what it had been doing before is not praiseworthy. OSCE possesses experience that is extremely valuable in annihilation of the environment, in which terrorism can be born and exist. OSCE has to strengthen its message concerning the fact that the democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and humanitarian considerations must not be ignored in the present campaign for combating terrorism. Another function, which OSCE could contribute to, is to promote the implementation of the decisions and measures agreed upon by the member states at the various forums, especially in UN. The United Nations are not able to do this and it depends on the cooperation of regional organizations in the field.
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The absolute advantage of OSCE, in comparison with NATO, the UE and the Council of Europe, is the fact that the organization covers all the states from Vancouver to Vladivostok. OSCE could promote or even organize a regular exchange of information between the member states concerning the progress achieved and the problems that appear when implementing the measures of combating terrorism. The second direction of the activities in this field has already been stipulated in the Action Plan adopted in Bucharest: OSCE will help the states to implement the efforts, in the fields they are experienced in and in the cases where it is useful and necessary, in cooperation with the Council of Europe, the EU and maybe NATO. The tenth OSCE Ministerial Council held in Porto ended with the adoption of the Charter for the Fight against Terrorism, and the President-in-Office of the OSCE at that time, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs Da Cruz, emphasized the importance of global and regional cooperation as an pro-element of UN strategy against terrorism. He affirmed that “no organization or state can stand up to this challenge alone.” The document requires a better border management and a better cooperation in identifying “the connections between terrorism and trans-border criminality, money laundering, trafficking in human beings, weapons, and drugs.” SS 2. Peace maintaining in conflict areas Although OSCE deals with the arbitration of numberless conflicts at multidimensional level, it has never brought peacemaking forces to the conflict areas it covers.
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However, it is important to highlight and analyze the OSCE potential in this field and the possible forms of the peacemaking operations under the auspices of OSCE. Despite the lack of direct experience in peacemaking, OSCE developed a distinct approach to the peacekeeping process. This approach emerges from the specific characteristics of the organization, large participation of the states, and the decision-making mechanism. Peacemaking can be considered as less explored and capitalized by OSCE. The implementation by cooperation of the commitments, programs, and measures represents the key method used by OSCE. Moreover, OSCE does not use military tools for achieving the desired objectives and targets.
However, the Helsinki Document of 1992 stipulates the preference of the organization to perform peacekeeping operations (PKO) and to use military force as an OSCE tool. While the Lisbon Document, called “Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty First Century” highlights the OSCE’s importance as a “forum for improvement of the cooperation and ” between the member states and European and transatlantic organizations for ensuring security in Europe, although does not make direct references to the peacekeeping. The history of OSCE showed that the Helsinki process had been always capable of functioning using only loyal methods, but there were various reasons for OSCE member states to apply tougher methods and particularly PKO. Conflicts prevention might also be necessary on higher stages of the process of conflict settlement l.
Crisis management is also an OSCE objective. Although this is not defined in the OSCE documents, crisis management can be considered as conflict prevention in the last stage of the process of conflict settlement, i. e. conflicts prevention in crisis situations. The assistance provided under these circumstances should comply with all the requirements of crisis situations and offer enormous political investments, as well as help programs in exceptional situations, preventive use of peacemaking troops and operations. The methods intended for OSCE should combine the entire range of measures that could be used by OSCE.
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Thus, OSCE will have the necessary flexibility for such situations. Moreover, the pacification performed by OSE C could offer an alternative better than that of bilateral pacification. Generally, the forces of maintaining multilateral peace in Europe should be established on the basis of OSCE decisions or managed and organized by OSCE. Another reason for OSCE to be more active in using peacemaking forces concerns the fact that in this way the organization would benefit from a higher reliability in the eyes of the entire world, which thinks of OSCE as of an inefficient arbor of political discussions. What would be the types of peacekeeping operations OSCE could get involved in? According to its role of conflicts prevention, there are two models of pacification operations that could be guaranteed by OSCE, namely: preventive use of military troops, like in Macedonia, and organization of peacekeeping operations in the post-conflict areas. The criteria stipulated in the Helsinki Document are very useful for this type of operations.
The 1992 Helsinki Document and the Decisions adopted by the Ministerial Council in Rome, 1993, draw a substantial attention to the OSCE subject and pacification. According to the Helsinki Document, OSCE can perform peacekeeping operations in the member states or between those, in order to maintain peace and direct the conflicting parties towards a political solution of the conflict. This stipulation must be analyzed in the light of OSCE regulations as a regional organization in the context of UN Charter. Like in the case of traditional UN operations, using peacekeeping troops under OSCE auspices is possible only after a sustainable seize of fire, signing an agreement or a memorandum between the parties and establishing the conditions for the security of the peacekeeping forces. Under the pressure of the Russian Federation, the discussions concerning peacekeeping organized at OSCE moved towards the methods of peacekeeping used by the third parties. In 1993, the Ministerial Council in Rome established the standards of monitoring the peacekeeping operations assigned to the third countries, by OSCE.
According to the decisions made in Rome, OSCE “can consider, upon occasion, and according to some specific conditions, the establishment of some cooperation arrangements with OSCE in order to ensure that the role and functions of military forces of a third party in the conflict zone comply with the OSCE principles and objectives.” The procedures for the implementation of such arrangements reflected the traditional approach used by UN, which supposes the consent of the conflicting parties, impartiality, transparency, lucidity of the mandate, and multinational structure. OSCE procedures also requested the compliance with the territorial sovereignty and integrity of the corresponding states and highlighted the need for a connection between these arrangements and the process of political settlement of the conflict. These severe procedures were aimed at ensuring the legitimacy of OSCE as an instrument of authorization of peace keeping by a third party. These principles would maintain the consensus of impartiality and legitimacy that exists within OSCE. Certainly, OSCE does not possess a fixed planning and an organizational system for dislocating peacekeeping operations. OSCE documents do not stipulate clear procedures for this type of operations.
However, in some cases OSCE can act as authorization institutions for implemented operations. For example, of NATO, the UE or CIS, because OCS E is impartial, while the CSI, NATO, the UE are not, or are not recognized as impartial organizations. In order to receive such a blessing from OSCE, certain preconditions and measures need to be accomplished. It is worth mentioning that PKO under Russian command still do not comply with all the general principles of PKO, especially with regard to the commitment of the involved parties. OSCE must insist for PKO under its auspices to be organized only in compliance with the named principles. The emphasis of OSCE on traditional approaches to pacification should not be considered weak points of the organization.
UN experience clearly proved that peacekeeping difficulties in internal conflicts are inevitable for organizations, which deal not only with joint defense. Moreover, these traditional principles of peacekeeping comply with the comprehensive and consensual approach to the security used by OSCE. The Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe developed in Lisbon in 1996 requires the continuation of the work for defining the cooperation models between OSCE and other organizations with regard to maintaining peace and security in Europe. Within a seminar held in 1997 in Vienna they emphasized the need to define these methods and to determine the areas of joint influence between these organizations. Thus, the security Model could offer a flexible framework for cooperation and coordination between the member states and European and transatlantic bodies, in the fields of peacekeeping and securing the crisis in the region. This model could help moving from what Madeleine Albright called “pacification in the area of influence.” It is important to analyze the pacification potential of OSCE with a view of dealing with the process of peace maintaining by Russia.
Finally, if OSCE dislocates PKO, it would be in the Area, which is self-declared by Russia as a sphere of vital interest. Beginning with the collapse of the USSR, Russia dislocated PKO in four zones: Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, Southern Ossetia, and Abkhazia in Georgia. The Russian government was largely implicated in the arbitration efforts of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In all these states post-soviet conflicts seriously affected the consolidation and transition opportunity of these states, leaving behind thousands of victims and millions of refugees and displaced persons.
These operations were dominated by the forces of the Russian Federation and the conflicting parties were included as peacekeeping forces. The policy of these operations makes them absolutely distinctive in international practice. The peacekeeping forces of Russian Federation were dislocated in conflict zones after the direct implication of the Russian soldiers in these conflict zones. Within 1992-1996, the Russian Government had referred to the special responsibility it carries regarding the ex-Union. Under these circumstances, the visions of Russia are justified by UN Charter and the regional agreement of the CIS. Moreover, Russia tries to secure the stability at its borders with the help of these operations.
Also, within this period, the Russian Government considered OSCE as an important tool of influencing the future structure of the European security, but not of solving the problems that threatened Russia’s security in the former Soviet Union. Russia’s suggestions regarding the approach as a third party clearly reflected Russia’s insistence on a limited international involvement in the operations managed by Russia. Since 1996, Russia’s policy regarding OSCE has changed. Russia was already insisting on a definite division of labor between European institutions and on defining the methods of their interaction in such specific fields like peace keeping. Peacekeeping operations under OSCE auspice in the Russian zone of influence has to comply with several circumstances. The possibility to include the troops of other states – members of OSCE – beside Russia would increase the OSCE status to a central forum of coordination in Europe and would reduce the accusations against Russian interests in this region.
The given opportunity would represent an important step for Russia towards integration in the structures of European security, where Russia will not perceive OSCE just as a “diversion”, but as a significant organization for solving Russia’s personal dilemmas in the ex-USSR. After the end of the Cold War, UN and Russian Government assigned very different parallel models of conception of peacekeeping operations. An international peacekeeping operation under OSCE auspice in the former Soviet Union represents an important challenge for this organization. But the constructive and consensus framework that prevails in OSCE can serve as a range for applying the already learned lessons about peace maintaining and for testing the new counteracting model of the peacekeeping operations with the support from Russia and UN. SS 3 Combating trafficking of human beings Trafficking of human beings, especially trafficking of children and women represents, above all, a serious violation of human rights, but also refers to the field of activity of law authorities. This phenomenon is a major and complex concern related to the protection of human rights and affects almost all the member states of OSCE, be they origin, transition, or destination states.
The modern trafficking in human beings is a global phenomenon that comprises all ages and genders, but the biggest part suffering from trafficking are children and women. The victims are trafficked using numberless means of compulsion or deceiving methods for a lot of abusive and exploiting purposes. Looking at the trafficking in human beings in Central and Eastern European countries to destination countries of Southern and Western Europe and in North America and Asia, the number of women trafficked for forced prostitution prevails among the number of victims of the trafficking in human beings. The trafficking for other purposes than prostitution, like forced marriage and house work does not attract all the attention of the police forces and the victims of such cases do not have the possibility to ask for help. “Trafficking of human beings” means recruiting, transporting, transferring, and sheltering people by using threats or force or any other forms of compulsion, kidnapping, fraud, deceiving, power abuse or vulnerable position, or else, giving or receiving payments in order to obtain an approval of a person that controls another person that needs to be exploited. (UN Protocol, Palermo) Because this plague dramatically increased in Europe, OSCE rapidly and determinately responded to this insolence.
There are several commitments of OSCE stipulated in the documents adopted at Summits and Ministerial Councils. OSCE demands from the participating states: – eliminating all forms of violence against women, as well as all forms of women trafficking (Moscow, 1991) – undertaking the necessary measures concerning the elimination of discrimination and violence against women as well as… of all the forms of trafficking in human beings (Istanbul, 1999) – signing and ratifying the UN Palermo Protocol (Vienna 2000) – taking up a quibble responsibility for trafficking of human beings and undertaking adequate measures of trafficking prevention, protection of victims, and criminal pursuit of traffickers (Bucharest 2001, AP OSCE, 2002) – combating trafficking of human beings in any form (Porto Ministerial Council, 2002) The main objectives of the anti-trafficking activities organized by OSCE are: monitoring the anti-trafficking activity and strengthening the coordination between governmental authorities, civil society, and international bodies; increasing the trafficking prevention, offering assistance to the victims and facilitating criminal pursuit of traffickers. The anti-trafficking activities of OSCE are based on the OSCE principles and the regional framework of the Action Group for Combating Human Beings Trafficking of the Stability Pact. The policies and the laws of many countries have the tendency to shrink the perspective regarding the phenomena of trafficking for the purpose of forced prostitution. However, within the last 10 years, at international debates and especially in the UN documents there appeared the belief that even if the purposes of trafficking in human beings differ and change, the basic elements of it remain the same.
That is why they reached a consensus regarding the large definition of trafficking, including that of men and women and concerning the definition of a large variety of abusive and forced purposes. The first international definition of trafficking in human beings was developed in the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime; the Protocol of Prevention, Impediment, and Punishment of Human Trafficking, Particularly Children and Women, adopted by the General Assembly in November 2000. For this reason, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights undertakes adequate measures regarding the adjustment of the legislation of the member countries to the international framework concerning this degrading phenomenon. OSCE offers financing to a lot of its Field Missions for setting crucial points of trafficking combating in OSCE countries and implementing field projects that would prevent trafficking, would improve the assistance offered to the victims and would activate the legal punishment of traffickers. Within the last years, the Republic of Moldova became one of the main countries of origin of the human trafficking victims, who are mostly women and young girls. Women from Moldova represent 30-50% of the number of trafficking victims in some Balkan regions; moreover, they are being trafficked to further destinations in the entire Europe, North America, and even Asia.
A year ago, the legislation in force of the Republic of Moldova could not offer a legal base for an efficient response to the traffickers. According to the laws of the Republic of Moldova, only prostitution and its promotion were declared illegal. Thus, victims of trafficking were subjects of legal pursuit even for practicing forced prostitution, while traffickers were not usually punished, because the legislation of the Republic of Moldova did not include a definition of trafficking in human beings and its various aspects as a crime. In the fall of 2000, the OSCE Mission offered technical assistance for accelerating the process of development and adoption of the relevant documents until the fall of 2001. By offering assistance to the authorities of the Republic of Moldova in developing the amendments to the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedures Code, and Administrative Code, they strengthened the legislative background for an efficient prosecution of traffickers, as well as for the protection of victims and created a basis for productive activities of the international bodies in training law and border authorities of the Republic of Moldova. Projects of this type were implemented in many other OSCE Field Missions and are currently completed by projects related to the assistance and reintegration of the victims.
Chapter III The prospective’s of OSCE in the Euro – Atlantic security structure 1. OSCE in the context of NATO and EU expansion The expansion of NATO and the EU will take place in a world with a modified structure. After the terrorist attacks of September 11 in the USA, the European security institutions have entered a new phase of deep adjustments caused by the new provocations. Unlike in the beginning of the 90’s, OSCE does not represent the foundation stone in the discussions regarding the institutional future of the European security anymore. This change has been almost unnoticed and reflects the actual situation. The diminished status of OSCE in the debates regarding the European security is partially due to the expansion of NATO and EU.
The impact of the expansion of these organizations on OSCE is not directly related to the extending of specific groups inside the organization. Due to formal and not formal procedures that function inside the organization, the numerical expansion of each group in OSCE does not automatically affect the decision-making process within the OSCE. This aspect has effects even on the EU, which speaks unanimously on the problems related to the entire OSCE agenda. The expected impact must be analyzed through the fact that OSCE implications in NATO and the EU responsibilities have always been minimum. Therefore, those who have already joined NATO and will join the EU will no longer be a target for OSCE. On the other hand, this practice of non-interference is not being applied inside NATO or the EU, which have tried to expand their operations beyond their geographical area and area of activity.
Soon the 11 countries that want to join the EU will be a part of the European Union. NATO, according to the decisions adopted at the Prague Summit, is already consolidated with 7 new members. Taking into consideration all the adhering procedures, we can expect that in a few years the EU and NATO will include about 25-26 member states. This means that about 31 out of 55 OSCE member states, will join the EU or NATO, or NATO, or both organizations. The number of members of both organizations will still be growing. What is important to remember, is the tactical division of labor, according to geographical criteria, which exists inside these organizations.
Although some experts do regret them, most tools, which OSCE disposes of, have been developed to solve problems in the East and not in the West. Therefore, there is a tactical subsidiary in OSCE. This phenomenon is mostly applied in such areas as: human dimension, early alert, conflict prevention, crises management, and post-conflict recovery. For example, human dimension mechanism, which was applied at the end of the 80’s, was chosen to be applied out of the functioning zones of the Council of Europe, exception being the cases when the European Court for Human Rights failed to solve a case or another.
Certainly the application of this mechanism in the Western states remains symbolic. The method was used mostly during the Soviet Block. Exactly, out of the 20 missions of OSCE, which are dislocated in 19 member states, 6 have operated in Balkans, 5 in Asia, 3 in the South Caucasus, 6 in the Eastern Europe and none in the Western Europe or North America. Even the activities of the High Commissioner for National Minorities have focused mainly in the eastern part of the OSCE zone, although there are problems related to national minorities in many West European countries.
The Russian Federation was the most explicit in criticizing the policy of double standards within the OSCE. Russia’s argument was the fact that such a practice would separate the organization in two groups: the ones that rule and the ones that are being ruled. The focus of the OSCE activities in the Eastern zone arouses a sense of discrimination and stigmatization in many of these states. Once the EU and NATO expansion ends, the functioning zones of these will contain Central and Eastern Europe, including Balkans and Baltic States. The zones that will remain out of the functioning area of these organizations will be Western Balkans (Albania and the former Yugoslavia) and the former USSR. This course of the events can lead to the consolidation of a sense of stigmatization, taking into consideration that there are a lot of countries which are “immune” to the OSCE interference.
The end of the Mission mandates in Latvia and Estonia by the end of 2001, which was highly promoted and encouraged by the EU, was motivated by the future adhering to the EU. Under these circumstances, these two cases have sent the first two warning signals. The geographical expanding of EU and NATO is made simultaneously with their functional expansion. The last one can generate a highly institutional competition in some fields of OSCE activity and can result in overtaking by the EU of some missions, especially in the Western Balkans. At the same time, there are certain activity fields, in which OSCE could be exclusive. Although OSCE has never been implicated in peace maintaining operations, the organization accumulated experience in such files as early warning, political crises management, mediation in negotiations of political processes, monitoring of fire seizure agreement, and the post-conflict recovery, which includes the institutional consolidation, human rights, democracy, and the supremacy of law.
In some cases OSCE has dislocated international police forces immediately after the conflict. However, since the 90’s, the EU has been more active in such fields, which seemed to be entirely for OSCE. But the evolution of the EU and its tools does not cover the whole spectrum of the activities of OSCE. More exactly, the EU does not have an expertise in consolidation of democratic institutions, human rights, observing the laws. Although the EU’s desire to implement the Common Comprehensive Policy for Security and Defense cannot pass unobserved by OSCE. The EU will try to apply directly its methods of conflicts prevention g and crises management, without OSCE’s implication.
And if all big plans of the EU materialize in the nearest future, the EU will be more skilful in applying the concept of comprehensive security possessed by the OSCE. The evolution of NATO and its impact on OSCE also deserves a special attention. Although OSCE has never been able to compete with the military bases of NATO, OSCE by developing shy attempts to maintain peace, reformation of NATO as a result of the attacks of September 11 and its transformation into an organization for joint security of OSCE’s type can generate overlapping with the OSCE mandate. The possible polarization of NATO and the activation of the common policy of the European security will result in much greater oppression on OSCE in case of possible crises in Europe.
The EU will test its capacities in the Western Balkans, and OSCE will focus only in the former USSR zone. Nevertheless, OSCE has some comparative advantages, which saved the organization during the difficult times of the history. Within its almost 30 years of existence, CSCE/OSCE, had to confront serious provocations and has successfully overcome them. Since the 70’s and by the end of the 80’s was not clear whether the conference will be capable to survive the east to west confrontations, and has managed.
At the beginning of the 90’s CSCE was adjusting to the post-cold war transformations and was looking for a new identity. It has also managed this time, becoming institutionally consolidated organization. Although it did not get the role of a European UN, as some member states wished for, OSCE has become an important part of the European security institution “orchestra.” These positive turns in organization’s life were possible due to the advantages it has. First of all OSCE has always benefited from a vast participation of the European countries, North America and now of the South Caucasus and the Central Asia. Besides, since the beginning OSCE tried to approach the comprehensive concept of security and did not limit itself to the joint defense dimension.
OSCE did not limit itself to what it has, but tried to be flexible, and proved to be a relatively efficient organization. However, on the background of other Security organization from Europe, these advantages do not allow to interpret OSCE as an exceptional organization, but rather an ordinary one, still there are domains in which OSCE can have exclusivity. It is the only European organization that can set different norms. Excluding the debates regarding the necessity to review the traditional principles of OSCE, the Decalogue adopted in Helsinki in 1975 and specified in the Paris Charter from 1990 and other documents, remain a stable fundament for the OSCE member – states. Also, OSCE standards regarding democracy, human rights, minority rights, although unique in Europe, are much more advanced and developed at a higher level than the ones adopted by other European organizations.
OSCE is also the “mother” of the measures regarding the trust raising. In this domain OSCE could be highly implicated in conflict and post – conflict zones. Although with NATO and the EU extension the demand for the services that OSCE offers could decrease, this is true partially. The presence and the implication of OSCE remains substantial especially i 8 n the former USSR and the Western Balkans. 2. Regional strategies of OSCE The OSCE missions and other activities of OSCE at place constitute the fundamentals of the organization.
These are the fields in which the organization is the most visible and makes real attempts to produce changes for the better at place. The OSCE mission is to make its implication at the place more effective. Due to a chain of unsuccessful experiences in the South Eastern Europe, the Head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ambassador (USA) launched a new initiative to adopt the regional strategy for the South Eastern Europe, which includes the following purposes: “To develop a comprehensive and inter dimensional policy in regional and cross – border problems in the South Eastern Europe; to expand the research and the recourses which are at the disposal of some OSCE missions, in the filed; to cooperate more efficiently with other international organizations as to avoid the doubling of the duties and too determine the added value that each organization can propose.” At first this strategy was perceived as a new conceptual approach for OSCE, some optimists view it as the fourth dimension of the comprehensive security architecture. In some years nothing will be heard regarding this strategy. The whole problem relies in the fact that the Stability Pact for the South Eastern Europe, heeded by the EU, represents the real center for cumulating the efforts of the international community, and OSCE plays a marginal role in concrete activities, such as the first Work Table, on genre problems and the second Work Table on problems regarding the trafficking of human beings. The concept of a regional approach for the South Eastern Europe is widely accepted.
But there are structural problems regarding OSCE, since the Stability Pact was placed under the auspices of OSCE. First of all, some states like Slovenia and Croatia did not agree on their placing in a region to which they do not belong, second, not all countries have the same level of economic development, social society, etc, and third, there are problems of regional importance that are not addressed with a sufficient degree of reciprocity, for example: the return of the refugees and the cooperation with the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia. Central Asia is another region where OSCE is about to develop a regional strategy. In 1998, within the Ministerial Council from Oslo, the member states have decided to explore the possibilities of a coordinated approach of Central Asian problems. The comprehensive approach of the cooperation between the states of the Central Asia has again been addressed at the Istanbul Summit. In 2000, the General Secretary Ku bis traveled a lot in the region in order to promote the coordination of the efforts between the international organizations.
These efforts had to be coordinated and united as to ensure the security of Central Asian states against the provocation caused by the international terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime, the weapon and drug traffic. OSCE was not capable to develop a regional strategy for Central Asia, because the Ministerial Council from Vienna has filled to adopt a consensual resolution. There fore, this is a field in which OSCE could intensify its efforts in order to end the things properly. It’s a test for OSCE, taking into consideration the fact that the states of Middle Asia are still in the process of overcoming the treasury left from the Soviet Union, and especially of the forced cooperation.
These are hesitating to cooperate again. Even more the regional approach in the Central Asia is seen as an attempt to impose these states a forced cooperation, while these are much more inclined to underline the difference between them. Also the Middle Asian countries are willing to have a regional cooperation regarding their economy and security, but in these domains OSCE has less to offer than, for example, Russia. A third region for is being decided to adopt a regional strategy is the Caucasus, although few steps were taken in this direction. In 2000, the Personal Representative of the President in Office for Caucasus tried to improve the process of the regional strategy adoption. The structural deficiencies stop the achieving of a success.
The development of a regional strategy for Caucasus would mean the including of the North Caucasus in the strategy, which belongs to Russia. OSCE could, how ever, develop a regional strategy for the South Caucasus, meaning Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. And in this case there will be similar problems to the ones from the South Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which would prevent the above mentioned states from accepting the regional strategy. Despite all this, OSCE can develop an inter dimensional comprehensive policy regarding the regional cross-border matters, which will not substitute but rather complement the already existing activities of OSCE in these states. In the South Eastern Europe OSCE activates through its missions in the field in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the former Yugoslavians Republic – Macedonia, Kosovo, and the Federal Republic Yugoslavia. Although many activities must be implemented by OSCE in all of its region missions, the efforts are concentrating on the missions in Kosovo, Macedonia and the Federal Republic Yugoslavia.
In this zone OSCE must attempt to prevent the scaling of conflicts until destabilization. It very clear that OSCE can contribute to a lasting stabilization only through a strong cooperation with other organizations and states and also taking into consideration Russia’s position. For Russia, OSCE, within which it has the right to veto, represents an instrument for preventing of some eventual destabilization’s in the region, which are not in Russia’s best interests. For the Eastern region of Europe, OSCE does not have a planned strategy. This region is diversified by many problems and provocations, and a unique strategy could be damaging. Russia as well as OSCE has vital interests in the regions of the Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea.
The Russian Federation has strategically and security interests in this zone in order to prevent the inclusion of these states in NATO and to protect the Russian minorities in the region and to use them in order to influence the policy of the respective states. OSCE has lost a lot from its influence in this zone, sins its missions in Latvia, Estonia and Belarus were closed. The only mission on field that OSCE has in the Eastern Europe is the Republic of Moldova, where the major objective of the organization is the state integration. OSCE activity in Moldova has been in the center of the organization for almost a year, even since the perspective of regulation of the Transnistrian dispute and the integration of Moldova on federal bases became evident.
The document presented by the three mediators (the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and OSCE) in Kiev during the summer of 2002 was interpreted as a major step forward. The Holland presidency in OSCE has declared the Transnistrian matter which Moldova has to confront with as a prior one for the Presidency’s activity in 2003, and for the first time, the President in Office of the organization named a personal representative for Moldova, the Ambassador Adrian Jacobovits of Szeged. The OSCE mission in Moldova is important due to some considerations. First of all, the political regulation of the Transnistrian conflict is very close. The process of the state’s reintegration will be done, of course, under the and the support of OSCE. Major programs are foreseen in various fields, like the border control, economic development, and mass – media closeness from the left and right banks, which are having an informational war between them.
Second, for the first time in its history, OSCE has the opportunity to dislocate troops for peace maintaining. This perspective is being seen as a positive one by Russia as well, which has sustained the Kiev accord that mentions the dislocations of the peace maintaining troops under the auspices of OSCE in Moldova. For Russia this is a chance to hold its troops in Moldova, under the unified umbrella of OSCE peace forces. Many OSCE states are interested to participate at the pacifying contingents. Organization’s mission is to develop an operational model for peace maintaining, which will be impartial, transparent and internationalized as much as possible. 3.
The prospective’s of overcoming the problems within OSCE In the search for its consolidation on the international area, or in the so called “alphabetical soup” of the security organizations, OSCE must overcome several problems and provocation related to organizational and structural issues. It is more and more spoken about the necessity of a reform within OSCE. While OSCE has the necessary characteristics to be defined as an intergovernmental organization, “the key problem lies in the fact that OSCE does not have a legal statute of an international organization.” Even from 1993, the Ministerial Council from Rome made an attempt to rectify this situation. It was decided that the OSCE institutions would be given a legal capacity, privileges and immunities, but not according to an international convention ratified by the member – states, this being the right procedure, but under the auspices of the national legal norms and the constitutional criteria of each state. From that period was attained the minimal progress, and the working group inside the Permanent Council did not manage to reach and to develop final recommendations, due to its failure in reaching to a consensus. The problem which regards the juridical capacity of an international organization is not only an academically problem for OSCE, but one that relates to the self-communication between these organizations.
Although OSCE has successfully managed to prove its capacity to function in the lack of a juridical capacity, this unresolved problem creates some disadvantages and tangible problems. Only the Secretary and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights have such a juridical capacity. The immunity and the privileges matter for the staff of the OSCE Missions in the field receive a problematic aspect, because OSCE is obliged to contract Memorandums of Agreement with the participating states regarding the dislocation of Mission in the field, and the protection of the local staff against the criminal persecutions. Although the Romanian presidency in 2001 has underlined the priority “the necessity to evaluate if OSCE could function more efficient with a different juridical capacity”, tangible results at this chapter have not been reached. OSCE has a very different role for different member states. While Russia would like to see OSCE as the dominant organization in Europe in order to equilibrate the role and the influence of NATO, the United States and other states want to see OSCE as an instant flexible instrument and some do fear that the organization will be much more difficult to control if it had its own institutional life.
Another concerning matter is the budget. The value of the financial assistance accorded by OSCE to the big Missions is much disputable. Within the Ministerial Council from Copenhagen, in December 1997, was decide to introduce a special scale to establish the financial contributions given to the big missions, invoking higher costs for the rich member states. This scheme was introduced due to the important expanding of the OSCE activities in the field and the arousal of the necessities to maintain these missions at an operational level. Due to USA obstruction the new scheme was not introduced. At present the situation is as follows: the distribution of the costs for some activities, besides the ones in the field, will follow the scheme established in 1992 at Helsinki, which is very favorable to USA and Grate Britain, France, Germany, which has to contribute only 9%, and in the detriment of Russia which has to contribute also 9%.
The Permanent Council has decided to change the situation anyway. A new formula will be applied for the Missions in the field starting with 2005, then will b established a new scale and will be reached a compromise. Another problem must be addressed, and especially the relation between the OSCE Secretary and the President in Office. Every new presidency comes with a new set of priorities, working procedures, etc, fact which leads to a temporary immobilization of the Secretary, until the moment when these procedures become functional. One must not invent the bicycle every year, the cooperation procedures between the Presidency and OSCE must be set clear and rough. This would lea to a better continuity and stabilization within the organization..