The period between 1830-1931 saw significant extensions of the franchise in Britain. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a narrow elite held a dense concentration of both economic wealth and political power, with little sign of wanting to concede either. Certainly there had, until then, been no major electoral reform since 1432, when Henry VI franchised male owners of property worth 40 shillings – which, by the 1830s, allowed only 635,000 out of a population of 20 million to vote.
Bribery, intimidation and rotten boroughs, in which some MPs could be elected into seats with less than 100 voters whilst entire cities such as Manchester went unrepresented, were common. As Thomas Paine succinctly put it, “The man who is in the receipt of a million a year is the last person to promote a spirit of reform, lest, in the event, it should reach to himself. ”# Nevertheless, by the end of the period, suffrage had been extended to all men and women over the age of 21 in what some have called a ‘democratic revolution’. Five Reform Acts, passed in 1832, 1867, 1885, 1918, and 1928, had this effect, whilst other reforming Acts removed rotten boroughs and corruption, and implemented a secret ballot. That the democratic revolution occurred peaceably between 1830-1931 requires explaining, as it was certainly not the case in many other European countries, where revolution was an integral part of reform. “Only when the dusk begins to fall”, wrote Hegel, “does the owl of Minerva spread its wings and fly. ” He meant that a historical era could only be properly understood as it drew to an end.
The Essay on Demanded Reform Revolution Tsar Nicholas
... one of the driving forces behind the revolution was the urban workers. They demanded reforms regarding the terrible conditions they worked under. ... Tsar was unwilling to grant the much needed reforms the urban workers desperately wanted, revolution seems necessary (and likely to succeed) based ...
Today, with few more apparent changes in suffrage on the horizon, there is perhaps no better time to evaluate the era of history that gave us our current democratic settlement. That social unrest gripped the country during this period is hard to deny, but the abiding question asks: was the social unrest sufficient to catalyse democratisation? Indeed, why did the elites on these occasions take the vox populi to be vox dei? Was it fear of revolution that forced their hands were into placatory gestures, or were other factors at work? And was the ceding of power by the elites done willingly, or reluctantly, at the end of a musket barrel?
It can be said that the British ruling classes conceded power when, as E. P. Thompson wrote, “in the autumn of 1831 and in the ‘Days of May’ Britain was within an ace of revolution. “# In this case, the revolutionary threat was sufficient. However, for the other instances of reform, these occurred only as an indirect result of the threat of revolution. Despite the manifestations of unrest at these times, “most historians now accept that there was relatively little threat of general insurrection, at least on the British mainland” (Lee, 1994)#.
An environment of instability pervaded, but it was not enough in itself to bring about democratisation. For that, other factors must explain the phenomenon in process. The fear of revolution among the elites created the unstable context in which these other factors, minor by themselves, could have a more profound effect. Ultimately, it was the culmination of all these factors in varying degrees that ensured the continued evolution of democracy in Britain. According to Lee (1994), “An essential prerequisite for revolution is economic upheaval, usually exacerbated by war. # Indeed, the beginning of the nineteenth century saw Britain at war with France and in the throes of social and economic change. War brought with it higher taxation on staples such as salt, soap, leather, sugar, tea and candles. The economic blockade by Napoleon and European Decrees in 1806 closed European markets to British wool and cotton exports, worsening the economic situation of the poor; exacerbated further by Corn Laws. The Industrial Revolution introduced processes that increased productivity and profit, but little that the working class would benefit from, only serving to deepen dissatisfaction with the established order.
The Essay on Economic Factors In Shaping US Foreign Policies Between 1890 And 1917
American foreign policy changed drastically between 1890 and 1917, from isolationist to interventionist. This change was due to economic factors as well as several other important factors. Many of these were factors outside of US control, but many of them were influenced by people or events in the USA. Big business is one economic factor that influenced US foreign policy. The business giants like ...
This dissatisfaction manifested itself in the Pentrich Uprising (see source A), the Peterloo Massacre and the Cato Street Conspiracy, hotly followed by the oppressive ‘Six Acts’, all signifying the revolutionary mood at the time. As Moore (1966) wrote: “The gathering movement to reform Parliament was placed outside the law, the press muzzled, associations that smacked of radicalism forbidden, a rash of treason trials initiated, spies and agents provocateurs let loose among the people, the Habeas Corpus suspended after the war with Napoleon had ended. # Britain, at the turn of the nineteenth century, satisfied both of Lee’s qualifications, and yet did not turn to revolution. Some might say: not for lack of trying. In 1829, no petitions for reform were brought to Parliament. A year later, in 1830, there were 645. Also in 1830, the reformist and radical, Henry Hunt, was elected to Parliament in Preston, having failed twice before. Agitation, sabotage, riots, strikes and rick-burning were all common. Then, when the House of Lords threw out a reform bill introduced by the Whigs, the situation became mercurial.
In June 1831, protests sparked, notably In Merthyr Tydfil where 24 people were killed and 70 wounded by soldiers dispatched by the Home Secretary to enforce order. This ‘Merthyr Rising’ was to be a violent high-point to years of simmering unrest; and with the protesters carrying banners bearing the single word, ‘Reform’, they gave voice to their indignation. When a second reforming bill was thrown out of the Upper House in October, several English cities were engulfed in flames. In Nottingham, the castle of the Duke of Newcastle was burnt to the ground.
Rioters roamed the streets of Derby for days, releasing prisoners and sacking buildings. In Bristol, also, armed insurrection occurred and several buildings were burned, whilst effigies of the Tory leader, the Duke of Wellington, and other reactionaries were burned. According to the MP and historian, Baron Macaulay, quoted in Source F, as well as the Whig leader, Lord Earl Grey, quoted in Source D, revolution was an explicit threat that could only be defused by parliamentary reform.
Industrial Revolution Source-Based Essay
Source A tells us how many of the injuries that occurred in the factories were from working with the various machines. “One hospital reported that every year it treated nearly a thousand people for wounds and mutilations caused by machines in factories. ” What also took place is that after the machines injured a worker said machine would not be inspected or adjusted to be less harmful. “There are ...
With this, it seems natural to assume that reform was a direct response to the threat of revolution, particularly if the political rhetoric of radicals like Macaulay is to be believed. And yet, the steward of the Bill, Lord John Russell, quoted in Source E, insisted that ‘I deny altogether that the measure would have the effect of rendering the House a democratic assembly – what I propose will not one jot advance democracy’. Then, if it was not for democracy that Russell advanced the Bill, the question remains: what was the Bill intended to achieve?
Perhaps this can be read as an instant in which the elites reformed to survive, innovating a concession in order to placate the revolutionary threat. Macaulay later corroborates this in Source F. This suggests that democratisation did indeed occur on account of the fear of revolution, at least in 1832. The orthodox view, held by those such as E. P. Thompson, supports this conclusion, further suggesting that without reform in 1832 there would almost certainly have been widespread revolution.