Tactical Nuclear Weapon: Deterrence Stability between India and Pakistan
Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal
Associate Professor
School of Politics and International Relations
Quaid-i-Azam University
Islamabad
India and Pakistan relations have been fraught with conflict since 1947. New Delhi‘s recent
doctrinal transformation, upsurge in its anti-missile program, and gigantic investment in the
conventional weaponry have obliged Islamabad to reciprocate by manufacturing and testing a
credible-cum-transparent new weapon-NASR missile on April 19, 2011. Indeed, to prevent India‘s
hegemony in South Asia, Islamabad requires an unyielding conventional fence and credible nuclear
second strike. The solidification of the Pakistani defensive fence needs three things: strategic
vigilance, a sophisticated national military buildup program,1 and above all, finances to bear the
burden of military modernization. The first two are easier to accomplish provided the third article is
on a positive trajectory.
India‘s growing economy encourages colossal investment in its military arsenals. Conversely,
Pakistan‘s increasing economic fragility and unending war on terrorism limits the latter‘s options to
invest in the military buildup. This prevalent economic equation obviously facilitates New Delhi to
shift the balance of power in its favor. The overwhelming majority in Pakistan believe that if the
The Essay on Pakistan & India
India and Pakistan have been in a dispute, which is well known around the globe. Many factors contributing to this dispute have caused much turbulence throughout their entire region. There are both similarities and differences between the two states, and just like most disputes, the differences are the ones that stand out most. In an article found, the author states “India seems to me to be a ...
balance of power were heavily skewed in favor of India, it would be likely to launch a hegemonic
war against Pakistan.
The gradual fattening of the Indian military muscle naturally exacerbates the military
vulnerability of Pakistan. Therefore, the latter‘s defense planners continuously endeavor to preserve
the balance of power to sustain the deterrence stability between the belligerent neighbors in South
Asia. Though Islamabad has limited options to cope with the emerging strategic puzzles due to its
economic challenges, it still has room for maneuvering. The economic limitations also necessitate
that Islamabad must be vigilant, calculated, and sensitive to India‘s bait-and-bleed and bloodletting
strategies,2 i.e. a costly arms race, limited war, and luring it into a prolonged struggle with religiously
radicalized/extremist groups through its armed forces.3 Nonetheless, India‘s doctrinal change
entailing military buildup necessitates that Islamabad implement countermeasures— albeit at a
reasonable cost.
Pakistani strategic enclave is determined to uphold balance of terror with India to deter its aggression or blackmailing
tactics. The deterring capabilities can be acquired through internal build -up and/or via alliance formation. Pakistan‘s
alliances (SEATO & CENTO) and bandwagoning (United States & China) did not prevent its dismemberment in 1971
war with India. Since 1971, therefore, it has been focusing on internal build up. That is why, despite the opposition,
economic sanctions (1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and negative signalling over safety and security of its nuclear weapon program
(since 9/11) by the United States and like-minded states, Islamabad has been upsurging its nuclear arsenal.
2 The bait-and-bleed and bloodletting strategies mean to keep rival or strategic c ompetitor into protracted internal or
external conflicts to enable oneself to get relatively stronger on the sideline while the adversely is wasting its resources in
fight.
3 Since 9/11, Pakistani armed forces have been conducting military operations again st the terrorist groups on its
The Essay on Should All Nuclear Weapons Be Destroyed
Since 1945, when the first nuclear bomb was exploded by the Manhattan Project team in the US, nuclear weapons have proliferated across the globe. Currently, the US has about 7,000 warheads and the nations of the former Soviet Union have approximately 6,000. There are enough nuclear weapons in the world to destroy all civilization as we know it. They are perhaps the most powerful forces that man ...
territory.
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India‘s revisionist military strategy and Pakistan‘s status quo-oriented tactics at the technical
level of grand strategy may be perilous for the current deterrence stability between Indian and
Pakistan. Hence, the subject of deterrence stability between India and Pakistan has been attracting
an immense amount of attention to strategic observers since the latter tested its NASR Missile in
April 2011. The NASR missile test has instigated a debate about the tactical nuclear weapons‘
(particularly in Pakistani arsenal) role in the deterrence stability between India and Pakistan.
Strategic pundits, intoxicated with the concept of ‗minimum nuclear deterrence,‘ confidently
plead that India‘s military buildup could not destabilize Pakistan‘s defensive fence because of its
nuclear arsenal. They tried to establish that Islamabad‘s anxiety over India‘s anti-missile program and
Cold Start Doctrine, declassified on April 2004, has been due to its strategic alarmist
miscalculations.4 Significantly, many analysts concluded that Pakistan‘s pursuit of a new generation
of nuclear weapon, i.e. tactical nuclear weapon, for its deterrence credibility contains ingredients of
instability.
Indeed, a new generation of weapon creates power transition and intensifies the security
dilemma between the strategic competitors. The introduction of a newly invented weapon taxes the
strategic stability and thereby could jeopardize deterrence stability. Conversely, in certain cases, if the
new generation of weapon is invented and introduced in arsenals as a reaction to the strategic
revisionist state‘s military buildup, particularly designs to defend or preserve the balance of power or
status in the prevalent strategic environment, it bolsters the strategic stability. However, it is a tested
verity that the new generation of weapon is a catalyst for arms race. The arms race always fabricates
misperceptions and miscalculations, which are injurious to deterrence stability between the strategic
The Term Paper on India pakistan Nuclear Threat part 1
India-Pakistan Nuclear Threat In May 1998, India carried out five nuclear tests and formally declared itself a "nuclear weapon state" (NWS). This dramatic move stunned the ... the world faces new threats to its stability. More and more nations are becoming nuclear or are working on it.The states ... (Keylor, p.386-387) As both sides continued their conventional, nuclear, and strategic arms build up, ....
competitors.
India‘s doctrinal transformation obsessed with the revisionist strategic outlook, and
Pakistan‘s endeavors to seize every opportunity to maximize its power, including new generation of
nuclear weapons despite being a military cost-sensitive state, marked that the arms race continues
between South Asian nuclear capable states. In addition, New Delhi‘s steadfast denunciation of
Islamabad‘s Nuclear Restraint Regime proposal underlines the absence of solid constructs—arms
control arrangements between the strategic peers—of deterrence stability between the belligerent
neighbors. The threat of the use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out completely in the future
war between India and Pakistan. In this context, the duelling impact of the tactical nuclear weapon
on the deterrence stability between India and Pakistan necessitates an objective analysis. In the
following discussion, the analysis will be based on intensely debated paradoxes, i.e. the strategic
stability/instability paradox and vulnerability /invulnerability paradox.
Many analysts argue that in the aftermath of the terrorists attack on Mumbai in November 2008, India refrained from
conducting surgical strikes inside Pakistan despite having the Cold Start Doctrine. According to these analysts, India
refrained from military adventurism due to Pakistan‘s nuclear weapon capability. But one cannot ignore that India Army
Chief, General Depik Kapoor, expressed his satisfaction with Cold Start Strategy on December 29, 2010.
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Reinforcing Stability/Instability Paradox
South Asia has been experiencing fierce India-Pakistan security competition fuelled by the
power and fear of a rising India.5 The United States Strategic Partnership with both India and
Pakistan has failed to cool the security competition between India and Pakistan. Though
Washington played a decisive role in lowering the tensions or facilitated in averting tension
escalation into war during the last two decades,6 it has failed to prevent them from military
modernization. Nor has Washington helped constitute a substantial bilateral arms control
agreement/treaty. In reality, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and India-U.S. Space Cooperation have had
The Term Paper on India And Pakistan Nuclear States War
In May 1998 India's new coalition government led by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) conducted five nuclear tests. This was shortly responded by Pakistan with similar action, and the world realized that it received at once two new overt nuclear states. The nuclear tests were met with great popular celebration in the two countries and a big concern worldwide. Why nuclear tests in 1998 took place? ...
bolstering impact on India‘s military modernization. The benign inclination towards India is an
outcome of Washington‘s global policy of ‗engagement and enlargement‘ in the 21st century.
Accordingly, it needs an Asian power to check China‘s prospects of becoming a potential regional
hegemon in Asia and a peer competitor of the United States.7 More precisely, India‘s military
buildup, which is perilous for the regional strategic stability, receives assistance from the United
States.
India has been on a path to major military development—nuclear weapons, offensive
strategic/tactical ballistic and cruise missiles, missile defense system, and conventional arms. 8 The
missile defense system program reveals that India has not been content with the development of its
triad of nuclear forces and relying on its nuclear second-strike capability. Although an operational
missile defense system is years away, this is certainly a first step in changing the nuclear balance
between India and Pakistan. In addition, India‘s Cold Start doctrine and military purchases signify
the increasing conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan. These developments reinforce
stability/instability paradox in the region.
Absence of Arms Control between India and Pakistan
The intellectual and political movements in favor of a nuclear-weapon-free South Asia suffer
from unconvincing rationales, inherent contradictions, and unrealistic expectations. They have failed
to bring about any shift in the perceptions of India-Pakistan nuclear optimists. Hence, the vertical
proliferation of nuclear capabilities is inevitable in India and Pakistan due to the emerging South
Asian regional security architecture. Indeed, Islamabad proposed to New Delhi a nuclear restraint
regime with a concrete proposal to prevent missile race between them. Unfortunately, India-Pakistan
belligerency and New Delhi‘s obsession with regional superiority have prevented New Delhi and
Islamabad from chalking out a bilateral arms control agreement. India‘s Cold Start Doctrine and
missile defense program further minimized the possibility of an arms control arrangement between
The Essay on Life Magazine cover depicting India-Pakistan War
The dispute over this region originated in the process of decolonization in South Asia. When the British colony of India gained its independence in 1947, it was partitioned into two separate entities: the secular nation of India and the predominantly Muslim nation of Pakistan. Pakistan was composed of two noncontiguous regions, East Pakistan and West Pakistan, separated by Indian territory. The ...
India and Pakistan. The strategic calculations indicate that the fattening of one party‘s military
muscle obliges the other party to take equal actions in order to solidify its defensive fence.
India has been economically rising and politically pursuing great power stature in the global politics. It feels insecure
due to Pakistan‘s potential to exacerbate intra-state conflicts within India by supporting the Indian radical groups.
Simultaneously, it is strategically afraid of China despite having immense bilateral trade volume between India and China.
6 The United States played a very constructive role in defusing tension in summer 1990, Kargil conflict 0f 1999, 2001 2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan.
7 China would be a peer competitor of United States. Peter Toft, ―John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between
geopolitics and power,‖ Journal of International Relations and Development, 8 (2005), pp. 381–408: 397.
8 India conducted the first test of its tactical ballistic missile Prahaar having 150 km range on July 21, 2011. It is capable
to carry a 200 kg conventional warhead and can be fired in salvoes of six independently targeted missiles.
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Minimum Deterrence: Unconvincing
Both New Delhi and Islamabad reiterate credible minimum deterrence doctrines.
Theoretically, minimum deterrence offer clarity, but practically, it is more intangible. The inbuilt
abstraction in the concept does not only defy the literal meaning of minimum deterrence, but also
creates a space for the strategic alarmists‘ fascination with the worst case scenario in the strategic
discourse. Therefore, instead of adopting a minimalist approach, India and Pakistan have been
executing ‗maximal‘ deterrence doctrines, which continuously build up their nuclear arsenals
qualitatively and quantitatively. The gradual fattening of India and Pakistan nuclear muscle
immensely dented the strategic notion that ‗nuclear deterrence is not about numbers.‘ India‘s nuclear
devices, offensive and defensive missiles, conventional arms development, and procurement
manifest that it has no faith in the mere possession of nuclear capability at the limited scale, and
The Essay on Indias Nuclear Weapons
This event is in the news because a country violated a law that the entire world agreed on not doing anymore. India have always wanted to become nuclear, and their wish came true. They accepted their consequences of being nuclear, but they are happy. It's neighboring country Pakistan and India have had two wars, and always competed to be the best, and so far India is winning, because India have ...
thereby it has been very much uncomfortable in the strategic environment constructed by the
balance of power (?) due to the nuclearization of belligerent neighbors in May 1998. New Delhi‘s
endeavor to overcome its prevalent strategic anxiety necessitates Pakistan to adopt certain measures
for the sustainability of the status quo, i.e. strategic equilibrium between India and Pakistan. These
measures defy the philosophy of minimum deterrence that prevents arms race between the strat egic
competitors.
Cold Start Doctrine: Limited War with Impunity
India declassified its new military doctrine—Cold Start Doctrine— on April 28, 2004.9 This new
doctrine marked a break from the fundamentally defensive orientation that the Indian military has
employed since independence in 1947.10 It visualized a tri-service doctrine, which necessitates
restructuring of the Indian Army and reorganizing the Indian Army‘s offensive power away from the
three large strike corps into eight smaller division-sized ―integrated battle groups‖ (IBGs) that
combine mechanized infantry, artillery, and armor.11 The eight battle groups would be prepared to
launch multiple strikes into Pakistan along different axes in advance to destroy its defensive and
offensive corps.12 The ground operations of the IBGs require integration with close air support from
the Indian Air Force and naval aviation assets to provide highly mobile fire support. 13 In addition,
the holding corps would be redesignated as ―pivot corps‖ and would be bolstered by additional
armor and artillery. This would allow them to concurrently man defensive positions and undertake
limited offensive operations as necessary.14 The major emphasis of Cold Start is on the speed of
both deployment and operations to multiply its war fighting capability against Pakistan. Zachary
Davis opined: ―Under Cold Start, India would conduct quick, punishing strikes into Pakistan,
hopefully without crossing Pakistan’s fuzzy redlines for a nuclear response. The vague redlines
include cutting off a major supply route, seizing key territory, defeating a major Pakistani military
group, or blockading Karachi with Indian naval forces. Indian planners believe they can achieve a
Firdaus Ahmed, ―The Day After ‘Cold Start‘,‖ Military – Articles, No. 2424, Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies,
November 23, 2007. http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/the-day-after-cold-start-2424.html, accessed on July 16, 2010.
10 Walter C. Ladwig III, ―A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army‘s New Limited War Doctrine,‖ International
Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007/08, p. 158.
11 Ibid., p. 164.
12 It appears that the goal would be to have three to five IBGs entering Pakistani territory within seventy -two to ninetysix hours from the time the order to mobilize is issued. Ibid., p. 165
13 Ibid., p. 164.
14 Walter C. Ladwig III, ―A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army‘s New Limited War Doctrine,‖ International
Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007/08, p. 165.
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quick military victory and sue for peace without Pakistan resorting to nuclear weapons.‖15 New
Delhi‘s doctrinal shift alarmed the policy-makers in Pakistan, and thereby they were obliged to take
conventional and nuclear countermeasures.
The review of Indian military field exercises since 2005 and organizational developmen ts within
India‘s military manifests that Indian armed forces have been endeavoring to institutionalize the
operational capability of the Cold Start Doctrine. For instance, in May 2006, Indian armed forces
conducted the Sanghe Shakti (Joint Power) exercise, which brought together strike aircraft, tanks,
and over 40,000 soldiers from the 2nd Strike Corps in a war game near the Pakistani border. General
Daulat Shekhawat, Commander of the Corps, when explaining the purpose of the exercise, stated
―to test our 2004 war doctrine to dismember a not so friendly nation effectively and at the shortest
possible time.‖16 He added that: ―We firmly believe that there is room for a swift strike even in case
of a nuclear attack and it is to validate this doctrine that we co nducted this operation.‖17On
December 29, 2009, General Deepak Kapoor, India‘s Army Chief stated, ―A major leap in our
approach to conduct of operations (since then) has been the successful firming-up of the cold start
strategy (to be able to go to war promptly).‖18 The Cold Start Doctrine would give India an
opportunity to keep military operation at the level of limited war. The limited war can be evaluated
by four parameters: time, geography, weaponry used, and objectives sought. P. R. Chari pointed out:
The Cold Start strategy, which seeks to call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff with limited
offensives, provides all corps with offensive capability and upgrades the role of
Special Forces. The tactical objectives may include a rapid shallow invasion,
destroying terrorist infrastructure or Pakistani military assets, or hot pursuit of
militants – all limited objectives. The strategic objective would be to get India out of
its post-1998 ‗strategic box‘ of being deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from
acting against Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir.‖19
Ironically, the Indian strategic community has been debating the advantages of Cold Start
Doctrine, rather than the specific conditions that produce the destabilizing characteristics of Cold
Start operational plan — the need for prompt mobilization, the immediate attack on Pakistan, and
the plan to knock Pakistani nuclear capable armed forces out of the war before international
community mobilizes and intervenes in the crisis. These destabilizing features not only unleash a
deadly arms race, but intensify security dilemma between the nuclear capable belligerent neighbors.
Zachary Davis, ―Stepping Back from the Brink: Avoiding a Nuclear March of Folly in South Asia,‖ Arms Control Today,
January/February, 2009.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_01-02/stepping_back_from_the_brink. accessed on July 16, 2010.
16 This exercise took place near Pakistan border. A.H. Nayyar and Zia Mian, ―The Limited Military Utility of Pakistan‘s
Battlefield Use of Nuclear Weapons in Response to Large Scale Indian Conventional Attack,‖ Pakistan Security
Research Unit (PSRU), Brief No. 61, November 11, 2010, p. 3.
17 Ibid.
18 Rajat Pandit, ―Army Reworks War Doctrine for Pakistan, China,‖ The Times of India, December 30, 2009.
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-12-30/india/28104699_1_war-doctrine-new-doctrine-entire-westernfront, accessed on September 18, 2011.
19 Prof PR Chari, ―Limited War Under the Nuclear Shadow in South Asia,‖ in Arzan Tarapore, Report of the seminar
presenting key findings of the USIP report held on January 19, 2005 at the IPCS conference room, Military – Articles, No.
1623, Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, January 29, 2005.
http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/limited-war-under-the-nuclear-shadow-in-south-asia-1623.html, accessed on July
17, 2010.
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Pakistan’s Strategic Anxiety & Countermeasures
The Cold Start Doctrine necessitates the integrated groups‘ deployment and mobilization into
‗highly mobile formations‘ on hair-trigger alert for launching limited war. The speed and efficiency
of a military force’s Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loop would disrupt
Pakistan‘s decision cycle, allowing the Indian Army to change the ground reality fast enough to leave
Pakistan Army constantly reacting to an inadequate understanding of the situation. The key is
maintaining the initiative, continually disorienting the enemy through rapid and unpredictable
change in tactics. The ultimate result should be strategic paralysis of the enemy, so that it is blind,
disoriented, confused, and incapacitated, thereby offering a faster and more efficient way of fighting
and winning a conventional war.20 If the Cold Start Doctrine operational plans are materialized in
the future, it could pose the following strategic challenges to Pakistan:
1. India‘s ―surprise‖ factor in terms of when, where, and how a ―Cold Start‖ battle group
would be launched. Indians believe that the element of surprise would be achieved.
2. Fighting the air battle in an environment where the IAF has significant superiority in terms
of numbers and quality of numerical strength. The Pakistan Air Force would be knocked
out.
3. Devising a credible anti-ballistic missile defense. Pakistan‘s ballistic and cruise missile strikes
would be defied.
4. Re-constitution of Pakistan‘s ―strike corps‖ and its three ‗Army Reserve‘ formations, which
were so far configured and located to take on India‘s three ―Strike Corps‖.
5. Having eight IBG (rather than three) units capable of offensive action significantly increases
the challenge for Pakistani intelligence‘s limited reconnaissance assets to monitor the status
of all the IBGs, improving the chance of achieving surprise.
The preceding assumptions raise a few questions about when and how Pakistan‘s nuclear
deterrent and its doctrine of ―First Use‖ come into play. How can Pakistan offset India‘s
overwhelming long range artillery fire support? How can it counter India‘s force projection
capabilities deep in Pakistan‘s rear? The aforementioned perceived and real threats necessitate that
Pakistan revise its nuclear strategy
Islamabad seems very sensitive to India‘s Cold Start Doctrine, especially after General Kap oor‘s
expression of confidence in India‘s new doctrine. On January 13, 2010, the National Command
Authority (NCA) of Pakistan declared that it had taken ―serious note of recent Indian statements
about conducting conventional military strikes under a nuclear umbrella.‖ It added that ―such
irresponsible statements reflected a hegemonic mindset, oblivious of dangerous implications of
adventurism in a nuclearized context …. General Parvez Kayani, Pakistan‘s Chief of Army Staff,
stated on January 1, 2010: ―Proponents of conventional application of military forces, in a nuc lear
overhang, are chartering an adventurous and dangerous path, the consequences of which could be
Arzan Tarapore, ―The New Army Doctrine in Limited War,‖ Nuclear – Articles, No. 1588, Institute of Peace &
Conflict Studies, December 2004. -new-army-doctrine-in-limited-war1588.html, accessed on July 18, 2010.
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both unintended and uncontrollable.‖21 These statements manifest Pakistan‘s resolution to respond
to the Cold Start Doctrine militarily.
The Pakistani Army conducted substantial war-readiness exercises, codenamed ―Azme-eNau III‖ (New Resolve), from April 10 – May 15, 2010. It involved more than 50,000 troops. It
started in the Bahawalpur desert area of South Punjab and culminated in Northern Sindh. The
exercise was held contextually in the backdrop of India‘s Cold Start Doctrine. The geographical
extent of this exercise manifests that Pakistan is very much sensitive to the Indian Cold Start
Doctrine and its armed forces are militarily capable of repealing India‘s offensives emanating from
latter‘s Cold Start Doctrine. Second, newly-inducted F-16 C/D Block 52 aircraft stationed at
upgraded the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Base Shahbaz at Jacobabad, Province Sind. These fighter jets
provide PAF all-weather precision attack capability day and night in the Southern theater.22
The preceding discussion underscores that Islamabad has been strategically vigilant and
systematically responding to the Indian Cold Start Doctrine. The countermeasures do have
limitations because of Pakistan‘s economic situation. Its weapons purchasing power from the
international market has drawbacks. It seems that the Azme-e-Nau military exercise was very
significant for revising Pakistan‘s nuclear posture. It may have exposed Pakistan‘s conventional and
nuclear limitations against the gradual modernization of the Indian armed forces. For instance,
hypothetically speaking, it seems that without the possession of tactical nuclear weapons, and
without the option of a flexible, measured, and proportionate response, Pakistan was faced with the
grim option of either calling for a massive and suicidal attack against Indian cities in response to
India‘s limited conventional aggression or surrendering. Indeed, these limitations necessitated the
revision of nuclear posture and necessitated the introduction of a new generation of weapon s in the
Pakistani nuclear arsenal.
Pakistan‘s nuclear doctrine speaks of minimum deterrence and a last resort. Would it be
credible for Pakistan to stick with the last resort? Or should the doctrine prescribe a graded and
proportional punitive retaliation option. Presently, however, a very important link is missing in
Pakistan‘s nuclear strategy, i.e. tactical nuclear weapons development and deployment. Though it
sounds jingoistic-alarming, it is a reality. Pakistan will come under increasing pressure to rely on its
nuclear arsenal for self-defense due to India‘s unrestrained military buildup. Moreover, Pakistan has
not foreclosed its tactical weapons option due to following factors:
Pakistan retains a robust nuclear arsenal to provide deterrence against nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons. Its nuclear weapons also guard Pakistan‘s national interest from
the conventional superiority of the adversary. It could develop in the future low-yieldbattle field nuclear weapons to solidify its defensive fence or to tackle the eventualities
sprouting due to increasing conventional asymmetries between India and Pakistan.
The quantitative and qualitative gradual upgrading in both conventional and nuclear
weapons remains the priority of the Pakistani armed forces. During the improvement of
armed forces arsenals, policy-makers ought to remain vigilant about the repercussions of
the defense industry on the country‘s socio-economic development. That is very
Iftikhar A. Khan, ―Tough Kayani warning to proponents of adventurism,‖ Dawn, January 2, 2010.
http://iaoj.wordpress.com/2010/01/03/kayanis-tough-warning-to-india/, accessed on September 18, 2011.
22 ―PAF to use F-16s as it wishes,‖ The News International, June 28, 2010.
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important because Indians believe that they would win against Pakistan by using the
‗arms-race‘ as a weapon of war. This hidden component of the Indian Cold Start
Doctrine, i.e. strategy of economic exhaustion/collapse, ought to be carefully
considered. The perfect balance between both the sectors (economic and military)
ensures the sustainable increment in the armed forces power.
TNW: Hatf IX—NASR
Pakistan successfully conducted the first flight test of the newly developed, short range
surface-to-surface multi-tube ballistic missile, Hatf IX (NASR) on April 19, 2011. The Inter-Services
Public Relations (ISPR) press release revealed: ―the NASR missile, with a range of 60 km, carries
nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy and shoot-&-scoot attributes.‖23
Importantly, the range and nuclear warhead characteristics of the NASR missile indicate that it may
be a tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) that could be used in the battlefield. Though its exact yield,
deployment location, and rank of the custodian in the battlefield were not announced, the
perception persists that its warhead would be low-yield.
Director General of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Lieutenant General (Retired) Khalid
Ahmed Kidwai, announced Pakistan‘s test of NASR. He stated that: ―the test was a very important
milestone in consolidating Pakistan‘s strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat
spectrum.‖ He added: ―that in the hierarchy of military operations, the NASR Weapon System now
provides Pakistan with short range missile capability in addition to the already available medium and
long range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in its inventory.‖24 Indeed, General Kidwai declared
NASR missile as a short range missile but refrained to call it a tactical nuclear weapon. This raised a
question whether we call NASR a TNW. It is because of the simple range and the nature of the
payload that the missile cannot be used as a yardstick to make a distinction between tactical and
strategic weapons. Despite all of the anonymities, can we consider NASR as a TNW due to its short
range, nuclear warhead, and shoot-&-scoot attributes in the following discussion. This issue drives
our attention towards the question how one can catalog or make a distinction between the weapons.
In the lexicon of weapons, nuclear weapons are cataloged into two categories: ‗tactical
nuclear weapons‘ and ‗strategic nuclear weapons.‘25 Generally, it is said that the tactical nuclear
weapons are those weapons which are designed for use against tactical targets on the battlefield or in
a theater of war. 26 In peacetime, making this distinction is simple, but during war, the division is
Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‗Press Release,‘ 19 April 2011.
ISPR, ‗Press Release‘, 19 April 2011. See also, Anita Joshua, ‗Pakistan tests short -range ballistic missile‘, The Hindu,
April 19, 2011. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article1709352.ece (24 April 2011).
25 The strategic weapons are typically targeted on the enemy country‘s homeland — on targets varying from leadership
centers to cities to nuclear missile silos. In addition, many tactical weapons were designed to be used against mobile
targets while strategic weapons are almost exclusively intended to be delivered to predetermined geographic points.
George lewis & Andrea Gabbitas, ―What Should be Done About Tactical Nuclear Weapons? Occasional Paper
(Washington D.C. The Atlantic Council of the United States, March 1999), pp. 2 -3.
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24
There is sometimes a distinction made between theater and tactical nuclear weapons. Shorter -range weapons (those
with ranges of a few tens of kilometers) have been referred to as tactical weapons while longer -range nonstrategic
weapons were called theatre weapons. The United States and Russian Federation TNW inventories today include long range land-attack sea-launched cruise (SLCMs) and air-deliverable bombs. Notably, the long-range nuclear SLCMs, have
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tricky because the TNW could be delivered against a strategic target during the war. The possibility
of the use of the TNW on the battlefield as well as against strategic targets brings into calculation
the significance of the intentions of the employer of nuclear weapon. The intention is an intangible
determinant; therefore, one needs to take into account the other characteristics of the weapon while
cataloging the nuclear weapon. Thus, in addition to the intentions of the employer, four factors—
range and payload capacity of delivery vehicle; yield of device; geographical location or deployme nt
area of weapon; and the nature of the command—serve as the basis for cataloging the nuclear
weapon. For example, the general understanding is that the weapon intended for the battlefield
always has shorter-range and lighter-payload carrying delivery vehicle. The lighter-payload capacity
of vehicle automatically limits the yield of the warhead. Moreover, the battlefield weapon is
supposed to be deployed in the battlefield and it is in the command of the local commander during
the crisis. In this case the National Command Authority delegates the power of the use to the local
commander.27
Hypothetically speaking, the NASR missile would be used to deter or inflict punishment on
mechanized forces such as the armored brigades and divisions envisaged in India‘s Cold Start
Doctrine. In addition, the successful test of the NASR missile indicates that Pakistan has succeeded
scientifically in miniaturizing its nuclear weapon designs to the extent that these can be launched by
tactical and cruise missiles.28 It seems that there would be shells for artillery guns carrying atomic
explosives deployed on the India-Pakistan border. More precisely, Pakistani defensive formation
would be capable of using nuclear strikes to annihilate the adversary‘s advancing rapid
cavalry/armored thrust in the Southern desert theatre or taking advantage of the short distance from
the border to takeover Lahore.29
TNW: Invulnerability vs. Vulnerability
The Grand Strategy constituted to encourage covert war or limited conventional conflicts is
perilous for deterrence stability between the belligerent states. The tactical weapons surfacing in
South Asia may purge these tactics from the grand strategies of India and Pakistan. This optimistic
conclusion about the constructive role of tactical nuclear weapons has been strongly questioned on
the premise that battlefield weapons increase the possibility of use of small nuclear weapons. This
undesirable trend—proliferation of tactical nuclear weapons in South Asia— necessitates that we
think rationally in order to chalk out a strategy to avoid the nuclear land combat operations in the
future.
The likely modernization of tactical weapons will blur the line between conventional and
nuclear weapons by making the use of nuclear capability a feasible option. In addition, the
ranges well over a thousand kilometers and have characteristics similar to some types of strategic weapons. The Russian
stockpile also includes ship-attack SLCMs, air-launched anti-ship weapons, torpedoes, airdefense weapons, artillery
shells, short-range ballistic missiles, and possibly land mines. George lewis & Andr ea Gabbitas, ―What Should be Done
About Tactical Nuclear Weapons? Occasional Paper (Washington D.C. The Atlantic Council of the United States, March
1999), p. 2.
27 It can be a unit commander, i.e. in Pakistan Army Lt. Colonel.
28 Ahmed, Mansoor, ―Why Pakistan needs tactical nuclear weapons,‖ The Weekly Pulse, May 6, 2011.
, accessed on September 16, 2011.
29 It is illogical to draw an analogy with NATO vs WARSAW pact deployments and use of nuclea r weapons during the
Cold War with India-Pakistan. The vulnerability of Americans was lesser because WARSAW deployments were not
directly threatening United States heartland. Whereas, Lahore, the second biggest city of Pakistan is in the range of
Indian Artillery. Therefore, Pakistan needs weapons, to prevent both blackmailing and aggression.
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introduction of TNW would increase chances of accidental, unauthorized, and inadvertent use of
nuclear weapons. Conversely, the proponents of the TNW opine that the fallout of even a small
nuclear weapon makes its use unwise and therefore, the nuclear weapon states ensure their safety
and security and also do their best to avoid the use of TNW. They are also convinced that battlefield
nuclear capability could lead to the shunning of conventional limited war or operations and low
intensity tactics from the grand strategies of both India and Pakistan.
The endeavor to negotiate a comprehensive arms control agreement to prevent both nuclear
and conventional arms races between India and Pakistan does not discount the utility of tactical
nuclear weapons in the defensive arrangements of Pakistan in the prevalent military asymmetries
between the belligerent neighbors. Brodie pointed out: ―It is nonsense to hold that a force trained
and equipped to fight conventionally–even though it has some essentially unusable nuclear weapons
behind it –makes a better deterrent than one of comparable size trained and equipped to fight from
the beginning with nuclear weapons designed exclusively for tactical use‖.30
It is a realistic calculation that without tactical nuclear weapons, the strategic
stability/instability paradox cannot be replaced with strategic stability/stability steadiness. Hence, the
NASR missile adds to deterrence stability. It is because Pakistan‘s conventional muscle has been
gradually losing its defensive punch/guard that a force-multiplier response from the Pakistani
defense planners is needed. The weakening of the conventional fence encourages adversaries to
initiate limited blackmailing or adventurous military operations which are prone to risk escalation.
More precisely, the threat of tactical nuclear weapon use will deter limited war between India and
Pakistan.
Conclusion
India‘s doctrinal transformation and anti-missile development underscore that it is inclined
to maximize its relative power to punish or blackmail Pakistan. Meanwhile Pakistan‘s pursuit for a
tactical nuclear weapon is very much to maximize its security by sustaining and enduring the
prevalent strategic equilibrium with its eastern neighbor. Therefore, the argument that NASR missile
development, test, deployment, and operationalization would destabilize the deterrence stability
between India and Pakistan seems incorrect. The balancing dynamic of the NASR missile frustrates
or makes futile the power-maximizing strategy of India. Nevertheless, the constructive role of the
NASR missile in the deterrence stability does not undercut the negativity of the deployment and
operationalization of a NASR missile in the battlefield. Thus, it is imperative that India and Pakistan
negotiate and implement a bilateral comprehensive arms control treaty. The comprehensive arms
control treaty not only prevents the tactical weapons deployment in the subcontinent but also
promises deterrence stability between India and Pakistan.
30
Brodie, ―The Development of Nuclear Strategy,‖ 65-83.
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